The European Commission of Human Rights sitting in private on
13 October 1986, the following members being present:

                      MM. C. A. NØRGAARD, President
                          J. A. FROWEIN
                          F. ERMACORA
                          E. BUSUTTIL
                          G. JÖRUNDSSON
                          G. TENEKIDES
                          S. TRECHSEL
                          B. KIERNAN
                          A. S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK
                          A. WEITZEL
                          J. C. SOYER
                          H. G. SCHERMERS
                          H. DANELIUS
                          G. BATLINER
                          J. CAMPINOS
                      Mrs G. H. THUNE
                      Sir Basil HALL
                      Mr. F. MARTINEZ

                      Mr. H. C. KRÜGER, Secretary to the Commission

Having regard to Article 25 (art. 25) of the Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;

Having regard to the application introduced on 17 July 1985 by
W.K. against Sweden and registered on 24 September 1985 under file
No. 11762/85;

Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 40 of the Rules of
Procedure of the Commission;

Having deliberated;

Decides as follows:

THE FACTS

The facts of the case, as they appear from the applicant's
submissions, may be summarised as follows:

The applicant is a Swedish citizen born in 1929 and resident at
Gunnebobruk.  He is a consultant by profession.

Alleging that he was unemployed, the applicant asked for unemployment
benefits under the Act on Cash Labour Market Support (lagen om kontant
arbetsmarknadsstöd).  His request was refused by the County Employment
Office (länsarbetsnämnden) of Kalmar on 26 November 1982.

The applicant appealed to the National Labour Market Board
(arbetsmarknadsstyrelsen) which in a decision of 23 March 1983
rejected the appeal with the following reasons:

"According to Section 4 of the Act on Cash Labour Market Support a
businessman is considered as unemployed if he no longer engages in any
activity in the business except such as is merely of an occasional
character.  In the Governmental Bill 1973:56 concerning the Act on
Unemployment Insurance etc. the responsible Minister stated inter alia
that in companies where an employee or his family owns the major part
of the shares, such an employee is in practice to be regarded as a
private businessman (egen företagare).

Among the documents of the case it appears from the minutes of a board
meeting of 4 November 1982 that you have transferred your shares of
SKAFTET KRAFTVERK AB (a limited liability company) to your wife.  It
has further appeared that you are still registered in the official
register of limited liability companies as competent to sign on behalf
of the company.  For these reasons, the National Labour Market Board
finds that your personal activity in the company has not ceased and
that you are to be considered as a private businessman.  According to
the Act you are not to be regarded as unemployed and consequently no
support can therefore be paid.  The Board finds no reason to amend the
decision of the County Employment Office."

The applicant appealed to the Supreme Insurance Court
(försäkringsöverdomstolen).  On 13 February 1985, the Court decided to
transmit the case-file to the National Labour Market Board for
supplementary investigation and for a possible opinion.  The reply of
the Board was communicated to the applicant who submitted his final
statement by a letter of 4 April 1985.

In the meantime the applicant had made a new application for
unemployment benefits.  This application was refused by the County
Employment Office on 10 December 1984.  The applicant's appeal was
rejected by the National Labour Market Board on 3 March 1985.

The applicant submitted a further appeal to the Supreme Insurance
Court.

On 2 July 1985 the Supreme Insurance Court rejected the applicant's
two appeals.

COMPLAINTS

1. The applicant complains that contrary to Article 6 (art. 6) of
the Convention he has not had an impartial hearing before the Supreme
Insurance Court.  He submits in particular that the Court was partial
since it requested his opponent, the National Labour Market Board, to
make an inquiry in the case.

2. The applicant also complains that he has had no effective
remedy as guaranteed by Article 13 (art. 13) of the Convention since
he does not know what has happened before the Supreme Insurance Court,
which, in the applicant's opinion, has not examined the applicant's
submissions.

3. The applicant submits that the only reason for refusing him
unemployment benefits was that he was married to his wife.  He alleges
that this is discrimination contrary to Article 14 (art. 14) of the
Convention as well as a breach of Article 12 (art. 12) of the
Convention.

4. Finally, the applicant complains that his personal identity
number was used as the case-file number.  He submits that one of the
digits in this number indicates that he is of other than Swedish
origin.  He submits that this practice is in violation of
Article 14 (art. 14) of the Convention.

THE LAW

1. The applicant complains that he was refused unemployment
benefits.  He also complains about the procedure which was applied
when his applications for unemployment benefits were refused.  The
applicant has invoked Articles 6, 12, 13 and 14
(art. 6, art. 12, art. 13, art. 14) of the Convention.

2. The Commission first observes that the Convention does not as
such guarantee any right to unemployment benefits, and there is no
provision in the Convention from which such a right could be derived.

Insofar as the application relates to the refusal to grant the
applicant unemployment benefits, it follows that the application falls
outside the scope of the Convention, and must therefore be rejected
under Article 27 para. 2 (art. 27-2) as being incompatible ratione
materiae with the provisions of the Convention.

3. The applicant also complains that he did not receive an
impartial hearing before the Social Insurance Court and that
Article 6 (art. 6) of the Convention has therefore been violated.
Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1) first sentence reads:

"In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any
criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public
hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial
tribunal established by law."

The Commission considers that it can leave open the question of the
applicability of Article 6 (art. 6), i.e. the question whether the
determination of the applicant's right to unemployment benefits
related to his "civil rights" within the meaning of Article 6
(art. 6).

Even assuming that Article 6 (art. 6) was applicable to the
proceedings before the Supreme Insurance Court, the Commission finds
that the fact that the Court asked the National Labour Market Board to
make an inquiry in the case, and to state its views, does not raise an
issue under Article 6 (art. 6) in view of the fact that these views
were communicated to the applicant, who then submitted his final
statement. The practice that the appeal instance requests further
investigation or an opinion from the authority which has made the
decision appealed against, is not in itself an objectionable
procedure.  This practice, as applied in the applicant's case, cannot
be considered to have made the Supreme Insurance Court lack
impartiality within the meaning of Article 6 (art. 6) or have resulted
in any lack of equality of arms, as guaranteed by Article 6 (art. 6).

It follows that in this respect the application is manifestly
ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (art. 27-2) of
the Convention.

4. Finally, as regards the applicant's complaints about the use
of personal identity numbers, the Commission observes that there is no
provision in the Convention which as such expressly or implicitly
prohibits the use of such numbers.  The question which may arise is
whether the manner in which personal identity numbers are used
infringes any Articles of the Convention.  The Commission has
previously held that data protection is an issue which falls within
the scope of Article 8 (art. 8) of the Convention and that it is
conceivable that the use of personal identity numbers as a way of
storing data in different registers and the matching of such registers
could raise an issue under Article 8 (art. 8) (see No. 10473/83,
Dec. 11.12.85, unpublished).

The Commission considers however that there is nothing in the
applicant's submissions which could raise an issue under
Articles 8 (art. 8) or 14 (art. 14) of the Convention.

It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded
within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (art. 27-2) of the Convention.

For these reasons, the Commission

DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE

Secretary to the Commission         President of the Commission

(H. C. KRÜGER)                      (C. A. NØRGAARD)