AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

                      Application No. 14006/88
                      by Barbro JOHANSSON
                      against Sweden

      The European Commission of Human Rights sitting in private on
30 November 1992, the following members being present:

           MM.   C.A. NØRGAARD, President
                 J.A. FROWEIN
                 S. TRECHSEL
                 A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK
                 A. WEITZEL
                 J.-C. SOYER
                 H.G. SCHERMERS
                 H. DANELIUS
           Mrs.  G. H. THUNE
           Sir   Basil HALL
           Mrs.  J. LIDDY
           MM.   L. LOUCAIDES
                 J.-C. GEUS
                 M.P. PELLONPÄÄ
                 B. MARXER

                 Mr. H.C. KRÜGER, Secretary to the Commission


      Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;

      Having regard to the application introduced on 5 May 1988 by
Barbro JOHANSSON against Sweden and registered on 8 July 1988 under
file No. 14006/88;

      Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent
Government on 11 October 1990 and 24 April 1991 and the observations
submitted by the applicant on 2 January, 15 April and 29 July 1991 and
20 May, 22 June 1992, 1 October and 15 November 1992;

      Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules
of Procedure of the Commission;

      Having deliberated;

      Decides as follows:
THE FACTS

      The applicant is a Swedish citizen born in 1932. She is a nurse
resident at Mörlunda. Before the Commission she is represented by
Mr. Göran Ravnsborg, a lecturer at the University of Lund.

      The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be
summarised as follows.

Particular circumstances of the case

      In 1971 the applicant's husband bought an agricultural property
called Brånstorp 1:6 in the municipality of Nässjö from Mrs. E.J. The
property had previously been offered for sale to the owner of the
neighbouring property, Mr. H.A., who refused it. The applicant's
husband's subsequent request for a permit to acquire the property was
rejected by the County Agricultural Board (lantbruksnämnden) of the
County of Jönköping on the ground that the property was needed to
promote the establishment of functional farm holding units. The
purchase was considered void and Mrs. E.J. remained the official owner.

      On 24 November 1982 the District Court (tingsrätten) of Eksjö
found that Mrs. E.J. was the dummy-owner of the property and that the
real owner was the applicant's husband.

      On 5 July 1983 the Enforcement Office (kronofogdemyndigheten)
decided that the property was to be sold at a compulsory sale by
auction (exekutiv auktion).

      In January 1984 the property was sold at such an auction for
101.000 SEK. The applicant bid 100.000 SEK. As the purchase was never
completed a second auction was held on 16 April 1984, at which the
applicant bought the property for 100.000 SEK, hers being the sole bid.
For the purposes of the 1979 Land Acquisition Act (jordförvärvslag
1979:230, hereinafter "the 1979 Act") the auction was regarded as a
compulsory auction. The applicant therefore received information as to
her obligation under Section 16 of the 1979 Act to obtain a permit to
retain the property within two years in order to avoid a compulsory
re-sale of the property.

      The purchase was registered in the real estate register on
11 July 1984.

      By letter of 5 September 1986 the County Agricultural Board
reminded the applicant of the conditions under the 1979 Act attaching
to her purchase.

      On 3 November 1986 the applicant submitted a request to the
County Agricultural Board that she be granted a permit to retain the
property in accordance with the 1979 Act. She stated that she intended
to work the land part-time in her leisure hours. On 3 February 1987 the
County Agricultural Board rejected the request, considering that the
property was needed for the rationalisation of agriculture and
forestry.

      In her appeal to the National Board of Agriculture (lantbruks-
styrelsen) the applicant submitted that she intended to produce
material for soil improvement.

      On 20 May 1987 the appeal was rejected. The Board found that the
property, which lacked buildings and covered about 21 hectars, was not,
on its own, a farm holding suitable for development. Furthermore,
Mr. H.A. had announced his interest in purchasing an additional
property. The need for a rationalisation of H.A.'s farm holding clearly
outweighed the applicant's interest in keeping the property.

      The applicant's further appeal was rejected by the Government on
10 September 1987 on the ground that the use of the property in the
rationalisation of forestry was in the general interest.

      On 25 February 1988 the County Administrative Board (läns-
styrelsen) of the County of Jönköping at the request of the County
Agricultural Board ordered that the property be sold compulsorily by
auction in accordance with Section 16 of the 1979 Act.

      The applicant's appeal to the Government was rejected on
8 September 1988.

      At the applicant's request a special valuation of the property
was carried out. The estimated value was considered to be 300.000 SEK.

      On 11 April 1990 the applicant requested that the Government
reconsider its decisions of 10 September 1987 concerning the retention
permit and of 8 September 1988 concerning the sale of the property. She
also requested that the Government order the suspension of the sale.
On 19 April 1990 the Government decided to take no further action, as
it had already taken a final position concerning the retention permit
and the auction.

      The public auction took place on 27 April 1990 and the property
was sold to the County Agricultural Board for 300,000 SEK.

      The applicant appealed against the auction to the Göta Court of
Appeal (Göta hovrätt), requesting inter alia that it set aside the sale
of the property and declare void the administrative decisions resulting
in the sale.

      On 21 May 1990 the applicant received the purchase-price.

      On 8 June 1990 the Göta Court of Appeal decided that the case
should be considered on the basis of written submissions
(föredragning).

      On 26 June 1990 it rejected the appeal, stating that it had no
jurisdiction to review the decisions of the administrative authorities
concerning the retention permit or the decisions ordering the
compulsory sale of the property.

      On 3 December 1990 the Supreme Court (Högsta domstolen) granted
leave to appeal. On 11 March 1991 it quashed the decisions by the Göta
Court of Appeal of 8 and 26 June 1990 and referred the case back to
that court, considering inter alia that the applicant should have been
granted an oral hearing.

      The Supreme Court further stated in its judgment:

      "[The applicant's] appeal raises the question to what
      extent an administrative decision taken on the basis of
      [the 1979 Act] can be reviewed or annulled in subsequent
      execution proceedings.

      This question is connected with the general question to
      what extent executable deeds can be annulled in execution
      proceedings. This problem has been noted both in the case-
      law and in the doctrine. It has been considered that the
      execution authorities - both the Enforcement Offices and
      the superior organs - have a right of review but that this
      right is very limited. However, according to what has been
      stated in one case, there may be good reasons to extend the
      review of executable deeds somewhat more than usual when
      the deeds are administrative decisions, in particular when
      these decisions cannot be appealed to an administrative
      court. ...

      It is also justified, in this context, to take into account
      the provisions of the 1950 European Convention on Human
      Rights as well as the case-law developed by the European
      Court of Human Rights. On 21 February 1990 the European
      Court decided a case against Sweden where - as in the
      present case - the issue concerned a compulsory sale of
      real property after a permit to acquire the property under
      [the 1979 Act] had been refused (the Håkansson and
      Sturesson case). In its judgment (Series A no. 171), the
      Court found that questions of permits to acquire property
      as well as questions of compulsory sales concerned the
      individual's "civil rights and obligations" and that the
      individual who was affected had a right under the
      Convention to have the issue examined by a court.

      In order to satisfy fully the requirements of the European
      Convention, a court review would seem to be required which
      is different from that which can be effected as part of
      execution proceedings. In a proposal which has recently
      been submitted to the Law Council (lagrådet) it has
      therefore been suggested that, in cases under [the 1979
      Act], the decisions of the central agricultural authority
      shall be subject to appeal to the Administrative Court of
      Appeal (kammarrätten). Pending a reform of such kind the
      possibility for a court review which exists at the stage of
      the execution should be used as far as possible.

      It follows that a review should take place of the
      administrative decisions which resulted in the auction of
      27 April 1990".

      On 1 April 1992 the Göta Court of Appeal rejected the applicant's
request that the former Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the County
Agricultural Board and a real estate agent be heard as witnesses.
Referring to the Supreme Court's finding in its decision
of 11 March 1991 the Court found, however, that the applicant herself
should be heard as well as the official of the County Agricultural
Board who had been in charge of the applicant's case.

      On 4 August 1992 the Göta Court of Appeal struck the appeal out
off its list of cases, the applicant having withdrawn it in view of the
settlement reached between her and the County Administrative Board on
30 July 1992. Under the settlement the applicant was granted a right
to repurchase the property Brånstorp 1:6 under the condition that she
would withdraw her appeal.

Relevant domestic law

      The acquisition of agricultural real property is subject to the
regulations of the 1979 Act. The aim of the 1979 Act was to implement
new agricultural guidelines adopted by Parliament (Riksdagen) in 1977
and to further the policy goals of forestry and regional planning.

      On 1 July 1987 amendments to the 1979 Act entered into force, the
purpose of which was to make it easier to obtain a permit for the
purchase of agricultural holdings. The aim of the amended 1979 Act was
to support appropriate development of farm holdings in the general
interest and to form well-adapted holdings in conformity with the aims
of regional policy.

      On 1 July 1991 further amendments to the 1979 Act entered into
force. The provisions below of the 1979 Act refer to their wording up
to 1 July 1991.

      Under Sections 2 and 3 of the 1979 Act a permit is required for
the acquisition of an agricultural holding. No permit is required inter
alia if the property is acquired at a compulsory auction. A request for
a permit shall in principle be made within three months from the
purchase (Section 12). Under Section 4, first paragraph, a permit may
be refused inter alia if it is in the general interest that the
property be used for rationalisation of agriculture or forestry
(sub-section 1) or if it is obvious that the purchase price or other
compensation considerably exceeds the market value of the property
(sub-section 4).

      Under Section 16, first paragraph, a property acquired at a
compulsory auction - in circumstances which in the case of an ordinary
purchase would have required a permit - shall be re-sold within two
years, unless the said circumstances have by then ceased to exist or
the purchaser has obtained a permit from the County Agricultural Board
to retain the property. The granting of such a permit is subject inter
alia to the regulations in Sections 3 and 4, with the exception of
Section 4, sub-section 4. The sale contract established after the
compulsory auction shall contain a note recalling the obligation laid
down in Section 16. A decision by the County Agricultural Board not to
grant permission to retain a property may be appealed to the National
Board of Agriculture and ultimately to the Government (Section 18).

      If, in a case where this is required under Section 16, the
property has not been resold within the prescribed time-limit, the
County Administrative Board shall, at the request of the Country
Agricultural Board, order that the property be sold at a public auction
by the Enforcement Office. At such an auction the property may only be
sold to someone who has received an acquisition permit or who is, like
the County Agricultural Board, exempted from the permit requirement.

      Section 17 specifies that no sale at an auction under that
Section may take place unless the purchase price offered amounts at
least to the value to be attributed to the property in accordance with
the provisions of Chapter 12 of the Code of Enforcement (utsöknings-
balken). This value is to be fixed by the Enforcement Office or, if the
owner of the property makes a timely request for a special valuation,
by valuers appointed by the County Administrative Board. In both cases
the valuation shall be made in consultation with the County
Agricultural Board. If the property is not sold at the auction the
County Agricultural Board may, within a period of two years, request
the County Administrative Board to hold a new auction. If no such
request is made, or if no acceptable bid is made at the second auction,
the owner is no longer required to sell the property.

      The County Administrative Board's decision to order a public
auction may be appealed to the Government.

      The Enforcement Office's decisions in respect of an auction may,
according to Chapter 18 Section 1 of the Code of Enforcement, be
brought before a court of appeal and ultimately, with leave to appeal,
before the Supreme Court. However, according to Section 6 para. 2 of
the same Chapter, an appeal against a decision that is merely a
preparatory step for a final decision may, in general, be lodged only
in connection with an appeal against the latter. Appeals follow the
rules of the 1986 Administrative Act (förvaltningslagen) and those of
the Code of Judicial Procedure (rättegångsbalken), as far as the latter
are relevant.

      In the event that the purchase of agricultural property becomes
void as a result of a refusal of permission to acquire the property on
the ground that it is needed for the rationalisation of agriculture and
forestry, the State is, according to Section 14 of the 1979 Act,
obliged to redeem the property at the purchase price agreed upon in the
invalid sale, if so requested by the seller. However, no such
obligation exists where the purchase price considerably exceeds the
value of the property in view of its yield and other circumstances, or
if the terms are unreasonable in other respects. A request for
redemption should be made to the County Agricultural Board. An action
for redemption may be brought before the Real Estate Court
(fastighetsdomstolen). The decision of that court can be appealed to
a court of appeal and from there an appeal lies to the Supreme Court.

      Under Chapter 52, Section 10, para. 1 of the Code of Judicial
Procedure the Court of Appeal shall, where it is necessary for the
purposes of the investigation of a case that a party or other person
be heard orally, decide on such a hearing as it finds appropriate.
According to Chapter 56, Section 12 the same provision applies in
respect of proceedings before the Supreme Court.


COMPLAINTS

1.    The applicant complains that there is no court remedy against the
decision to refuse her a permit to retain her property. She alleges
that the absence of such a remedy constitutes violations of Article 6
para. 1 of the Convention and Article 13 of the Convention.

2.    She also complains that the refusal of a retention permit
violated her rights under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the
Convention. In her submissions of 2 January 1991 she further complained
of the 1990 compulsory sale of Brånstorp 1:6.

3.    She finally complains of violations of Article 14 of the
Convention, separately as well as in conjunction with Article 1 of
Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, and of Articles 18 and 60 of the
Convention.


PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION

      The application was introduced on 5 March 1988 and registered on
8 July 1988.

      On 14 December 1988 the Commission decided in accordance with
Rule 42 para. 2 (b) of its Rules of Procedure to give notice of the
application to the respondent Government but not to invite them at that

stage to submit written observations. The Commission also decided to
adjourn further examination of the application pending the outcome of
the case of Håkansson and Sturesson before the European Court of Human
Rights.

      On 21 February 1990 the Court delivered judgment in that case
(Eur. Court H.R., Håkansson and Sturesson judgment of 21 February 1990,
Series A. no. 171).

      On 2 July 1990 the Commission decided to invite the respondent
Government to submit written observations on the admissibility and
merits of the application, limited to the complaints under Article 6
of the Convention and Article 1 of Procotol No. 1 to the Convention.

      The Government submitted observations on 11 October 1990 and the
applicant's observations in reply were submitted on 2 January 1991.
Additional observations were submitted by the Government on
24 April 1991 and by the applicant on 15 April and 29 July 1991 and
20 May, 22 June, 1 October and 15 November 1992.

      On 8 July 1992 the Commission rejected the applicant's request
for disqualification of some members of the Commission in the further
examination of the case.


THE LAW

1.    The applicant complains that there is no court remedy against the
decision to refuse her a permit to retain her property. She alleges
violations of Article 6 para. 1 and Article 13 (Art. 6-1, 13) of the
Convention.

(a)   Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1) of the Convention reads, in its
relevant parts, as follows:

      "In the determination of his civil rights and
      obligations..., everyone is entitled to a ... hearing ...
      by an independent and impartial tribunal..."

      The Government first submit that the complaint is inadmissible
because of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies. Following the Supreme
Court's decision of 11 March 1991 it is now possible for the applicant
to have both the question of her right to a retention permit and the
subsequent auction proceedings re-examined by the Göta Court of Appeal.

      The Government secondly submit that the complaint is inadmissible
as being incompatible ratione materiae with the Convention. They refer
to the case of Håkansson and Sturesson (loc.cit., p. 19, para. 60) in
which the Court found that Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1) of the
Convention was applicable, as it was

      "quite clear that the applicants considered themselves
      entitled, under the relevant statutory provisions, to the
      grant of the necessary permit. In the light of the Court's
      established case-law, 'civil rights and obligations' were
      at stake in the ensuing dispute before the administrative
      authorities on the permit issue and before the ... Court of
      Appeal on the lawfulness of the terms of the ... auction
      ... In addition, nothing suggests that the applicants had
      waived their right to a court, even assuming that this
      would have been permissible."

      The Government submit that the situation in the present case is
considerably different from that in the Håkansson and Sturesson case,
as the applicant's husband had earlier been refused a permit to acquire
the same property on the grounds that it was needed to promote the
establishment of functional farm holding units. The applicant must have
been aware of this fact and also of the fact that, subsequently,
Mrs. E.J.'s ownership was considered by the District Court to have been
of a dummy-owner character. When the applicant bought the property she
had no reason to believe that the position of the administrative
authorities in her case would differ from that in her husband's case.
Her chances of being granted a retention permit being very slim, the
applicant had no arguable case when applying for a permit. Moreover,
the fact that the applicant failed to apply for a permit within the
prescribed time-limit also indicates that she was well aware of the
fact that she would not be able to keep the property. Thus, there was
no serious and genuine dispute before the administrative authorities
in respect of the applicant's alleged right to a retention permit.

      If Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1) of the Convention were to be
found applicable, the Government admit a violation in that the
applicant had no access to a court for the determination of that
dispute.

      The applicant contends that only after the auction the
authorities stressed the "public interest" in the consolidation of the
neighbouring property, this leading to a genuine and serious dispute
between the applicant and the authorities regarding the ownership of
her property.

      The Commission has first examined whether the applicant's
complaint is inadmissible because of non-exhaustion of domestic
remedies. It considers, however, that the objection raised by the
Government in this regard, which relates to the possibilities of having
the right to a retention permit re-examined in subsequent auction
proceedings, does not concern the exhaustion of domestic remedies but
the substance of the issue under Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1).

      The Commission has made a preliminary examination of the
complaint relating to Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) in the light of the
parties' submissions. It considers that the issues raise questions of
fact and law which are of such a nature as to require an examination
on the merits. The complaint cannot therefore be declared inadmissible
as being manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para.
2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention. As no other ground for declaring it
inadmissible has been established the application is in this regard
admissible.

(b)   The applicant also complains of a violation of Article 13
(Art. 13) of the Convention, which reads:

      "Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this
      Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy
      before a national authority notwithstanding that the
      violation has been committed by persons acting in an
      official capacity."

      The Commission considers that the complaint under Article 13
(Art. 13) of the Convention is closely linked to the complaint under
Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention which the Commission has
found above to be admissible.  This complaint is therefore also
admissible.


2.    The applicant also complains of a violation of Article 1 of
Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) to the Convention, which reads:

      "Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful
      enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of
      his possessions except in the public interest and subject
      to the conditions provided for by law and by the general
      principles of international law.

      The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way
      impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it
      deems necessary to control the use of property in
      accordance with the general interest or to secure the
      payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties."

      The Government first submit that this complaint is also
inadmissible because of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies, in view
of the Supreme Court's judgment of 11 March 1991.

      Should the Commission find that the applicant has exhausted
domestic remedies the Government admit an interference with the
applicant's right to the peaceful enjoyment of her possessions in that
she was refused a retention permit for the property. This interference
amounted to a control of use of her property aiming at a subsequent
deprivation of the property, provided the applicant did not choose to
sell it herself. The refusal of the retention permit was aimed at
promoting a structural rationalisation of agriculture and forestry,
this being a legitimate aim in the general interest. It was based on
the 1979 Act and was thus lawful. In view of the applicant's
neighbour's interest in purchasing the property, the need for
rationalisation of his farm holding clearly outweighed the applicant's
interest in keeping the property. Furthermore, the applicant was aware
of her obligation to sell the property if she was not granted a
retention permit. As her husband had previously not been granted such
a permit for the same property, the refusal of her own request cannot
have taken her by surprise. Thus, the refusal of the retention permit
was a measure proportionate to the aim sought to be realised.

      Should the Commission consider the refusal of the retention
permit as a deprivation of the applicant's property, the Government
submit that the complaint is manifestly ill-founded. They refer to the
case of Håkansson and Sturesson, in which the Court found that the
promotion of the rationalisation of agriculture constituted a
legitimate public interest for the purposes of the second sentence of
Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1), even to the extent that it may
imply the compulsory transfer of property from one individual to
another. The Court, having regard to the margin of appreciation enjoyed
by the national authorities under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1
(P1-1), furthermore found that the applicants had not been made to
carry an individual and excessive burden, notwithstanding the fact that
as a result of the public auction they received a sum considerably less
than the purchase price they had paid (loc.cit., p. 15, para. 44, and
p. 18, paras. 54-55). In the present case the applicant bought the
property for 100.000 SEK, while she received 300.000 SEK for the
property as a result of the public auction. Thus, the refusal of the
retention permit had a legitimate aim, was not disproportionate to that
aim and was lawful for the purposes of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1
(P1-1).

      The applicant contends that she has been deprived of her property
by means of both the administrative decisions leading to the 1990
auction as such and that auction. Furthermore, she considers the
purchase price of 300.000 SEK to be unacceptable, the market value
being much higher. Moreover, no legitimate "public interest" as defined
exhaustively in the 1979 Act could justify depriving her of her
ownership in favour of Mr. H.A. Both the County Agricultural Board and
Mr. H.A. could, once in 1971 and twice in 1984, have satisfied that
interest without subsequently intruding upon the applicant's property
rights. Mr. H.A. indicated already in 1971 that he was not interested
in acquiring the property Brånstorp 1:6. However, subsequently he
announced his interest in acquiring the property to the County
Agricultural Board. He seems to have been present at both auctions in
1984, without bidding, this also revealing his private interest in
acquiring the property at a substantially lower price than would have
been possible in a sale on the open market. This is further supported
by an opinion of the County Agricultural Board of 29 October 1990 to
the Supreme Court, in which it was admitted that, at the time of the
1990 auction, a neighbour was still interested in buying the
applicant's property but was not prepared to pay the price of
300.000 SEK paid by the Board. It further appears from the opinion that
the Board, after having contacted the neighbour, decided that it would
use means from the Land Fund (jordfonden) to achieve the
rationalisation. Thus, Mr. H.A. was the predestinated owner of the
property.

      The Commission observes that the applicant's initial complaint
under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) only pertained to the refusal
of the retention permit. In her observations of 2 January 1991 the
applicant expanded her complaint to include also the 1990 auction in
order to facilitate the drawing of a comprehensive picture of all
measures with the common aim to deprive her of the property.

      The question may be raised whether the applicant, by not pursuing
the proceedings before the Göta Court of Appeal, has failed to exhaust
the domestic remedies and whether she can still, in view of the
settlement, be regarded as a victim of the alleged violation of
Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1). The Commission does not find it
necessary to examine these issues in detail, since the complaint
regarding Article 1 (Art. 1) is in any case inadmissible for the
following reasons.

      It is not in dispute that the refusal of the retention permit
constituted an interference with the applicant's right to the peaceful
enjoyment of her possessions as guaranteed by Article 1 of Protocol
No. 1 (P1-1).

      The Commission does not consider it necessary to examine
separately whether the refusal of the retention permit as such violated
the applicant's rights under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1), as the
property at issue was subsequently sold compulsorily at the 1990
auction. This sale constituted a deprivation of the applicant's
property which should be examined under the second sentence of the
first paragraph of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1).

      The Commission must thus decide whether this deprivation was "in
the public interest" and "subject to the conditions provided for by
law" and "by the general principles of international law".

      As regards the general principles of international law the
Commission recalls that this condition does not apply to the taking by
a State of the property of its own nationals (Eur. Court H.R., Lithgow
and Others judgment of 8 July 1986, Series A no. 102, p. 50, para.
119). Consequently, this condition is not applicable in the present 
case since the applicant, who was deprived of her property by S
is of Swedish nationality. It remains to be examined whether the
interference satisfied the other two conditions.

      As regards the question whether the deprivation was carried out
in the "public interest" the Commission observes that the purpose of
the deprivation, as stated in the 1979 Act, was to promote the
rationalisation of agriculture, this being a legitimate "public
interest" for the purposes of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1), even
to the extent that it may imply the compulsory transfer of property
from one individual to another (above-mentioned Håkansson and Sturesson
judgment, p. 15, para. 44, with further references). The finding that
the deprivation was carried out in the public interest is not affected
by the fact that the applicant has subsequently been allowed, as part
of the settlement of a dispute, to repurchase the property.

      As regards the lawfulness of the interference the Commission
recalls that its power to review compliance with domestic law is
limited (e.g. above-mentioned Håkansson and Sturesson judgment, p. 16,
para. 47). It finds no evidence in support of the applicant's
allegation that the authorities' real concern was not to rationalise
agriculture by merging the applicant's property with Mr. H.A.'s farm
holding, in accordance with the 1979 Act.

      Accordingly, the interference with the applicant's rights under
Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) pursued a legitimate aim and was
lawful for the purposes of that provision.

      Finally, as regards the proportionality of the interference,
Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) requires a reasonable relationship
of proportionality between the means employed and the aim pursued. This
implies that the individual shall not have to bear "an individual and
excessive burden" (above-mentioned Håkansson and Sturesson judgment,
p. 17, para. 51, with further references).

      The Commission finds that the applicant, at least when concluding
the purchase, must have been aware of her obligation to re-sell the
property if she could not obtain a retention permit. Having also regard
to the previous refusal of a similar permit for the applicant's husband
to retain the property, the applicant deliberately took a risk of
having to re-sell the property. Furthermore, as a result of the 1990
auction, the applicant received 300.000 SEK for her property, while the
price paid by her in 1984 was 100.000 SEK. It has not been shown that
the applicant did not regain the money invested by her in the property.
Having regard to the Court's finding in the case of Håkansson and
Sturesson (loc.cit., p. 18, para. 54) the price received by the
applicant must be considered reasonable in relation to the value of her
estate.

      In these circumstances, and having regard to the wide margin of
appreciation enjoyed by the Contracting States under Article 1 of
Protocol No. 1 (P1-1), the Commission concludes that the applicant has
not been made to carry an individual and excessive burden.

      Consequently, the interference with the applicant's right to the
peaceful enjoyment of her possessions was justified under the terms of
the second sentence of the first paragraph of Article 1 of Protocol
No. 1 (P1-1).

      It follows that this complaint must be rejected as being
manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2
(Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

3.    The applicant further complains of a violation of Article 14 of
the Convention separately as well as in conjunction with Article 1 of
Protocol No. 1 (Art. 14+P1-1). She finally complains of violations of
Articles 18 and 60 (Art. 18, 60) of the Convention.

      The Commission finds no appearance of a violation of Article 14
of the Convention, either separately or in conjunction with Article 1
of Protocol No. 1. (Art. 14+P1-1) Furthermore, there is no appearance
of any violation of Articles 18 or 60 (Art. 18, 60) of the Convention.

      It follows that this complaint must also be rejected as being
manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2
(Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

      For these reasons, the Commission, unanimously,


      DECLARES ADMISSIBLE, without prejudging the merits of the case,
      the complaint relating to the absence of a court remedy against
      the refusal of a retention permit;

      DECLARES INADMISSIBLE the remainder of the application.


   Secretary to the Commission      President of the Commission


         (H.C. KRÜGER)                    (C.A. NØRGAARD)