AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

Application No. 11356/85
by Irka CEDERBERG-LAPPALAINEN
against Sweden


        The European Commission of Human Rights sitting in private
on 4 March 1987, the following members being present:

              MM. C. A. NØRGAARD, President
                  G. SPERDUTI
                  J. A. FROWEIN
                  G. JÖRUNDSSON
                  S. TRECHSEL
                  B. KIERNAN
                  A. S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK
                  A. WEITZEL
                  J. C. SOYER
                  H. G. SCHERMERS
                  H. DANELIUS
                  H. VANDENBERGHE
                  F. MARTINEZ

              Mr.  J. RAYMOND, Deputy Secretary to the Commission

        Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;

        Having regard to the application introduced on 9 November 1984
by Irka Cederberg-Lappalainen against Sweden and registered on
14 January 1985 under file No. 11356/85;

        Having regard to:

-       the Commission's decision of 2 December 1985 to bring the
application to the notice of the respondent Government and invite them
to submit written observations on its admissibility and merits;


-       the observations submitted by the respondent Government on
7 March 1986 and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant
on 23 May 1986;

-       the report provided for in Rule 40 of the Rules of Procedure
of the Commission;

        Having deliberated;

        Decides as follows:


THE FACTS

        The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be
summarised as follows:

        The applicant is a Swedish citizen, born in 1942 and resident
at Malmö.  She is an information secretary by profession.  The
applicant's child, born on 1 October 1977, was attending a nursery
school in Malmö at the time of the introduction of the application,
which concerns a peace demonstration in which the children of the
school were supposed to participate.

Domestic law and practice

        Provisions on freedom of expression and freedom to
        arrange demonstrations

        The constitutional safeguards concerning fundamental, human
rights and freedoms are contained in the 1974 Instrument of Government
(regeringsformen).  Under Chapter 2 Section 1 of the Instrument,
every citizen is, in relation to the community, guaranteed the right
to freedom of expression and the freedom to arrange and participate in
any demonstration on public grounds.

        According to Section 12 of the same chapter, the right to
freedom of expression and the right to arrange and participate in any
demonstration can be subject only to such limitations as are
prescribed by law and, inter alia, necessary for a purpose which is
acceptable in a democratic society.  Such a limitation may never be
extended so far as to constitute a threat to the free formation of
opinions.

        According to Chapter 2 Section 2 every citizen shall, in
relation to the community, be protected against, inter alia, any
compulsion to make known his opinion in any political, religious,
cultural or other such matter, or to participate in any demonstration
or other expression of opinion.

        Provisions concerning public social services

        The goals of the public social service, as well as the basic
means by which these goals are to be reached, are outlined in the
1980 Social Services Act (socialtjänstlag 1980:620).  According to
Section 2 of the Act, each municipality carries the responsibility for
social services within its own territory.  For the purpose of
fulfilling this obligation, there shall be in each municipality a
Social Council, cf.  Section 4 of the Act.

        All forms of care provided for in the Act are, with a few
exceptions, offered on a voluntary basis.  The Act has taken the form
of a general, goal-oriented framework legislation, which leaves leeway
for the municipalities in forming and organising, having regard to
their own particular conditions and requirements, the services to be
offered.

        According to Section 1 of the Act, public social services are
to be established on the basis of democracy and solidarity.  Under the
same Section, one of the goals of such services is to promote, while
paying due respect to the individual's right to self-determination and
privacy, active participation in the life of the community.  In
respect of children and young persons, Section 12 further provides
that social services should, inter alia, promote, in close
co-operation with their families, a comprehensive personal development
as well as a favourable physical and social development.

        As regards children, who have not reached compulsory school
age, the Act enjoins the municipalities to organise the pre-school
activities, cf.  Section 13.  Each municipality shall have a plan for
its pre-school activities, adopted by the publicly elected
Municipality Council and covering a period of at least five years,
cf.  Section 17.  The Social Council shall endeavour to ensure that
children avail themselves of the opportunity of attending the
pre-school activities and shall also inform the parents of the
activities and their purposes, Section 16.

        The Act does not contain any provisions in respect of the
substance of the pre-school education.  According to the travaux
préparatoires, one goal of pre-school activities should be to lay the
foundation of children's desire to seek and use knowledge with a view
to improving the living conditions for themselves and others (SOU
1972:27, p. 24).

        The 1980 Compulsory School Curriculum is not directly
applicable to pre-school activities.  However, regarding the goals of
the education, the curriculum points to the necessity of making the
pupils realise the importance of international relations and
co-operation and explicitly designates "peace education" as a proper
element of the educational programme.

        Decisions by the Social Council are taken at a meeting.
Minutes shall be taken of the meeting containing, among other things,
a brief description of each subject matter dealt with and also any
decision taken at the meeting.  Upon completion, the minutes shall be
verified by the chairman, and notice of the minutes shall be posted on
a public noticeboard, cf.  Section 28 of the Social Services Act and
Chapter 2 Sections 10 and 25 of the 1977 Act on Local Government
(kommunallag 1977:179).  A decision by the Social Council may be
appealed, under a special appeal procedure laid down in Chapter 7 of
the Act on Local Government, to the Administrative Court of Appeal
(kammarrätten) by a citizen of the municipality.  The grounds that may
be invoked in support of such an appeal are that the decision

-       has not been taken in the legally prescribed manner

-       conflicts with existing laws or regulations

-       falls outside the competence of the local government in
        any other way

-       infringes on the individual rights of the complainant or

-       is otherwise based on unjust grounds.

        A judgment of the Administrative Court of Appeal may be
appealed, as a last resort, to the Supreme Administrative Court
(regeringsrätten).

        The particular facts of the case

        On 3 May 1983 the Social Council's Committee for Pre-school
and Leisure Home Activities in the municipality of Malmö
(socialnämndens delegation för förskole- och fritidshemsverksamheten i
Malmö kommun) approved a proposal to arrange a peace demonstration for
around 3,000 children attending the pre-school and leisure home
activities of Malmö municipality.  The peace demonstration was to take
place on 15 and 16 June 1983 in connection with the annual "People's
Park Days" (Folkets Parkdagar) which were arranged on the theme of
peace.  The intention was that on both days the activities should
commence with a peace demonstration with the participation of the
children, the personnel and the parents, who wished to and had the
possibility of attending.  The participants should meet at a place
outside the park and then walk in a peace march to the park.  Further,
the intention was that the children should prepare, in advance, flags,
peace doves and other symbols of peace to be carried during the
demonstration.  In the decision it was further stated that "the
parents will be informed of the peace march and the children will only
participate with the consent of the parents".

        The Government have submitted that the Social Council's
decision to arrange a peace demonstration was formally made known to
the public in accordance with the applicable provisions of the Social
Services Act and the 1977 Act on Local Government.  In addition the
Government have submitted that, according to the information procured
from the official in charge of the child care activities in the
municipality of Malmö, each pre-school was informed in writing of the
decision and that no child was to be engaged in the demonstration
unless the consent of the parents was obtained.  In view of the almost
daily contacts between the pre-school staff and the parents, the
ultimate responsibility of informing the parents and obtaining their
positions on the matter was placed upon each individual pre-school.

        The applicant has stated that she was never asked by her
child's nursery school about the demonstration.  She was informed,
however, at the beginning of June, that the Administration had sent
out instructions to the nursery schools that the parents had to be
informed and asked about their children's participation in the
demonstration.

        The applicant lodged a municipal appeal (kommunalbesvär) with
the Administrative Court of Appeal of Gothenburg which in a judgment
of 8 June 1983 rejected the appeal.  The applicant appealed to the
Supreme Administrative Court, which on 29 May 1984 rejected the appeal
with the following reasoning:


        "In the appealed decision, the Social Council's
Committee for Pre-School and Leisure Home Activities of Malmö
municipality approved that the children involved in these
activities, with personnel and parents, should participate in a
so-called peace march in connection with the arrangement in the
People's Park on the theme of peace.  The idea was that in the
march the children should carry flags, peace doves and other
peace symbols which they had made in advance.  An express
condition for the decision was that the parents were asked about
the participation of the children.

(The applicant's) submissions first raise the issue whether it is
at all compatible with the intended pedagogic activity in nursery
schools and leisure homes to engage children in activities for
peace.  It is to be observed that there are no regulations for
the pedagogic activities in the nursery schools and leisure
homes.

An overriding objective for the nursery school is to lay the
foundation for the child being willing to seek and use
knowledge in order to improve its own living conditions and
those of other people (SOU 1972:27 p. 24).  This appears to be
entirely compatible with the aim of creating in the child,
through its own activities, a wish for peace in the world.  In
the curriculum for the basic school (grundskolan) it is said:
'It is necessary to choose, at school, material which allows
the children to realise our society's international dependence
and the importance of international contacts and international
co-operation' (Lgr 80 p. 31).  Peace education is furthermore
indicated as an example of issues which the individual school
may take up in its working plan (Lgr 80 p. 59).  Against this
background it is clear that the activity at the leisure homes
could also comprise activities for peace.

According to Chapter 2 Section 1 of the Instrument of
Government every citizen is, in relation to the community,
guaranteed the freedom to arrange and participate in a
demonstration in a public place.  A municipal organ may also be
considered to have the right, in a matter which falls within
its competence, to arrange a demonstration provided it is done
with objectivity and in a positive spirit.  The Committee
cannot be considered to have, from the said points of view,
exceeded its competence by approving the arrangement of a peace
march.

Every citizen is, according to Chapter 2 Section 2 of the
Instrument of Government, in relation to the community, protected
from compulsion to participate in demonstrations.  It can be
questioned whether it was entirely compatible with this provision
that a child, who had not attained such an age at which it could
be assumed to have an opinion of its own on the peace issue, was
allowed to participate in the peace march.  This, however, is a
question for the judgment of the parents.

In view of the fact that the participation of the children had
been made dependent of the consent of the parents the decision
of the Committee cannot be considered to have been in conflict
with the provisions of Chapter 2 Section 2 of the Instrument of
Government.

In summary, the Supreme Administrative Court finds that what (the
applicant) has submitted does not lead to the conclusion that the
the Committee through the appealed decision, can be considered
to have exceeded its competence or that the decision is otherwise
unlawful on any ground laid down in Chapter 7 Section 1 of the
Act on Local Government."


        One of the five judges dissented, considering that the
appealed decision should be quashed, mainly since the request for
consent from the parents could constitute an interference with the
parents' right not to be forced to disclose their opinion in political
or other matters.

        Prior to the above decision, on 22 September 1983, the
Parliamentary Ombudsman (JO) had stated that the peace march did not
call for any further action on his part since it had been arranged
with the consent of the parents.

        The applicant's child did not attend the peace demonstration.
The applicant took a week's holiday and stayed at home with her child.


COMPLAINTS

        The applicant invokes Articles 8, 9, 10 and 11 of the
Convention and Article 2 of Protocol No. 1.

1.      She alleges that the use of pre-school children in a
demonstration is a violation of the child's right to respect for its
integrity.

2.      She complains that the request for permission from the parents
violates the parents' right to respect for their private and family
life, to freedom of thought and conscience and to freedom of
expression.  Moreover, it encourages the parents to violate the
child's right to respect for its integrity.

3.      The applicant also complains that the parent is forced to
disclose his/her opinion regarding an issue which has been the subject
of substantial political debate.

4.      The applicant furthermore complains that the authorities have
failed to respect the right of the parents to ensure such education as
is in conformity with their own religious and philosophical
convictions.

5.      The applicant finally complains that the action of the
authorities' violates the right to freedom of peaceful assembly.  She
submits that "freedom" must include the right to abstain from acting.


PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION

        The application was introduced on 9 November 1984 and
registered on 14 January 1985.

        On 2 December 1985 the Commission decided to bring the
application to the notice of the respondent Government and to invite
them to submit written observations on the application.

        The Government's observations were submitted on 7 March 1986.

        After the grant of an extension of the time-limit the
applicant's observations in reply were submitted on 23 May 1986.

SUBMISSIONS OF THE PARTIES

        The Government

        The Government have submitted that the applicant's answer as
to whether or not her child could participate in the peace
demonstration was obtained in accordance with the applicable
provisions of the Social Services Act and the Act on Local Government
as well as in accordance with instructions given to the pre-school
staff having the ultimate responsibility for informing her.

        However, even assuming that the applicant was not informed in
this manner this should be of no relevance when considering whether
her rights under the Convention and Protocol No. 1 to the Convention
were infringed.  The applicant did in fact, and this she admits,
have access to all relevant information concerning the prerequisites
of the demonstration.  Given her position at that time as an
information secretary, employed by the Social Council of Malmö and
working at its information department, her knowledge of these
prerequisites must have been well known by all officials involved in
the matter.  Furthermore, in view of the actions taken by the
applicant to have the decision revoked, it must also have been clear
to them that informing her would have been of no use since she had
already clearly demonstrated that she was not going to let her child
take part in the manifestation.

        The Government have furthermore submitted that they will not
go beyond what is required by the facts of the applicant's case in
answering the issues raised but that they have no objections to
considering any possible interference with the applicant's son's
rights under the Convention or under Protocol No. 1 to the Convention
as equally infringing the applicant's rights.

Re Article 8 of the Convention

        The Government fail to see that the facts presented by the
applicant could at all be viewed so as to involve any right guaranteed
by this Article.  Under all circumstances, and since the reasons
invoked in support of the Government's position as regards the alleged
violation of Article 9 of the Convention apply with equal force in
respect of the present Article, the Government, with reference to the
following arguments, submit that the complaint under this Article is
manifestly ill-founded.

Re Article 9 of the Convention

        The Government first observe that the only manner, in which
the purpose and shaping of the demonstration was defined, was that it
was supposed to be a "peace demonstration".  In the Government's view,
this would appear to entail no constraint as regards the positive
aspects of the applicant's right to freedom of thought in respect of
the question of peace.  This is so since, while the basic topic of the
participant's manifestation was given, each individual participating
in the manifestation was free to express his or her own ideas and
opinions on the topic.

        The participation in the peace demonstration was, as by the
way the attendance of the pre-school and leisure home activities in
general, entirely voluntary.  There was no obligation for the
applicant and her child to state any reasons whatsoever for their
decision not to take part in the demonstration, and this decision did
not entail any form of sanctions or other negative effects.  The
applicant was well aware of this voluntary character of the
demonstration and she availed herself of the opportunity not to let
her child take part in it.  If she had decided to join the
demonstration herself, she would have done so as an individual, free
to express her own opinions on the topic, and not in the capacity of
spokesman for any public establishment.  The same applies, if she had
decided to let her child participate.

        In view of this, the Government maintain that the facts
presented by the applicant fall short of suggesting any interference
with her, or her son's rights under Article 9 of the Convention.

        In case the Commission would consider that the applicant's
right under Article 9 para. 1 has been interfered with, the Government
submit that this interference was justified under para. 2 of the
Article.  The right to arrange demonstrations is laid down in Chapter
2 Section 1 of the Instrument of Government.  This right is of vital
importance as an element of the freedom of expression, and an
indispensable feature of a democratic society, also guaranteed by
Article 10 of the Convention.  In the Government's view, therefore,
any possible interference with the applicant's rights under Article 9
para. 1 in the present case is undoubtedly justified as necessary for
the effective protection of the rights of others under Article 10 of
the Convention to freedom of expression.  It should be added that not
even the applicant has asserted any interferences in excess of those
allegedly following as a necessary consequence of the very fact that
the demonstration was arranged.

        In view of this, the Government submit that the complaint
under Article 9 of the Convention is manifestly ill-founded.

Re Article 10 of the Convention

        The Government maintain that the reasons invoked in support of
their position as regards the alleged violation of Article 9 of the
Convention apply with equal force in respect of Article 10.
Consequently, with reference to the above submissions, the Government
submit that the complaint under this Article is also manifestly
ill-founded.

Re Article 11 of the Convention

        The Government take, in respect of the alleged violation of
Article 11 of the Convention, the same position as in regard to the
complaint under Article 8.  Consequently the Government maintain that
the complaint under Article 11 is also manifestly ill-founded.

Re Article 2 of Protocol No. 1

        With reference to what has been said above, the Government
first submit that the organising of the demonstration did not in any
way involve an expression of views that could possibly give rise to
any conflict with the applicant's religious and philosophical
convictions.

        Even in case the Commission does not share this view, the
Government, for the following reasons, maintain that the complaint
under Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 is manifestly ill-founded.

        The applicant's allegations are apparently founded on the
assumption that the present Article requires a State under all
circumstances to refrain from including in education and teaching any
religious and philosophical views.  In the Government's opinion, this
assumption is inaccurate.  In the case of Kjeldsen, Busk Madsen and
Pedersen (Eur.  Court H.R., Kjeldsen, Busk Madsen, Pedersen judgment of
7 December 1976, Series A No. 23) the European Court of Human Rights
adopted the view that teaching or education imparting information or
knowledge of a religious or philosophical kind would violate the
present Article only when they were not carried out in an objective,
critical and pluralistic manner, but rather assumed the character of
indoctrination (p. 26, para. 53).  With reference to what has been
said above, the Government submit that the demonstration in the
present case was in fact carried out in precisely the manner thus
alluded to by the Court and that it bore no stamp of indoctrination.
As regards this point, the Government further observe that no other
view appears to have been expressed by the applicant.  In this
context, the Government would finally like to draw attention to the
facts that the demonstration was an exceptional and transitory element
of the educational programme and that, as has been pointed out above,
it was entirely voluntary.

        The applicant

        In the applicant's view the Government do not seem to realise
the difference between the administrative aspects of demonstrations -
such as security, traffic and timing, in which the Government have a
proper role to play - and every citizen's right to freedom of
expression and demonstration.

        If the Government start arranging, sponsoring and supporting
political demonstrations, this limits the individual citizen's right
to demonstrate, particularly if the Government provide the
demonstrators through government-controlled institutions.  These
actions, in themselves, are sufficient to violate the rights cited in
this case.  Further, to claim that the participants, children of
pre-school age, were freely exercising their rights is illogical.

        According to Chapter 2 Section 2 of the Instrument of
Government every citizen shall, in relation to the community, be
protected against, inter alia, any compulsion to make known his
opinion in any politicial, religious, cultural or other such matter, or
to participate in any demonstration or other expression of opinion.
When the Government state that the ultimate responsibility of
informing the parents and obtaining their positions on the matter was
placed upon each individual pre-school, they admit that the
authorities asked or were supposed to ask each parent of his or her
opinion.

        The action described above necessarily violates the rights
secured under both the Instrument of Government and the Convention,
since the freedom of speech and expression includes the right not to
be compelled, either directly or indirectly, by any government body to
express an opinion on certain matters.

        The Government's position reveals some misunderstanding
regarding political demonstrations and their purpose.

        The Government assert that no constraint was placed on
individual participants since they could express their own ideas on
the basic topic of peace.  If no constraint at all is manifested by
the general topic of a demonstration, then there is no purpose for it.
If there is no purpose, then there is no need for the demonstration.
The Government's reasoning reduces the right to demonstrate to an
absurdity.  Individuals participate in demonstrations in order to
manifest a political opinion.  A "peace" demonstration is necessarily
a political demonstration which manifests the opinions of the
participants - at least with regard to those who are mature enough to
have formed an opinion.  If the participants are too young, as the
children in the present case, they are going to reflect, on the whole,
the opinions of the adult participants who in this case were the
pre-school personnel.  So it is quite naive to say the children were
free to express their own opinions.

        In addition, since it was a normal workday many parents would
have to take time off from work in order to be able to "freely"
express their opinions or "freely" influence their children, if their
views differed from those of the authorities.

        The demonstration was admittedly voluntary in the narrow
sense.  However, if the term is compared to what voluntary means in
relation to normal demonstrations which are arranged and sponsored by
private organisations or individuals, a parent of a potential
participant is not required to "avail" herself of the opportunity not
to let her child participate.  In this sense, it was not voluntary.

        Furthermore, voluntary in the broader sense also means that
nobody will be asked by the Government about their participation.  Nor
will anybody be required by the Government to approve or disapprove of
their child's participation.  Participation here is as voluntary as
participation in the pre-school system in general.  For some people it
might be entirely voluntary, but for most people it is a question of
economic necessity.

        Finally, being forced to state a position regarding
participation is enough to constitute a violation of the right to
privacy and freedom of speech etc, which again is not remedied by the
assertion that "this decision did not entail any form of sanctions or
other negative effects".  The latter assertion has nothing to do with
the question of whether or not a violation occurred.

        The ideas presented by the Government regarding the right to
demonstrate are at least unique, if not absurd.  Fortunately the
Government recognise the right to demonstrate as a vital element of
freedom of expression.  Unfortunately the Government go on to assert
that "any possible interference with the applicant's rights under
Article 9 para. 1 in the present case is undoubtedly justified as
necessary for the effective protection of the rights of others under
Article 10 of the Convention to freedom of expression".

        It is true that in some sense the Government have a right, or
more accurately a duty, to assist the organisers of a demonstration
regarding the practical arrangements of the demonstration.  However,
in most countries which are Parties to the Convention this presumably
does not mean that the Government have somehow obtained the right to
demonstrate.  Each citizen is guaranteed this right and the Government
do not have a right to interfere with the citizens' right in order to
protect the rights of the local Government.

        The assertion that any interference of the rights guaranteed
was necessary in order to protect the rights of the local Government
is absurd, since the purpose of this Section of the Instrument of
Government and of various Articles of the Convention is to protect
citizens from the Government, and not the other way around.

        Finally, the very fact that the Government arranged, sponsored
and financed the demonstration, in addition to providing the bulk of
the demonstrators, that is the employees and the children from the
pre-school, also violated the Convention in a more general way since
the freedom of expression and the right to demonstrate imply some form
of competition between various ideas.  If governments have a right to
demonstrate which is equal to that of the individual citizens, this
freedom will become meaningless for most people.

        The demonstration was not objective, since demonstrations are
not the place for objective, critical and pluralistic transmissions of
philosophical views.  The whole purpose of a demonstration is to
manifest already existing views which participants share.  Since most
of the participants were children, the main views expressed were
necessarily those of the pre-school personnel.  Since the Government
did not limit the demonstration to presenting an "objective" view of
"peace", the demonstration was not objective.

        The Government assert that "the demonstration was an
exceptional and transitory element of the educational programme".  The
"exceptional and transitory" nature of the demonstration is irrelevant
as a defence regarding the issue of a violation of the rights
guaranteed by the Convention.  In fact, it may indicate that the
Government have recognised that they should not participate in the
organisation and promotion of demonstrations.


THE LAW

1.      The applicant has complained about the fact that the
responsible local authorities in Malmö arranged a peace demonstration
in which the intention was that children attending pre-school and
leisure homes should participate.  The applicant has alleged breaches of
Articles 8, 9, 10 and 11 (Art. 8, 9, 10, 11) of the Convention and
Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-2) to the Convention.

        Article 25 (Art. 25) of the Convention provides that the Commission may
receive petitions from a "person ... claiming to be a victim of a violation
...".  It follows from this provision that normally the person who submits a
petition to the Commission must himself be the victim of the alleged violation.
 An applicant cannot, however, complain as a representative of people in
general, because the Convention does not permit such an "actio popularis".  In
the present case, the applicant complains not only on behalf of herself and her
child, but also on behalf of other parents and children who might have been
affected by the proposed peace demonstration.  It follows from the above that
the applicant can only claim to be a victim insofar as she, or her child, were
affected by the peace demonstration.  In this respect the Commission notes that
the applicant's child never participated in the peace demonstration.  The
applicant chose to stay at home and take care of her child during the week when
the peace demonstration took place.  The decision of the applicant to avoid her
child's participation was in conformity with the decision of the Social Council
Committee which required the parents' consent for such participation.
Accordingly, the applicant's child was not forced to take part in the
demonstration.

        It follows that the applicant's complaint that the
participation in the demonstration violates the child's integrity
(complaint no. 1), and the right to abstain from a peaceful assembly
(complaint no. 5), are manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of
Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

2.      As regards Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-2), the applicant has
submitted that the authorities have failed to respect the right of the parents
to ensure such education as is in conformity with their religious and
philosophical convictions (complaint no. 4).

        The Commission notes that the participation of the applicant's
child in the peace demonstration presupposed the consent of the
applicant and that the applicant did not let her child participate in
the demonstration.  The Commission considers that by making the
participation dependent on the consent of the parents the Swedish
authorities have shown sufficient respect for the applicant's rights
as parent under Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-2) to the Convention.

        It follows that this aspect of the application is manifestly
ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the
Convention.

3.      It remains to examine the applicant's complaints (nos. 2
and 3) that the facts of the case disclose a violation of her right to
respect for private and family life, to freedom of thought and
conscience and to freedom of expression in that she was allegedly
obliged to disclose her opinion when keeping her child at home and not
letting him participate in the peace demonstration.  The applicant has
invoked Articles 8, 9 and 10 (Art. 8, 9, 10) of the Convention in this respect.

        The Commission does not agree with the applicant.  It may be
questioned whether, in a democratic state, it should be the task of
public authorities to arrange demonstrations involving children of an
age at which they cannot be assumed to have an opinion of their own.
However, the applicant's decision to keep her child at home and
thereby avoiding his participation in the peace demonstration does not
necessarily imply any views as to peace issues in general.  It is true
that the applicant's attitude could be interpreted as a disagreement
with the local authorities as to the appropriateness of arranging a
peace demonstration in which children should take part.  However, the
Commission does not find that the authorities' decision concerning the
organisation of the demonstration can for this reason be considered to
interfere with the applicant's, or her child's, rights under para. 1
of Articles 8, 9 or 10 (Art. 8, 9, 10) of the Convention.

        It follows that in this respect the application is also manifestly
ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the
Convention.

        For these reasons, the Commission

        DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE

Deputy Secretary to the Commission         President of the Commission




         (J. RAYMOND)                          (C. A. NØRGAARD)