(TRANSLATION) THE FACTS The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. The two applicants are American citizens residing in Allentown (Pennsylvania,, United States) . The first applicant is an attorney-at-law in Allentown and is the father of the second applicant . The latter, born in 1949, has no occupation . They are> represented before the Commission by Mr. Claude Serge Aronstein, a lawyer practising in Brussels . On 2 May 1975, the second applicant, at the time a medical student in Belgium ,wasinjuredinatraficacident . A collision between him, while he was riding a motorcycle, and Mr. V., driving a lorry with a trailer, had serious consequences for the second applicant . Efforts to obtain a friendly settlement of the matter failed, and the criminal investigation opened by the public prosecutor ("procureur du Roi") for the Louvain Judicial District was discontinued. By a summons of 13 September 1979 the applicants instituted civil proceedings on the basis of Articles 1382 and 1383 of the Civil Code -against Assurances Générales de France (hereinafter referred to as A .G.F .), as the insurers of Mr . V. , 110 to obtain the sum of 50 million esultins froni the accident . On 27 March 1979 the Brus dent in which the second applican snd carelessness on the part of M ôrdered A.G.F. to make an advat ~cant and of one franc to the firs I mainder, the Court appointed a Following an appeal by the a judgment dated 19 May 1981, Mr. V . had not been at fault . manoeuvre of Mr . V .'s vehiicle . francs in compensation for the injuries On 8 Septer>ber 1981 the a Cassation, Mr. J. Dassesse, appee alleged that the judgment failed to ily have seen the motorcycle and a way ihat he could see to the rig with their submission that the els Couit of First lnstance declared that the accirad been injured was a direct consequence of fault V ., insured by A.G.F. Consequently, thaCourt e payment of 100,000 îrancs to the second appliby way of damages . Before cleciding on the regal expert . company, Bntssels C'ourt of Appeal, in the plaintiffs' claim on the ground that cants, represeneed by counsel at the Court of to the Court of Cassation . In their appeal, they I with their subtnissions that Mr ., V. could e.ast his lorry should have been equipped in such They also claimed [nat the court had n.ot dealt ond applicant would not have foreseen th e Cn 20 November 1981 counseI for A .G.F. lodged a memorial in reply in wtiich the basis of the legal arguments advanced by the applicants was challenged . Gn 28 December 1981 Mr . Aronstein, representing the app] memorial . Although the lodging icle 1094 of the Judicial Code, tl missibi e iri view of the requireme also criticised the reference in the Courtof Cassation's case-law acr for judgments does not involve a constitute separate arguments" .asetoutinthei-memorial,cor i Article.s 6, 13, 14 and 18. . Dassesse, acting on the instrnetions of Mr . C.S. cants before the-C'ommission, lodged aîounter- 3f such a memorial was not provided foi in Att- : applicants explained that it was nevertheless adts of a fair hearing and the rigtds of defence . They above-nrentioned memorial in reply to the Belgian )rding to which "the obligation to provide reasons y obligation to reply to submi3sions which do not astly, they pointecl out that violations of the law, tituted violations of the Convention, inter ulta of On 14 October 1982 a public hearing was held before the F'irst Chamber of the Court of C'assation . The judge-rapForteur nrade his report at the hearing . Mr . Dassesse, when asked to speak, referred tb the terms of his appeal to the Court . Similarly, counsel for A .G .F. referred to h).s memorial in reply . Iinmediately afterw~ards, the Advocate General ("Avocat général"), Mr . Ballet, made oral submissions in favour of rejectina the appeal . The Court then reserved its judgtnent pending deliberations . 111 The same day, after deliberating in private in the presence of AdvocateGeneral, Ballet, the Court dismissed the appeal . In its judgment, it firstly declared that it could not take the counter-memorial into account. It considered in this connection that thé, legal bar on areply by the .appellant to the memorial of the respondent, except in, the case where the latter objected to the admissibility of the appeal, was not incom-" patible with the requirements of a fair hearing as set out in Article 6 of the Conven-, tion and, in particular, with the rights of defence embodied therein, as the parties were able to expound all their arguments on the subject-matter of the dispute in the memorials they were entitled to lodge. With regard to the arguments concerning a lack of reasons in support of the judgment, the Court, in examining each argument, considered that the judgment had replied to the submission that Mr. V. could easily have seen the motorcycle and tha tit(theCourt)wasnotobligedtoreplythesubmisionsconcerninglory's equipment, as these were now irrelevant . With regard to the submission that the second applicant could not have foreseen the manauvre of Mr . V.'s vehicle, the• Court considered that the decision contained in the judgment was legally justified and properly reasoned. COMPLAINTS The applicants' complaints may be summarised as follows . 1 . The applicants complain that the judgments of the Court of Appeal and the : Court of Cassation are not sufficiently reasoned either in terms of rigour or from the legal point of view. Comparing the length of their appeal submissions and their Court of Cassation memorial with the length of the judgments of both courts, they feel that in terms of sheer quantity the courts have not satisfied the requirements of Article 6 regarding a fair hearing. According to the applicants, the proper administration of justice requires that an appropriate, comprehensive and logical reply should be given to each of the grounds and arguments - both as to the law and as to the facts - put forward by each party . 2. The applicants also complain that the Court of Cassation, by refusing to consider their counter-memorial of 28 December 1981, ignored the provisions of Art-i icle 6 of the Convention, in particulaCthe principle of equality of arms . They argue, that the requirements of a fair hearing include the right for an appellant before th eCourtofCasationtosubmitamemorialofhisowninanswertotherespondent' smemorialinreply . They point out that it is not possible to draw up a single procedural document containing, in advance, a reply to and a refutation of any objec-, tions which may be raised subsequently .3 . The applicants complain that their counsel was not authorised to speak afte rA .G.F.'s counsel, whereas the latter, being invited to speak after the former, was able to reply to him immediately . In their opinion, this constitutes disregard for the necessary oral and adversarial nature of proceedings, respect for which constitute s12 an essential element of the right tô a fair hearing, as well as a violation of ttte prinçiple of' equality of arms before the Court of Cassation .4 . The applicants argue that the Court of Cassation, having dehvered its judgmen t on the very day of the hearing, conld not ltave given serious considei•ation either to âny oral submissions made by thé parties to the Court at the public fieàring on the same day, nor to the oral submissions of the public prosecutor !Ministèré public) . iThey allege that this praetiee. is inconsistent with the necessary oral andadversarial nature of proceedings and conclud IF . that the publicity of proceedings before the Court of Cassation is inadequate .5 . The applicants further c.ompP~ain that they were not informed of the subniissions of the DRinistère public before thehearing, which made it impossible for thein to reply thereto. They state that tie public prosecutor often communicates his opinior, to the Court of Cassation judges foriaing the Chamber and, in all cases, to the judgerapporteur . The latter and thè Advocate General appointed by the Attorney General discuss the case as well as the juclge-rapporteur's draft judgmerit . Pollowing these close cantacts, they agree on the text of a draft judgment . According to the ap- ~plicant„ this procedure is incompâtible with the principle of equality of arms as well as with the adversarial and oral nâmre of proceedings, while alsc being inconsistent ,with the principle of the rights ôf the defence, as the main steps in the decisionmaking process take place outside the public hearin ;g. 6. The applicants also complain of the fact that they were not able to reply to the 'oral submissions of the public piosecutor, since he was the last to speal-, at the hearing . I 17. The applicants allege an infringement of the right to a fair hearing and of the ,principle of equality of arms on the ground that the Advocate General attached to the Court of Cassation took part ir: the Court's deliberations . They consider that the maxiin "justice must not only be done ; it jmust also he seen to be done" is not corn- ,patible witlh the Advocate General participating in any way whatever in the deliberations of thie Supreme Court Eve~~ . if the substance is impeccable, appearances must ,be equally so. 8. Lastly, the applicants, summing up the foregeing arguments, allege that the cassation proceedings generally failed to respect ihe lùndamental rights of the defence. . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. ,THE LAW 1 . The applicants complain of t. lack of reasons in the judgments of the Coun: of Appeal and the C'ourt of Cassaitén . They consider that the requirements of a fair hearing were unfnlfilled not only because of a series of errors, omissions or silence s 113 in the reasons provided by the two courts, but also because of the relative brevity of the judgments in question . They invoke Article 6 para . 1 of the Convention, the first sentence of which reads as follows : ' "In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law . "TheComisionrecalsitsestablishedcase-lawacordingtowhichArticle6 is applicable to proceedings in cassation (see, inter alia, Eur. Cour H.R., Delcourt judgment of 17 January 1970, Series A no . 72, p. 12, para . 27) . The way in whichl the article is applied depends, however, on the special features of the proceedings in question (ibid.). Account should therefore be taken of the fact that the applicants' appeal was of limited scope in that only points of law and not of fact could be invoked. To the extent that the applicants complain that the judgments delivered by the Court of Appeal and the Court of Cassation in their case are insufficiently reasoned, the Commission firstly recalls that it is not competent to deal with an applicatio nalegingthaterorsoflaworfacthavebencomitedbydomesticourts,except where it considers that such errors might have involved a possible violation of any of the rights and freedoms setout in the Convention (No . 7987/77, Dec. 13.12 .79, D.R. 18 pp. 31, 45) . It accepts that in certain specific circumstances the absence of reasons in a court decision might raise an issue as to the fairness of the procedure which is guaranteed by Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention (No . 8769/79, Dec. 16.7.81, D.R.25 p. 241) : Nevertheless, when a court does state its reasons, it is presumed that the requirements of Article 6 have been respected . The Commission also points out that this provision does not imply that the reasons set out by a court must deal in detail with each of the points which one of the parties may consider to be fundamental to his case, and that a party does not have an absolute right to require the court to pro -videreasonsfortherejectionofeachhisarguments . As to the right guaranteed by Article 6 para . 3 (d) of the Convention, the domestic court retains a certain measure of discretion in the matter (No . 5460/72, Dec . 2.4.73, Yearbook 16 pp. 153, 168) . In the present case, the Commission notes that the Court of Cassation, after pointing out that the judgment was not required to reply to irrelevant submissions, took the view that the Court of Appeal's decision was legally justified and properly reasoned. It also notes that the applicants have failed to show that either the Brussels Court of Appeal or the Court of Cassation, having regard to the special features of the proceedings in question, ignored any essential element in the defence . The mere fact that the judgments criticised are shorter and less detailed than the applicants' appeal submissions and their memorial to the Court of Cassation is not sufficient to affect the presumption that the requirements of Article 6 were met inthe present case .- 114 Accordingly, examination of this complaint, as presented, cloes not reveal any appearance of a violation of the r•ight to a fair hearing as guaranteed by Article 6 para. 1 It follows that this complaint must be rejected as manifestly ill-founded in accordance with Article 27 para . 2 of the Convention .2 . The applicants complain of a violation of the right to a fair hearing on the ground the Court of Cassation refused to take tlreir covnter-memorial of 28 December 1981 into consideration . They claim that Article 1094 of the .fudicial Çode, which restricts the scope of a counter-memorial to a reply to an objection to the admissibility of the appeal, gives rise to a situation of inequality to the advantage of the respondent, since the latterlmay reply in writing to the arguments of the appellant, whereas the reverse is not true. The Govermnent consider th at the obligation for the appellant to set out all his grounds, at once, a rule dictated by the nature of the hearing befere the Couit, does not infringe the principle of equality of arms . In this respect, ttiey emphasise that the respondent, in his memorial in epl y, must confrne himielf to countering the legal ârgumcn[s put for,vard by the appéllant in support of the grounds of his appeal and that during the oral stage of proceedings the appellant may amplify his arguments either by submittirig a memoranduii n of pleadings or by addressin ; the Court orally . Purthermore, the lodging of counter-memorials might, in the Governement's view, have the effeet of slowing down the proceedings, an assertion whieh the applicants contest. I The C'ommission notes that Article 1094 of the Judicial Code doés not provide for the lodging of a counteo-meiuoiial except where ttie re :ipondent before the Court 6f Cassation has objected to the aclmissibility of the appeal . In the present case, as the respondent's inemorial in reply was limited to challenging the basis .of the grounds of appeal, and did not ini :lude an objection to its admissibility ; the Court 6f Cassation refused to take the applicant's counter-memorial into consideration. The Commission is of the opinion that the right to a fair hearing a right . which includes the, principle of equality ôf arms, does not preelude Statas from regulating the exchange of memorials . 1Noreéver, it recalls that it has repeatedly held that the right to a fair hearing, in both civii and criminal proceedings, entails that everyone who is a paety to such proceedings Ishall have a reasonable opportunity of presenting his case to the court under conditions which do not place him at substantial disâdvantage vis-à-vis his opponent (âee, inter alia; No. 2804/66, Dr,c . 16.7.68 ; Yearbook 11 pp . 381, 398-400) . 1 I Given the cireumstances of the present ease and in view cf the fact that the Court oFCassation concerns itself on1y with questions of law, the Commission considers ttat the fairness of the procéselings was not prejudiced by the fact that the applicants could not respond to A .G .F.'s memorial in reply . This memorial merely discussed the legal arguments underlying the grounds advanced by the applicants' counsel in the meniorial submittedlto the Court of Cassation. During thé pleadings , 115 moreover, Mr. Dassesse and Mr . Aronstein had an opportunity, either by addressing', the Court orally or by submitting a memorandum of pleadings, to-amR}ify•-the~ grounds set out in the appeal to the Court of Cassation and, thereby, respond to the legal observations in the respondent's metriorial in reply . Accordingly, the Commission considers that the applicants did have an oppor -tunitytopresentheirargumentsinawaywhichdidnotplacethematadisadvantage vis-à-vis their opponent . Examination of this complaint, as submitted, does not therefore reveal any appearance of a violation of the applicants' right to a fair hearing as guaranteed by Article 6 para . 1 . It follows that this complaint must be rejected as manifestly ill-founded, in accordance with Article 27 para. 2 of the Convention .3 . The applicants complain that, during the hearing before the Court of Cassation;, their counsel was not allowed to reply orally to A .G.F.'s counsel . They allege a violation of the right to a fair hearing as well as disregard for the necessary oral and adversarial nature of proceedings . F The Government, pointing out that neither Mr . Dassesse nor Mr . Aronsteiri spoke during the hearing, maintain that the applicants' counsel before the Court of Cassation could have replied, whereàppropriate, to the respondent's pleadings'. They acknowledge thatpleadings before the Court of Cassation are rare, but notë that this is due both to the nature of cassation proceedings, which involve only legal questions, and to the comprehensiveness of the parties' memorials and memoranda (if any) . The applicants reply that the right to plead is limited and illusory . The Commission recalls that the Convention organs have already made several pronouncements on the question of the absence of public proceedings before a Supreme Court or a Court of Cassation . It has itself acknowledged that, in view of the technical nature of questions discussed before supreme courts and the impersonal nature of the legal issues submitted to them, the absence of oral proceedings before such courts did not infringe Article 6 para . 1 of the Convention (see, inter alia, No i721/75,Dec . 6 .10.76, D.R. 7 p. 104). The European Court of Human Rights in the Axen case (judgmént of 8 December 1983, Series A no . 72, p.13, para. 28) and the Sutter case (judgment of 22 February 1984, Series A no . 74, p. 13, para. 30) has considered in substance that the absence of public proceedings before a highei court dealing only with questions of law after a public hearing of the case had been held in a lower court did not infringe Article 6 para. I of the Convention . In the present case, however, the applicants do not complain of the absence of public proceedings before.thè Çourt of Cassâtion, whose proceedings are partly oraF but of a lack of opportunity to reply [o the pleadings of'the respondent . Insofar as Belgian legislation provides for ah oral procedure before the Court of Cassation, such a procedure must obviously meet the requirements of Article 6 para. I of the Convention . . 116 In the presert case, the ComI~mission notes that neither the applicants' aounsel before ihe Court of Cassation nor ~:he respondent's counsel addressed the Court but merely referred to their respective inemorials . It is clear that the only addresses made during the hearing were those of the judge-rapporteur and of Advocate General Ballet. It follows that the applir,ants' I complaint that their counsel was not able m reply to the respondent's lawyer is unjustified and that the complaint rnust be reje:eted as nanifestly ilI-fourided, in aceordaice with Article 27 para . 2 of the Convention . 4 . The applicants complain thall the Court of Cassation, having delivered judgment on thr, same day as the heari I ng, could not have given any consideration either to any oral submissions by ttte pan_ies before the court or to the oral submissions of the public prosecutor attached to the Court . They allege a violation of the necessary ôral and adversarial nature of pmi ;eedings, maintaining that as a result the hearing i as clearly pointless . The Govermnent explain thab the procnptness with which the Court of Cassation normally delivers judgment is due to the mainly written nature of the proc.adings 3nd the preliminaty work carried ôut by each of the Court's judges, who study ithe parties' memorials and, as appropiiate, their hearing notes, the report and the draft ôr drafts oiF the judge-rapporteur .l Furthermore, the Governmem point out :hat the questions submitted to the Court of Cassation in the present case raised few legal problenrs since the appeals allegeil a lack of supporting reasons . In view of tfie mainly written nature of proceedings before the Court of Cassation and the fact that the appli~cants' appeal did not involve any difficult legal questions, rhe Commission considers that the fact that the Court of Cassation, after deliberation, delivered judgment ôn the same day as the hearing is not in itself sufficient io show that the provisions of Article 6 were infringed .RecallingthaLtithasalreadyooncludcdthatitdoesnotapparfromthefacts , las submitted by the applicants, that any essential ground advanced by them was îgnored by the Court of Cassation, the Commission finds no appearance of di,regard for the nece,ssary adversarial ., oral and public nature of proceediq ;s with which Article 6 para, 1 of the ConverLtion requires compliance . Consequently, the application is manifestly ill-founded in this respect, too, and must be. rel1ected in accordanee with Article 27 para . 2 cff the C'.onvention. 5. The applicants also cornplaiû that they were not informed before the nearing ôf the submissions of the public prosecutor attached to the Court of Cassation and that the parties were unable to address the Court after the public prosecutor at ihe hearing . They cousider that this situation is especially serious as, in practice, rhe Minist8re public riotifies his opinion to the judges oP the Court or, at least ., to the judge-rapporteur . Close contacts are established betvveen the juilge-rapporteur and the representative of the public prosecutor, as a result of which they agree on . the 117 text of a draft judgment. The applicants claim an infringement of the principle of equality of arms, disregard for the adversarial and oral namre of proceedings and a violation ofthe rightsof the defence . The Government consider that the principles relied on by the applicants do no t apply to the public prosecutor attached to the Court of Cassation, who is not a party to cassation proceedings . They refer to the Delcourt judgment in which the European Court declared that Article 6 of the Convention did not require that an accused should have the possibility of replying to the purely legal submissions of an independent official attached to the Coqrt of Cassation as its assistant and adviser (loc.cit., p. 20, para. 41). The Government acknowledge that the public prosecutor has contacts with thejudge-rapporteur, but maintain that such a dialogue between two neutral officials ; far from being reprehensible, contributes to justice being done in the best possible manner . The applicants retort that the nature of the public prosecutor's task is not in itself a sufficient reason to keep its representative at the Court of Cassation out of the Court's proceedings . The Commission will concentrate on the circumstances of the present case, while pointing out that, contrary to the situation in the aforesaid Delcourt case, the public prosecutor attached to the lower courts involved was not a party to the dispute : This was a civil case in which the defendant was an insurance company, A .G.F. Thé applicants could therefore expect to the treated on an equal footing with the insurance company . In this connection, the Commission reiterates its observation that the applicants did have a reasonable opportunity to defend their interests in conditions which did not place them at any disadvantage vis-3-vis their opponent . The Commission notes that it is not denied in the present case that the public prosecutor at the Court of Cassation could not have been considered a party to the proceedings before the Court . In assisting the Court of Cassation in its role of reviewing the legality of contested decisions, the main task of the public prosecutor at the Court is to provide an opinion on legal questions referred to the Court . His submissions are therefore aimed at helping the Court by devising possible solutions ; In the present case, his submissions could only contain Icgal observations on the validity of the legal arguments advanced by the applicants . Moreover, the Com` mission notes that it is difficult to establish the nature of any consultations between the repçesentative of the public prosecutor at the Court of Cassation and the samé Court's rapporteur. They do, however, involve an exchange of views on legal questions raised by the appeal to the Court. Even if the two officials agreed on the solution to be adopted, such an agreement would not be binding on the Court since it comprises five judges and takes its decisions by a majority of at least three of them i The.Commission recallsthat, in the Delcourt case (loc.cit. p. 20, para .41)? the European Court considefed that Article 6 of the Convention did not require, even by implication, that an accused should havethe possibility of replying to the purely legal submissions of an independent official attached to the highest court in Belgiuni 118 'as its assistant and . adviser. Since the present case involvea a civil dispute, the Com- 'missior- camsiders that the European Court's opiniDn is all the more ap,plicable thereto. Therefore, having regard to the task of the public prosecutor at the Court of Cassatien, the Cominission takés the view that the fact that the applicants did not have an opportun:.ty to reply, eitûer in writing or orally, to the submissions of the public prosecutor's official nepreséntative and were not inFormed of the subsr.ance of any eonsultations between hhm and the judge-rapporteur does not imply any breach of the rights guaranteed by Article 6 para . 1 of the Convention . It follows that this aspect ofjthe application must be rejected as manifestly illfounded in accordance with Article 27 para . 2 of the Convention. t 16. Similarly, the applicants quéstion the participation of the public prosecutor at the Cotirt of Cassation in the Couit's deliberations, considering xhat this constitutes an infringement of the right xô a fâin cearing and of the principle of equality of arms ~which is implicit in that right . The Gover¢nent point out that Belgian practice, based on Article 1109 of the Judicial Code, is due, firstly, to, thc fact that the public prosecutor at the Court of Cassation is not a party to the casin and, secondly, to the fact that his role is limited to providing an independent optnton on legal questions raised by the appeal . In civil cases, inoreover, it is inconcéivalile that thélitigant, who is nec-ssarily assisted by a lawyer before Ihe Court of Caicsation, should view the public prosecutor as an adversary or even as aparty ; sirice he is not involved in the dispute . There can therefore be no semblance of paniality . The applicants refer for the inost part to the arguments put forward by a ntinority of the Commission in the Delcourt case and to the argurnents noted by the Court, which show how difficulf it somatimes is, particularly for an outsider, to idistinguish between the public prosecutor attached to the Court oè Cassation and tLat attached to lower courts . Without questioning the peirsoad impatiality of Advocate General Ballet, who made submissions in their case, the applicants consider that the public prosecutor at the Court of Cassation does not offer guarantees of sufficient independence and impartiality, and th ey refer to the makim "justice must not only be done, i¢ must also be seen to ~be done" .Eventakingaccountofthismaxim,quotedintheDelcourtjudgment (loc. cit. , p. 17, para . 31) aid alluded to by,!:he Court in cases raisirig probl ems of impartiality on the part of officials who took part in the same crinrinal case in two aeparate Icapacities (see, inter alia, Eur. Court H.R., Piersaelc judgment of I Octob(tr 1982, Series A no. 53, pp. 15-16, para . ~3 1, and De Cubber judgment cf 26 October 1984, ISeries A no. 86, p. 14, para. 26)1, the Commission acknowledges that it is difficult to argue tttat, in a civil case, thé litigant might regard as an adversary the public prosecutor at the Court of Cassatiom whose submissions advocate the rejection of his lappeal . 119 Indeed, the distinction between the public prosecutor attached to the Court .of Cassation and that attached to lower courts is clearer in civil than in criminal cases (on this point, see the Delcourt judgment, loc. cit., p. 16, para. 30) since, in principle, the public prosecutor at lower courts is not involved,in the dispute . He may of course, in certain cases detennined by law, act as either the principal party or â co-party. This is not, however, so in the present case .Furthermore,sincetheassistanceofalawyerbeforetheCourtofCassationi s obligatory in civil cases, any doubt which may exist in the mind of the litigant in this regard can be dispelled by the lawyer . The Commission is bound to note that no doubt was entertained by the applicants regarding either the status or the impartiality of Advocate General Ballet. The Commission also notes, with regard to the role of the public prosecutor at the Court of Cassation, that, by attending the Court of Cassation deliberations in a non-voting capacity, the public prosecutor is merely continuing his role of providing legal assistance and advice, drawing the Court's attention to any risks of case-law discrepancies between its chambers, risks which may become apparent only during deliberations . The public prosecutor therefore ensures that the unity of case" law is maintained during deliberations . Accordingly, having regard to the status and the role of an independent an d impartial judicial organ played by the public prosecutor at the Court of Cassation in civil cases, the Commission considers that the fact that Advocate General Ballet took part in the Court's deliberations did not place the applicants in a position contrary to the provisions of Article 6 para . 1 of the Convention or, more specifically, to the right to a fair hearing . It follows that this complaint must be rejected as manifestly ill-founded in accordance with Article 27 para . 2 of the Convention . 7 . Lastly, as a consequence of the foregoing six complaints combined, the applicants complain that the Court of Cassation proceedings, viewed as a whole, violated the fundamental rights of the defence . They consider that the gravity of their complaints is compounded by the fact that they are interlocking . The Commission, having declared that each of the foregoing six complaints is ill-founded, considers that the complaint based on all six combined should also be declared ill-founded. This complaint must therefore be rejected in accordance with Article 27 para. of the Convention . For these reasons, the Commission DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE . 120