(TRANSLATION) THE FACTS The applicant, a Swiss national, born in 1953, is resident i n Basle. He is a printer. In the proceedings before the Commission, he is represented by Mr. Martin Neidhart, a lawyer at Liestal ( Switzerland) . 194 The applicant is the spokesman for the regional section of an anti-nuclear movement at Kaiseraugst, near Basle. On 3 February 1983 a demonstration directed and organised by the applicant took place at Basle. At the time of these events, a high tension pylon was c riminally blown up at Prattein, a town no[ far from Basle. According to the a pplicant, this act gave the Swiss authorities an excuse for tapping his private telephone. In the first week of February the applicant had already noticed that he was being tailed by the police . On 22 August 1 983, he was informed unofficialiy that his telephone had been tapped for one week in February . On 12 September 1983, the applicant lodged a public law complaint with the Federal Court, challenging the telephone surveillance which he suspected. By decision of 19 March 1 984, the Federal Court dismissed the complaint, considering that such a complaini was not admissible unless directed against cantonal measures. That was not the case. In a letter of 1 2 April 1984, the applicant then applied to the Attorney General of the Confederation to enquire whether he had ordered the telephone surveillance. The Attorney General's Office informed the applicant in a letter of 16 M ay 1984 that it was unable to give an answer on that point . On 28 May, the applicant repeated his request, making a point of referring to Articles 6, 8 a nd 1 3 of the Convention. In a letter of 4 June 1 984, the Office of the Attorney Generai of the Confederation c ited several reasons which niight have resu lted in the applicant not being notified : either no telzphone tapping had been ordered , or the measure was still in force, or it was no longer in force but had to remain secret so as not to interfere with the course of the investigation. In any case, it was claimed, the measure was in conformity with Section 66 of the Federal Law on Criminal Procedure (PPF) as well as with Article 8 para. 2 of the Convention . On 25 June 1984, the applicant lodged with the Federal Department of Justice and Police a formal complaint under a"complaints to the supervising authority" procedure (Aufsichtsbeschwerde) against the refusal of the Attorney General's Office io give information about the reasons for and manner and duration of the telephone surveillance . In a letter of 21 December 1984, the Federal Department of Justice and Police informed him thai it treated any complaint founded on Section 71 ofthe Federal Law on Administrative Procedure as a formal complaint within the meaning of Sect ions 44 et seq. of that Law . Consequently, the applicant enjoyed all the recognised rights of parties and was entitled to an officiai decis ion by the Federal Department of Justice and Police. It follows that the conditions of Article 13 were respected . 195 In a letter of 1 1 )anuary 1985 , the applicant asked for right ut access to the file on the procedure conceming the telephone surveillance. He was met by a refusal on the part of the Federal Department of Justice and Police in a letter of 30 January 1985. In its final decision of 23 April 1985 , the said Depanment dismissed the cumplaint. Having pointed out that it was treating the applicant's complaint as a formxl complaint under Section 44 of Ihe Federal Law on Administrative Procedure and having once more refused the request for access to the file, the Department stated, in the first place, that the legal basis for a telephonz survei llance was laid down in Sections 66, 66 quater and 72 PPF. A i the same time it explained that the cond it ions laid down in these prov isions were legitimate inasmuch as the purpose of the criminal i nvestigation department was to prosecute o ffences against the internai and external security of the Confederation committe d, as was the case in point, by groups belonging to the Kaiseraugst anti-nuclear movement, whose spokesman the applicant was. The fact of keepi ng any telephone tapping secret had to be considered separa tely in each case . In any eve nt, there could be no breach of Article 8 of the Con- vention, since Ihe praclice adoPted was in conformity with the case-law of the European Court (cf. Eur. Court H. R., Klass and others judgment of 6 September 1978, Series A no . 28, p. 30). Lastly, the Department considered that pending an official revision of the provisions of the Federal Law on Criminal Procedure, the complaints procedure (Aufsichtsbeschwerde) constituted an effective remedy within the meaning of Arti cle 13 af the Co nvention. Indeed, the regulations provi de that at the advance notification stage of the enquiry into the complaint it is ascertai ned from the President of the Indictments Chamber of the Swiss Fede ral Court whether and for what reasons telephone tapping has taken place and for what reasons informaiion was subsequently withheld. Thanks to this procedure the Federal Depanment of Justice and Police has full k nowledge, when it takes a decision on the com plaint, of the decision taken in this context by the President of the Ind ictments Chamber of the Federal Co urt. It is thus in a position to evaluate the justification for t he telephone tap ping and for Ihe refusal of subsequent information to the person subjected to this measure . Notwithstanding. the upplicant applied, on 8 May 1 985, for an interpretation of the decision of the Federal Department of Justice and Police of 23 April 1985, under Sect ion 69 of the Federal Law on Admin ibtra[ive Procedure . However, by decision of 23 May 1 985, this latter outhority informed the a pplicant that it was not taking up the matter of the interpretation request. 196 The applicant's comploirus may be summed up a s follows : The applicant alieges, in the first place, a breach of Article 8 of the Convention, then of Articles 6 and 13 of the Convention and lastly of Article 17 of the Con- vention . With regard to Article 8 of the Convention : The applicant, who claims to have had his telephone tapped, states that this interference with his right to respect for his private life was not in accordance with any legal provision. He points out in this connection that the relevant provisions of Swiss law, unlike the provisions of the German Code of Criminal Procedure, make only vague and impreci se reference to the co nditions in which surveillance measures in the form of telephone tapping may be ordered . Furthermore, Swiss legislation authorises all technical mea ns of implementing such measures. Lastly, he daims that the judicial control is perfunctory and that the legislation contains nothing concerning notification to the person concerned, either if that person's telephone is still being tapped or subsequently. 2. With regard to Anicles 6 and 13 of the Convention : The applicant considers that the complaints procedure (Aufsichtsbeschwerde) before the Federal Depariment of Justice and Pol ice does not meet the requirements of Articles 6 and 13 of the Convention . He maintains that the authority in question here i s not an "i ndependent" authority, such as a"VibunaP' . Furthermore, the failure to notify the pecsun concerned deprives him of any possibility o f seeking and securing reparation for any alleged inj ury . With regard to Anicle 1 7 of the Comemion : The appl icant considers that the measure allegedly ordered in respect of him not only constimtes a breach o( the abuve-memioned provisions of the Convention, but seriously infringes his right to respect for his private life and in that way exceeds the limi[s imposed by Article 17 of the Convention . THE LAW I . The applicant alleges a violation of Article 8 of the Convention because, he ciaims, his telephone was tapped. In bis v iew, this constitutes a n interference with his right to respect for his private life. In addition, the applicant claims that his rights guaranteed in Articles 6 a nd 1 3 of the Convention have infringed, considering that the complaints proeedure (Aufsicht sbeschwerde) befo re the Federai Department of Justice and Police does not meet the requirements of either of these provisions of the Convention because, on the one hand, (hat authority cannot be described as un " independent tribunal " within the 197 meaning of Article 6 and, on the other hand , the procedure does not constimte an effective remedy within the meaning o f Article 13 to the s ituation complained of. Lastly, the applicant considers that the measure alleged [o have been ordered in respect of him fundamentally in[[inges his right to respect for his private life and so exceeds the limits imposed by Article 17 oC the Convention . Froni the outset, the responde nt Government leave open the question whether surveillance by telephone tapping was in fact ordered. This raises the question whether in Ihe present case the applicant can claim Io be a victim within the meani ng of Article 25 of the Comen[ion, the first paragraph of which reads : " I . The Commission may receive petitions addressed te the Secretary Gene ral of the Council of Europe from any person, non-governmzntal organisation or group of individuals claiming to be the victim of a violation by one of the High Contracting Panies of the righis sel fonh i n this Convention . . . " The Government refer o n this point to the following reaso ning, advanced by the Commission in its decis ion on the admissibility of application No . 10628/83 (Dec 1 4. 1 0.85, D. R. 44 pp. 1 75, 191) : "Reftrring ro the E uropean Coun ol Human Rights judgment in ihz Klass case (Eur. Court H . R., Klass and others judgment of 6 Sep[ember 1978, Series A no. 28, para . 34), the Commission recalls thai the Couh accepted that an individ ual may . under certain w ndi[ ions, claim to be the victim o f a violation occasioned by t he mere existence of secret meusures or of legislation perni itti ng secret measures, without havi ng to al lege that such measures were in fact applie d to him . In this respect the Court stated t hat the relevant conditions are [o be determined in each casz accordi ng to the Convention right or rig hts alleged to have been i nfringed, the secret character of the measu res objected to and t he co nnection betwee n the applicant and those mensures. In this context the Commission notes that Swiss legislation has established a system of surveillance under which anyone's telephone commu nications may be controlled when the conditions prescribed by law are satisfied without the person subjected ro this surveillance being informed of the fac t. In these circumstances (he Commission considers that the applicants ar e antitled Io claim to be victims of a violation of the Conve ntion although they are unable to bring evidence in support of their application to prove (hat they were subject to such a measure of surveillance . " The respondent Government als-o argue that, as regards the question of supe r- v ising telephone tapping, the applicant should have requested the competent national au[horities and in part icular the Federal Council to give a decis ion on the situation compl ained of, in particular by using the complaints procedure (Aufsichtsbeschwe rde), which involves an a posteriori control of the expediency of a telephone surveillance order and, more generally, co nvol of the proper appl ication of the 198 relevant legal provisions. In the Government's v iew, the range of procedural guaran- tees available to the applicant in this case g uaranteed him an effective remedy within the meaning of Article 26 of the Convention. The applicant contests this point of view . In particular, he considers that the complaints procedure before the Federal Council advocated by the respondent Governmem is not an effective remedy within the meaning of Article 26 of the Conve ntion and, more generally, Ihat there are no remedies available in Swiss law capable of providing a solution for a situation such as that complained of. It could not, therefore, validly be mai ntained that the application is inadmissible for failure to exhaust the domestic remedies within the meaning of Article 26 of the Convention . The Commission finds the question of the exhaustion of domestic remedies a difficult one which in the present case raises some uncenainty. It is strongly disputed between the parties . Nevertheless, the Commission does not consider it necessary to examine this question further, si nce the application is in any event inadmissible for other reasons . 2. The Commiss ion will examine in the first place whether the alleged measures of surveillance and control by telephone tapping complained of by the applicant amoum to an interference with his rights guaranteed by Article 8 of the Convention and, if so, whether such interference may be justified under paragraph 2 of that provision. This article reads as follows : I . Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence. 2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exerc ise o f this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society i n the interests of national security, publ ic safety or the economic well-being of the country, fo r the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of heatth or morals, or (or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. ┬░ The Commission considers that these measures, assuming that Ihey were applied to the applicant's telephone communications, constituted an interference with the exercise of his rights under paragraph 1 of Article 8. As the Court stated in its judgment in the Klass case (foc. cit., para. 41) : "Clearly, any of the permitted surveillance measures, once applied ro a given individual, would result in an interference by a public authority w ith the exerci se of Ihat individual 's rights to respect for his private and family life and his correspondence . Furthermore, in the mere existence o f the legislation itself there is imolved, for all those to whom the legislation could be applied, a menace of surveillance ; this menace necessarily strikes at freedom of eommunicatio n between users of the postal and telecommunication services and 199 therefore constitutes a n 'interference by a public authority' with che exercise of the applicants' right to respect for private and family life and for correspon- dence. " However, paragra ph 2 of Article 8 a uthorises certain restrictions on the exercise of t hese rights and the question arises whether the interferences provided for by Swiss legislation fall within the ambit of this paragraph. As the Commission poinied o ut in its decision on Application No. 1 0628/83 referred to above, in order not to cause a breach of Article 8 of the Convention, the interference must in the first place have been "in accorda nce with the law" . This requirement is fulfilled in the present case because the measures of surveilla nce and control by telephone tapping are provided for by Sections 72 and 66 to 66 quater of the Federal Law on Criminal Procedure (PPF) . Finally, the interference m ust be "necessary" in a democratie society, in particular for "national security, public safety . . . or for the prevention of d isorder or crime" . The general responsibility for "investigations and intelligence for ihe purpose of protecting the internal and external security of the country" (Section 58 of the Pede[al Law on ihe Admin istration of 19 September 1978) lies wi th the Attorney Gene ral of the Confederation. Furthermo re, it is clearly specified in the wording of Sections 72 and 66 to 66 quuier PPF that surve illance and control of the v arious forms of communication may only be ordered if vario us conditions are satisfie d. In particular, there Rmst be ev idence providing a ground for suspicion that someone is planning, commilling or has committed an offence, the serio usness or particular nature of w hich j ustifies this kind oi intervention. Furthermore, a person subjected to surveillance must be suspected of having committed or taken part in committing such an offence ; in addition, the ordinary measures of investigation must have proved inadequate owing m[he nature of the facts a nd the circumstances o f the case . Under Section 72 PPF any measure co nnected with the prosecution of offences againsi the internul or extemal security of the Confede rution must be ordered by the Attorney General of the Confederation himself, acting in complete independence . Withi n 24 hours of his decision he must submit it to the approval of the President of the Indictme nts Chambe r of the Fede ral Court (Sectio n 66 to 66 gimrer PPF). Finally, there is a periodical control nf the co ntinuation of surveillance at least once every six months. On the expiry of this period a prolongat ion order must be made hy the Attorney General a nd approved hy the President of the Indictments Chambcr. The Commission notes that the measures of surveillance and control by telephone tapping are subject to a prior authorisation procedure and that this surveill ance is terminated as soon as it is no longer necessary or t he decision is revoked . The conditions set out by the Court i n the Klass judgment (lor. cir., paras . 51 and 52) are thus, generally speaking, satisfied in this case. 200 The fact that the judicial control procedure is "secret even with respect to the person affected " (Section 66 quater (1) PPF) cannotjustify criticism from the point of view of A rticle 8 para. 2 of the Convention because this characteristic of the procedure is itself " in acco rdance with the law " and is "necessary" i n a democratic society (Eur. Court H. R., foc. cit. para . 55) . Finxlly, as regards the absence of subsequent notification to the applicant, the Commi ssion recalls that in the Klass judgment the Court stated that it cannot be incompatible with Article 8 para. 2 not to inform the person affecteA as soon as the surveillance has stopped because refraining from doing so is precisely what ensures the efficacy of the interference (Eur. Court H.R., loc. cit., para. 58) . It should be pointed out, moreover, that in the Swiss system it is permissible ro refrain from subsequent notification only in cases where such information would risk compromi sing the aim and object of the telephone tapping measure . Taking all these facts into consideration, the criteria stated by the Court in the above-cited judgment and the conclusion reac hed by the Commission in its decision on the above-mentioned application No. 10628/83, the Commission reaches the conclusion that the measures of surveillance and control by telephone tapping which can be ordered under Swiss legislation do not go beyond what is strictly neccssary in a democra[ic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the prevention of disorder or crime. It follows that in this respect the application is manifestly i ll-founded and must be rejected under Anicle 27 para. 2 of the Convention. 3 . The Commission must next take a decision on the applicam 's allegation that the complaints procedure (Aufsichtsbeschwerde) before t he Fzderal Department of Justice and Police did not meet the requirements of Article 6 of the Convention because that authority is not an "independent tribunal" within the meaning of that prov ision. Here the Commission refers to the Court's Kl ass judgment (/oc. cie., para. 75). In that judgment the Coutt stated that as long as the surveillance remained validly secret, the decision placing someone under surveillance was thereby incapable of judicial control on the initiative of the person concerned, within the meaning of Arti cle 6 and therefore of necessity escaped the requirements of that article. Following the same reasoning in the present case, the Commission reaches the conclusion that Article 6, assuming that it is applicable here, bas not been violated . As the applieant received no subsequent notification of the application of telephone surveillance, it is unnecessary in this case to decide whether, if he had, there would have existed a judicial remedy satisfying the requirements of Article 6 . I[ follows that thia part of the application is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected under Article 27 para. 2 of the Convention . '_0 1 4. The applicant also com plained of a violation of Anicle 13 of the Convention, which reads : "Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set fort h in this Convention are violated s hall have an effective remedy before a nationa l authority notwithstand ing that the violation has been commiuzd by persom acting in an officiul capacity . " The applicant claims in this connection that there is no effec tive remedy, in Switzerland, for the sit uation complained of. In particular, the complaints procedure (Aufsichtsbeschwerde) advocated by the Govzrnment does not satisfy the requiremen ts of the said provisio n of the Convention . In their obse rvations, the Government made the general point that in Switzerland the individual has a nomber of remedies ava ilable in the matter of telephone tapping which, taken together, met the requirements of A nicle 13 of the Convention . These were control by the judicial uuthority in the person of the President of the Indictments Chamber of t he Aederal Co urt, action by the administrative authority, namely the Federai Auor ney General's Office, combined with adm inisvative remed ies before the Federal Department of Justice and Police and before the Federal Counci l. administrative authorilies with jurisdiction in this ficld . In part icular, ihe Government referred to the complaints procedure (Aufsichtsbeschwerde) poin[ing ou t that complaints based on Section 7 1 of the Fedcra l Law on Admi nistrative Procedure are treated as forma l complaints wi thin the meaning of Section 44 et seq . of that Law . Consequently, the perso n concerned enjoys all the recognised rights o f part ies and is enti lled lo an ofPicia) decis ion by the Aederal Departmen [ of Justice and Police, itself subjzc[ to ap peal to [he Federal Counei l . The applicant replied that Ihe authori[ies shou ld have informed him whether his telephone had real ty been tapped . Moreover, he considers that the Federa l Department of Justice and Police, as the hierarchical superior of ihe Federal Attorney GeneruL could not be considered an independent appeal body . Here the Commission recalls thet, in accordance with its eonstant case-law, Article 13 of the Conven tion is concerned with a remedy for an al leged breach of one of the righis and freedoms set forth in other anicles o( the Convention. It also points to ii s conclusion in the Klass case (cf, above-ci ted judgmem) that if notifieat ion ran counter to the purpose of the interference necessary for national security and j usti fied by the Convention (Article 8 para . Z), an imerpretatiu n of Article 1 3 having the effect of creating a right to he informed would no( be i n harmony with the logic of the Co nvention (see Comm . Report 9.3.77, para . 71, Series B no. 26). This reason ing was endorsed by the Court in the same case (judgmen[, [oc. cit., para. 68). The Commission points out that the system of remed ies in the matter of telephone tapping raises special problems in relation to Article 1 3 of the Convention , 202 since even subsequent notification of the measu re applied would be likely tu defeat the purpose of that measure. Consequently, as the Court stated in the Klass case (lor. cit., para. 69), an effective remedy under Article 13, in the specific situation of secret surveillance, must mean a remedy that is as effective as can be having regard to the restricted scope for recourse inherent in any system of sec ret surveillance . Whereas under the German system examined in the Klass case there was an obligation tu notify the person concerned subsequently, provided this could be done without jeopardising the purpose of the restriction, the Luxembourg system, examined by the Commission in the cases of Mersch and others (No. 10439/83, No. 10440/83, No . 10441/83, No . 10452/83, No . 10512/63 and No . 10513/83, Dec. 1 0.5 . 85, D .R . 43 p . 34), was characterised by the total absence of any such notification. Nevertheless, the Commission considered that the right to apply to the Luxembourg Council of State, which was bound to instimte an enquiry, together with the existence of certain other guarantees, namely the right to bring a civil action against the State and the prior control ofthe appropriateness of the surveillance, were of a nature to meet the requirements of Article 1 3 . In the summing up by t he Cou rt in the case of Silve r and others (E ur . Court H.R., judgment of 25 March 1983, Series A no 61, p. 42, paras . 111-113) in th e con text of an examination of Articles 1 3 a nd 8 of the Co nventi on taken toge ther, it enunciated a number of princ iples . from the last of which it followed that "the applicatio n of Article 1 3 in a g iven case will depend upon th e mann er in which th e Con- trac ting State concerned has c hosen t o discharge its obliga tion unde r Article 1 directly to sec ure to anyone within its jurisdiction th e rights and freedoms set o ut in Section I" . Thc Commission must now consider Ihe va riou s remedies ava ilable to the applicant under Swiss law in order to establ ish whether they are "effective" i n this narrow sense . It should be st ressed that there exists in ihe Swi ss system a prior control of the appropriateness of surveillance in as much as the authoriry which orders telephone tapping is obliged to seek, within 24 hou rs, the approval of Ihe President of the Indictments Chamber of the Federal Court. 'The Commission notes, moreover, that a posteriori control seems possible to a certain extent. It is true that in this case the applicant has not so far been informed by the authorities as to whether or not his telephone calls have been monito red. [t was in an exchange of letters be tween him and the Office of the Federal Attorney General and in the light of the written reply he received that the yuestion of a posteriori control arose . In a letter of 4 June 1984, that authority, replying to the applicant's re quest for information concerning orders that might have been given to tap bis telephone, stated 203 that "either no s urveillance had been ordered, or s urveillance was si ill conti nuing, or surveillance had cease d but had not, or not yet, been notified because of the risk that such notification might jeopardise the purpose of the measure" . [t follows that once the measure has ceased, assu ming that it was ordered, ihe applicant will be informed unless such inY╠łOrniation threatens to jeopardise the aim and object of the measure in question. Where it is in the public interest to p reserve secrecy, namely when the internal or external security of the Confederation is at st ake, the Fulerai Attorney GeneraPs Office must secure the approval of the President of the lndietmeuts Chamber of the Federal Co urt in order to be relievzd of the obligation to inform the person concerned in the normal course of events of the telephone surveillance. Las[ly, it must be said thut when the complaints procedure (Aufsichtsbesc hwerde) is instimied before the Federal Depariment of Justice and Police against the refusal of the Federal Attorney Gene raPs Office to g ive information conce rning the reasons for and the manner and duration nf le{ephone surveillance, that authoriry, in accorda nce with recent practice, treats the complaints it receives under Sect ion 71 of the Federal Law on Administrative Procedure as complaints within the meani ng of Section 44 et srq. of that Law. Consequently, the person concerned tnjoys all the recognised rights of parties and, in particular, is entitled to a formal deci sion. The complaint gives rise to an enquiry addressed to the President of the Indictments Chamber of the Federal Cou rt and , on the basis of the information received, the Federai Department of 7ustice and Police evaluales the legitimacy of t he surveillance measure and of the absence of any subsequent noti5cation to the person concerned, where that is the case. In add ition, ihat authority takes an o[ficial decision against which it is possible to appeal to [he Federal Council, the highest national instance. The Commissiun notes that in this case the procedure descr ibed above was applied, inasmuch as the applicant made use of the legal means at his disposal, e xcept, however, for the appeal to the Federal Council . The Commission accordi ngly considers that the range of remedies provided for i n Swiss law meets the requirements of Article 13 of the Convention, having regard to the special field of survei ll ance by telephone tapping and to t he specific circumstances of the case . It follows that this part oCthe application is also manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected under Article 27 par . 2 of the Convention . 5 . Lastly, in so far as the applicant alleges that the measure allegedly ordered in his case fundamentally infri nged his right to respect fo r his private life, thus exceedi ng the limits imposed by Article 1 7 of the Convention, the Commission considers that there is no cause to take account of this provision of the Convention, having regard to the conclusions il has reached concerning the other points raised in the application. For these reasons, the Commission DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE. 2C4