The European Commission of Human Rights sitting in private on 24
January 1986, the following members being present:

          MM. C. A. NØRGAARD, President
              G. SPERDUTI
              J. A. FROWEIN
              G. JÖRUNDSSON
              S. TRECHSEL
              B. KIERNAN
              A. WEITZEL
              H. DANELIUS
              G. BATLINER
              H. VANDENBERGHE
        Mrs.  G. H. THUNE
         Sir  Basil HALL

Mr. H. C. KRÜGER Secretary to the Commission

Having regard to Art. 25 of the Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (art. 25);

Having regard to the application introduced on 31 July 1985 by
N.M. against the United Kingdom and registered on 27 November 1985
under file N° 11864/85;

Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 40 of the Rules of
Procedure of the Commission;

Having deliberated;

Decides as follows:


The applicant is a United Kingdom citizen, born in 1945.  He lives in
Staffordshire and describes himself as a company director.

The facts of the application, as they have been submitted by the
applicant and may be deduced from the documents supplied by him, may
be summarised as follows:

In 1980, the applicant's company was sued by another company ("the
plaintiff company").  The applicant, claiming a personal interest in
the action, was added as a second defendant.  The trial took place on
21 May 1984, when judgment was given against the applicant's company
and against him.

The applicant applied to have the Order of 21 May 1984 set aside, but
that application was refused on 10 August 1984 as the applicant should
have appealed formally.  A notice of appeal dated 30 November 1984 was
submitted in which the applicant also requested an extension of time
in which to appeal.  A single judge of the Court of Appeal considered
the evidence and the judge at first instance's decision and found on
15 February 1985 that the appeal would have no realistic chance of of
success at all and that leave to appeal out of time should not be
granted.  The full Court of Appeal on 29 April 1985 agreed with the
single judge.

On 24 October 1985 a further hearing was held in which a judge in
chambers first refused an application for the original order of 21 May
1984 to be dismissed (there being no power to make such an order).  A
request for a committal order against the plaintiff company's lawyers
and an unnamed officer of the court in the Leeds District Registry was
also refused.  That second application was by way of an appeal from an
order of a District Registrar which itself dismissed a summons by the
applicant requesting an indemnity for the applicant from the plaintiff
company's lawyers in respect of costs.

As a corollory to the above proceedings, the applicant is being
pressed by the bankers to his company for payment of various sums in
connection with guarantees made by the applicant in respect of his
company's lending from the bank.


The applicant complains of the hearings before the various courts from
1984 to 1985.  He also alleges a conspiracy on the part of the bank in
that the bank is also banker to the plaintiff company.

The applicant alleges violations of Arts. 8 (art. 8), 13 (art. 13) and
14 (art. 14) of the Convention.


To the extent that the applicant complains about the activities of his
company's bank, the Commission recalls that, under Art. 25, para. 1 of
the Convention (art. 25-1), it may only admit an application from a
person, non-governmental organisation or group of individuals, where
the applicant alleges a violation by one of the Contracting Parties of
the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention and where that party
has recognised the competence of the Commission.  The Commission may
not, therefore, admit applications directed against corporate bodies
such as a bank.  In this respect the Commission refers to its
consistent case-law (see e.g. Dec. Nos. 172/56, Yearbook I, p. 211
and 3925/69, Collection 32 p. 36, 58).  It follows that this part of
the application is incompatible ratione personae with the Convention
within the meaning of Art. 27, para. 2 of the Convention (art. 27-2).

The applicant also complains about the proceedings in which he has
been involved before the United Kingdom courts.

However, the Commission is not required to decide whether or not the
facts alleged by the applicant disclose any appearance of a violation
of the Convention as Art. 26 of the Convention (art. 26) provides that
the Commission "may only deal with a matter ... within a period of six
months from the date on which the final decision was taken". According
to the Commission's consistent case-law the "final decision" within
the meaning of Art. 26 (art. 26) refers solely to the final decision
involved in the exhaustion of all domestic remedies according to the
generally recognised rules of international law.  In particular, only
a remedy which is "effective and sufficient" can be considered for
this purpose (see e.g. Dec. No. 918/60, Collection 32 pp. 108-110 and
No. 654/59, Yearbook IV, p.277, 283).

The Commission finds that, in the present case, the applicant's
request on 30 November 1984 for an extension of time in which to
appeal which was refused on 15 February 1985 and all subsequent
hearings could not constitute an effective remedy under the generally
recognised rules of international law because they were all brought
either out of time or in circumstances in which there was no
competence to consider them. Consequently, the decisions regarding
these further applications and summons cannot be taken into
consideration in determining the date of the final decision for the
purposes of applying the six months time limit laid down in Art. 26
(art. 26). The final decision regarding the applicant's disputes with
the plaintiff company is accordingly the decision of the judge of
first instance of 21 May 1984, whereas the present application was
submitted to the Commission only on 31 July 1985.  Furthermore, an
examination of the case does not disclose the existence of any special
circumstances which might have interrupted or suspended the running of
that period.

It follows that this part of the application has been introduced out
of time and must be rejected under Art. 27, para. 3 of the Convention
(art. 27-3).

For these reasons, the Commission


Secretary to the Commission         President of the Commission

    (H. C. KRÜGER)                       (C. A. NØRGAARD)