(TRANSLA TlON) THE FACTS The facts of the case as su bmitted by the parties may be s ummarised as follows . The applicant, a French national born in 1 922, is currently unemployed and resides in Paris . He is represented in the proceedings bzfore the Commission by Mr . Jean and Ms . Corinne Imbach , lawyers practising in Strasbourg. After he had passed the examination for traince inspectors of direct taxes in 1949 and had subsequently been confirmed in the rank of inspector by order of 25 April 1951 , the applicant was assigned to the office of the Di rector of Direct Taxation in the département of Moselle. Following his transfer to the Paris area on I July 1952, the applicant occ upied successively, over a pe riod of several years, the posis of exam iner and divisional inspector in the former département of Seine-et- Oise and Seine. The applicant was promoted to the rank of central inspector of taxes by o rder of 29 June 1 964 and, after worki ng for some mo nths in vxrious units answerable to the Directorate of Fiscal Services for Paris-West, the applicant was vansferred on 1 September 1975, a t his own re quest, to the top position in the Inspecto rate of Direct Taxes of Arcueil (Val-de-Marne), a post which he occupied until he was suspended from his duties on 19 July 1 978 . 28 It appears that at the end of May 1978, the administratiods attention was drawn to the professional ronduct of the applicant in the context of an investigation by the customs a uthorities of a certain L., a director of com panies and planning offices in Paris . Having been asked to report without delay to the office of the Director of Fiscal Serv ices, the applicant received from the latter , on 5 June 1978, a letter o f Ihe prev ious 23 May informing him of the opening of an administrative inquiry against him and temporarily relieving him of h is duties, with no loss of remuneration or promotion entitlement . Subseque ntly, the applicant was suspended from his duties by n Ministerial llecree of 10 July 1978 which look effect on 1 3 July 1978, the date of notification to the person concerned . On 8 September 1 978, follow ing a complaint lodged with the Public Prosecutor at the Paris Regional Court (tribunal de grande instance), a criminal investigation was opened in respect of the applicant on the ground of acceptance of bribes by a civi l servant. The applicant was not charged with this offence by the investigating judge until 22 September 1978, that is to say four months after his suspension, and he was immediately renianded in custudy . The applicant's suspension was terminated by an order of 16 October 1 978, having been ren dered "purpose l ess", acco rding to the administration, as n resuit of his iniprisoninent . The applicant found it necessary to lodge two successive appeals with the Admini strative Court of Paris, the first on 74 July 1978 and the second on 10 August 1 978, in which he called for the annulment - un the grounds of ultra vires - of the decision of 23 M ay 1978 by the Di rector of Fiscal Serv ices for Val-de-M arne and Ihe M inisterial Decree of 10 Ju ly 1 978 by which he had been suspended from his Cunctions. The legal basis for the mi nisterial decision is Anicle 30 of the Order of 4 February 1959 laying down the general conditions of employment of civil servan ts. This Article lists the different possible disciplinary sanctions including, in subp aragraph (j), °dismissal with suspznsion of pension rig hts" . In support of his first appeal , the applicant maintained inter alia thal ihe deci- sion of the Director of Fiscal Services for Val-de-Marne was nothing short of a suspension measure which that official had no authority to take. In suppon of his second a ppeal the appl icant also claimzd that the Decree of 10 July 1 978 had bern signed by an authority lacking jurisdiction, in as much as the Director General of Taxes had no legal au[horiry, according to the appli cant, to delegate to the head of the personncl division of the General Directorate of Taxes, 29 who had signed the decision complained of, a prerogat ive which he did not possess in his own right and which he exercised by virtue of a ministerial delegation ot signature . Furthermore, the applicant argued that the two impugned dec isions also deserved to be annulled because they made no reference to serious misco nduct which, under the terms of Article 32 of the General Cond itions of Employme nt of Civil Servants, was the only possible justifica tion for a suspension measure . Before the Administrative Court, the administration submitted that the applicant's two appeals should be rejected . It was on the basis of the complaint lodged on 8 September 1 978 by the Minister for the Budget, alleg ing acceptance of bribes by a civil servant, that the applicant was sentenced by the Paris Regional Court on 22 June 1979 to a term of imprisonment of three years, with 18 months suspended, a nd to payment of a fine of 30,000 FF, as well as deprivation tbr a period of 18 yea rs of the rights enumerated in A rticle 42 of the Criminal Code. The applicant did not appeal against this judgment. Following his release, the appli cant wa s once ag ain suspended fr om his dutie s by vinu e of an order of 6 August 1979. In a note dated 27 August 1979, the central administration had made known its decision to commence disciplinary proceedings against the applicant . The disciplinary counci l , or more precisely joi nt administrative commSttee No. 2 of the extcmal service of the Genera l Directorate of Taxes, meeting as a discipli nary body, expressed its opinion on 30 October 1979. This opin ion went against the applicant and the penalty of dismissal with suspension of pension rights was subsequently imposed on him by a Ministerial Decree of 4 December 1979, on the ground that he had been guilty of a dereliction of duty for financial gain . The appl icant lodged a thi rd appeal on 4 February 1980, this time against the decision of 4 December 1979 by which the Minister fo r the Budget had ordered his dismissal with suspension of his pension rights. He alleged in particular that the discipl inary decision in question was based exelusively on the reasons for a decision by the criminal court whereas the applicant had always contes(ed the facts found, that the said decision had also failed to take into account t he autonomy of the disciplina ry regulations applicable to c ivil servants and of criminal law and that the Minister had contented himself with merely refe rring to the opinion of the joint administrative committee . The Administrative Court of Paris heard the three appeals and, in a decision of 20 March 1981, rejected them . l0 The applicant appealed against this decision to the Conseil d 'Etat, which on 22 December 1982 gave a decision rejecting the applicant's appeaL This was notified on 2 February 1983 . Fi nally, in response to a re quest by the Commission for additional information on questions of fact, the parties provided the following details : - the amounts deducted from the applicant's salary from the date of his establishment in the Civil Service to the date of his dismissa l by Ministerial Decree of 4 Deceniber 1979 to talled 42 .5 I 2 .47 FF : - if the applicant's dismissal had not been accompanied by the suspension of his pension rights, he would have been able to lay claim , on the date of his official d isestxblishment, to a pension for which the date of eligibility would have been deferred to his 60th birthday, on 20 August 1982 . In view of his 36 years a nd 25 days of effective civilian and military service, together with an additional two years and nine months of active service benefit, the applicant would have obtained a pension eyuivalent to 68% of the salary indicated by the gross index of 780 on the salary scale, corresponding to the grade of Central Inspector of Taxes, 9th slep. At 20 August 1982, the pension in question would have been fixed at 89,604 .96 PF per annum . It would have amo unted to 114,441 .28 FF per anmom since 1 March 1987. His wife currenil y receives the sum of 4,768 .38 FF per month, which is one hnlf of (he above-mentioned amo unt : - the amount of the monthly pension to which the applicant would have been entitled (rale of 50%) al I September 1987 (the first day of the month following his 65th birthday), if he had been retroactively affilia[ed to the general social security scheme, would have been 3,752.63 FF. COMPLAINTS The applicant's complain[s may be sumtnarised as follows : The applicant ' s principal allegatinn concerns the violation of Article 6. but he alsu alleges violations uf Articles 7 and 8 of the Convéntion and Artiele 1 of P roiocol No. 1 . He considers that he was not given a fair hearing by either the discipl inary auihorities or the administrati ve courts, which did no more than ratify the decision taken by the criminal court, that is to say the Regional Court of Paris, in imposing a diseiplinary sanction . In particular, the rights of the defence were not safeguarded. The applicant relies on A nicles 7 and 8 of the Convention and Article 1 of Prutocol No. l , inasmuch as this case involved the suspension of pension rights already acquired by the applicant . 'Chis suspension of pension rights can be defined as having the effect of an expropriation without compensation since it invoives a deprivation of acquired rights with no reimbursement of paid contributions . 31 To sum up, the appl icant is currently deprived of a ll means of suppott. He is not receiving any pens ion. In the eyes of the Administration, the applicant is practically deceased. His wife draws 50% of the pension which he ought to receive from the Adm inistra[ion. THE LAW The applicant complains ol the decisio n by wh ich th e Minister for the Budget orde red his dismissal, with suspensio n of pensio n rig hts, from the post he occupied within the tax admi nistration, and alleges i n this co nnection a viola tion of Article 6 para . 1 and Articles 7 a nd 8 of the Convention and of Article 1 of Protocol No . 1 . I . As regards the com plai nts based o n Article 6 of the Convention, the a pp licant considers that he was den ied a fair hearing by bot h the d isci pli nary authorities and t he administra tive co urtc which, he claims, confined themselves to re lying on the rea sons given in the judgmem of the c rim ina l court as a bas is fo r th e disci pli nary sanctiun . Before the Commissio n, the a pplicant has argued ti rst of all that the disciplinary proceedings i n this case constituted an extension of the criminal procecdfngs, inasmuch as t he acceptance oC bribes by a civi l servant is an offence covered by Articles 117 et seq. oP the Criminal Code and that hc was b rought before the criminal coun on those grounds . Consequently, i n the applicant's v iew, a case cou ld indisputably be made out for the argument that the charges against him were c rim ina l in nalure. In addition, the applicant has asserted that this was a dispute concerning civ il righls and obligutiuns, inasmuch as the decisions of the ndm i nist rotive courts which ruled on his appeal were decis ive for h is right to receive a pension, a right which he considers to be of a private nature, goi ng beyond the bounds of a mere benefit, and thus constituting a civil right w ithin the meaning of the above-mentioned prov is ion of the Co nvention . In the Guvernment'~ view, the dispute is not covered by Ar ticle 6 of the Convention . On the one hand , it concerns disciplinary and a dministrative proceedings which incidentally gave rise to a criminal prosecution ; on the other hand, a dispute concerning ihe dismissal of a civil servant falls om side the scope of the above-mentioned provision of the Convention , and the suspension of pension rights is merely intended to abolish a be ncfit granted by the State to its p ublic servants in consideration of serv ices rendcred, without infringing a civ il right. On the assumption that Article 6 of the Convention applies to this case, the question which the Commission has to consider is whether the applicant was given a fair hearing within the meaning of that provision of the Convention . 32 The applicant complains essentially that the rights of Ihe defence were disregarded si nce the disciplinary sanction imposed on him by Ministerial Decree was based solely and exclusively on the reaso ns given in the decision handed down by the criminal court. It is true -- as is apparent from the decisions of the admini strative courts, in panicular the judgment of the Conseil d'Etat of 22 December 1982 - that the Decree by virtue of which the Minister for the Budget imposed on the appl icant the sanct ion of dismissal with suspension of his pension rights is based on the fact that the Paris Regional Court found him guilty of accepting bribes in his capacity as a civil servant and convicted him on those grounds, this being a form of misconduct which at the disciplinary level is defined as dereliction of duty for financial gain. However, t here is nothing in the file Io suggest Ihai the procedural guaramees set out in Article 6 of the Convention were not respected in the criminal proceedings. Moreover, the applicant does not dispute this fac[ before the Commission, nor did he dispute it in the domestic proceedings as he could have done by lodging an appeal against the judgmem uf the Paris Regional Court which had found him guilty and convicted him . The Commission notes in this regard that certain States - such as France - recognise the principle of the °binding effect of a judgment del ive red by a criminal court" . Accordi ng to this principle, in a"non-criminal " dispute based on the same facts as the criminal proceedings, the civil court must abide by the findings ot ihe criminal court, w hen such findings con~tiwted the " necessary support" for the latter's decis ion . In ihe present case, therefore, the Commission secs no grounds for criticism of the fact that the administrative co urt applied this principle. The Commission concludes from this that the fact thut the administrative courts based themselves on the existence of maierial facts established in the context of uncontested c riminal proceedings cannot infringe the principle of a fair hearing as defined in A rticle 6 para. I of the Convention . Moreover , there is nothing in the file to support the contention that the principle of a fair hearing was disrcgnrded in the proceedings before Ihe adm inislralive courts . It follows that the applicant's comp laints on this point are manifestly illfounded and must be rejected in accordance with Art icle 27 para . 2 of the Convention . 2. The applicant also main tains that the suspension of pension rights can be defined as liaving the e ffect of an expropriation without compensation, inasmuch as it involves a deprivation of acquired righls wilh no reimbursement of paid coniributions . He alleges thai this deprivatio n amounts to a depriva(ion o( property, and in this regard he relies on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, whic h reads as follows : "Every natural o r legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprivcd of his possess ions except in t he public z 1 interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law . The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties. " In the present case, the applicant was deprived of his pension rights on the basis of Article L58 of the Code on civilian and military retirement pensions, which provides that °the right to obtain or benefit from a pension or di sablement annuity shall be suspended : by dismissal with suspension of pension rights" . According to the Government, the deprivation of pension rights does not mean that the appl icant was partially dispossessed of his property. In th e lig ht of the arguments developed by ihe Government, it h as to be noted that, in th e abse nce o f dep endants, the administration is obliged to take steps ex officio to sec ure the retroac tive affiliatio n of a former civil serva nt to the general social security sc heme. In short, the procedure in such a case is o ne of tra nsfer from one social welfare sc heme to another. However, if the penalised civ il servan t has dependa nts, Art icle L60 of the pensions co de provides that , during the period of suspension, they shou ld rece ive a pensio n eq uiva lent ro 50% o f that w hich the persun concerned would have drawn, for the sake of ensuring their sub sistence. It shoWd be noted in this co nnection that the beneftt received by the dependent person is a direct offshoot of the rights acqui red b y the penalised civi l serva nt. This rule has worked to the benefit of the applicant 's wife who is wrrently receiv ing a pension on account of her husband. The appl icant vigorously d isputes the point of view expressed by the Government, as he considers that he has bee n deprived of his possession. He emphasises that a pension cannot today be considered as a benefit awarded at t he end of a career. In his view, it is a contractual e ntitlement , the basis of which lies in the contract under which the civ il servant is bound not to engage in any other activity, the contributions paid and the ded uctions from salary. The question whether the pension entitlement may be considered a possession within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 has already been examined by the Commission in earl ier cases (cf . No. 41 30/69, Dec . 20.7.71, Yearbook 14 pp . 224, 250). In that case, however, the Commission had concluded that A rticle 7 uC Protocol No. 1 was inapplicable beca use, under the domestic legislation, a person did not have, a t any given moment, an identifiable share in the fund claimable by him . The present case concerns a civil servant employed by the French administration whose pension is defined as a contractual right. However, this right is not unconditional. 34 lndeed, the right of ci vil servants to obtain a pens ion may be suspended under certain conditions lisied in the pensions code applicable Io them , includi ng cases where a civil servant is found guilty of offences connected with the exerc ise of his duties . It follows that the right to obtain a pens ion is a conditional right and that any civil servant may expect th is right tn be wiihdrawn when he is convicted of one of the above-mentioned offences. In this connection, the Commission refers, mutatis mutandis, to the reasoning it has adopted on several occasions in cases concerning the withdrawal of licences io engage in cenain economic activities. fl has found Ihat the graniing of such licences is often made subject lo certain condi tions and that they may be withdrawn if those conditions cease to be fulfilled, without prejudice to the property right of the licence-holder . In the Commissiods view, the licence-holder cannot be considered to have a legitimate a nd reasonable expectation of pu rsuing his activities if the condi tions for the grant o f ihe licence arc no longer f'ulfilled and iTthe wilhdrawal is effected in acco rdance with the legislation in force at the time the licence was granted (cf. No. 10438/83, Dec. 3. 10.84, D. R. 41 p. 170 ; and No . 10426/83, Dec . 5.12 .84, D. R. 40 p . 234). The Commission considers that a similar lin e of reaso ning is applica ble to the prese nt case. The applica nt w as co nvicted of an offence whi ch , unde r th e statutory prov isions i n force throughout the period of the applicant's serv ice, co uld have give n ri se to the wilhdrawal of his pe nsion entidemenL In v iew of the conditions auached to I hat e ntitleme nt, its suspensio n does not t herefore i nterfere with any property right proiccled unde r Article 1 of Prolocul No . I . It follows t hat this part of the applica tion is man ifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 27 para. 2 of the Conve ntion. 3 . Finally, as to Ihe remainder o f the application, namely Ihe alleged violat ion of Arti cles 7 and 8 of the Co nvem ion, the Commission no les t hat the applicant put s furward no argumen t capable of supportin g his co mpl aints. Consequently, the remai nder of the application must be rejected as manifestly ill-foun ded within the meaning of A rtic le 27 para . 2 o f the Convention . For these reasons, the Commi ssion DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSBLE. 35