THE FACTS

Whereas the facts of the case as presented by the Applicant may be
summarised as follows:

The Applicant is a Netherlands citizen, born in 1910.
Although residing at Eindhoven (Netherlands), he has worked since 1952
in Belgium.

His complaints may be summarised as follows:

1. Contributions to the Dutch social security system

While referring to a Treaty of 29th August, 1947, between Belgium and
the Netherlands and to a certain Ordinance of the European Economic
Community (EEC), the Applicant states that, as long as he is employed
in Belgium, he is insured exclusively under the Belgian social security
system and he receives children's allowances in Belgium. Consequently,
he is obliged to pay contributions under the social security scheme in
Belgium, but has no similar obligation in the Netherlands.
Nevertheless, during periods of unemployment, he receives unemployment
relief and children's allowances in the Netherlands and during such
periods he falls under the Dutch social security system in general.
In 1960, he was unemployed for 83 days and during that time he received
in the Netherlands unemployment relief and children's allowances. As,
during this period of unemployment, the Applicant still under the Dutch
social security system, he had to pay contributions according to the
Dutch Old Age Pensions Act (Algemene Ouderdomswet) and the Widows and
Orphans Act (Weduwen-en Wezenwet), and he now complains of the way
these contributions were calculated.
In this respect, he states that, instead of deciding the amount of such
contributions exclusively on the basis of his income in the Netherlands
during the period of unemployment, the Tax Inspector at Eindhoven took
into account his income during the whole year 1960. The result was that
he was in fact obliged to pay contributions in the Netherlands in
respect of a part of the salary and the children's allowances which he
had received in Belgium.
In the Applicant's opinion, this way of calculating these contributions
was contrary to the Treaty of 1947 and to a certain EEC Ordinance, as
in fact he had to pay contributions twice (in Belgium and in the
Netherlands) in respect of the same income.
As the Applicant found this unreasonable, he lodged an appeal with the
Court of Appeal (Gerechtshof) at 's-Hertogenbosch. By decision of ...
1963, the Court rejected his appeal on the ground that his
contributions had been calculated according to the rules laid down in
an Order issued on 22nd December, 1959 by the Secretaries of State for
Social Affairs and Public Health and for Finances and that, moreover,
this way of calculating was not contrary to the Treaty and the
Ordinance referred to by the Applicant.
The Applicant lodged a further appeal (beroep in cassatie) which was
rejected on ... 1964 by the Judges' Chamber (Raadkamer) of the Supreme
Court (Hoge Raad).
The Applicant concludes that, as a result of the decisions taken by the
Netherlands courts, he has been obliged to pay contributions twice (in
Belgium and in the Netherlands) in respect of the same income; that
this implies an unjust "punishment" imposed on him for working outside
the Netherlands; that another unreasonable result is that the amount
of contributions which a person has to pay in the Netherlands is
increased according to the number of his children (the Applicant here
refers to the fact that the children's allowances received in Belgium
were included in the amount on the basis of which the Dutch authorities
calculated his contributions in the Netherlands); and that, in his
case, the result was particularly unreasonable, since a part of the
children's allowances which he had received in 1960 related to the year
1959 and should therefore, in no circumstances, have been included in
his income for 1960.
He alleges a violation of Article 3 of the Convention.

2. Taxation in the Netherlands in respect of Belgian children's
allowances

In the Applicant's opinion, it follows from the Treaty of 1947 and the
EEC Ordinance concerned that as a Dutch citizen working in Belgium he
is entitled to the same treatment as a Belgian worker in respect of
social security benefits.
However, whereas the children's allowances received by a Belgian worker
are not subject at all to taxation, the Belgian children's allowances
which he receives are subject to taxation by the Netherlands
authorities.
Although he considers this practice incorrect, it does not appear that
he has lodged any appeal on this point. As regards his taxation for the
year 1960, he expressly states that he lodged no appeal, since he was
ill at the relevant time.

3. Proceedings before the Supreme Court

As stated above, the Judges' Chamber of the Supreme Court rejected, on
... 1964, the Applicant's appeal from the decision of the Court of
Appeal regarding his contributions to the Dutch social security
schemes.
The Applicant alleges that he did not receive a "fair hearing" before
the Supreme Court as he had not been invited to appear. There had been
no public hearing and judgment had not been pronounced publicly. He
also considers that, in view of the issues involved in the case, the
Supreme Court was obliged, according to Article 177 of the EEC Treaty,
to submit the case to the Court of Justice of the European Communities
before deciding on the Applicant's appeal. He alleges violations of
Article 6, paragraphs (1), (2), (3) (c), of the Convention.

THE LAW

Whereas the Applicant complains of the manner in which social security
contributions and taxes are calculated in the Netherlands and, in
particular, of the obligations which have been imposed upon him in this
regard by the Netherlands authorities;

Whereas, in respect of the social security contributions, he alleges
himself to be a victim of a violation of Article 3 (Art. 3) of the
Convention which provides that "no one shall be subjected to torture
or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment";

Whereas the Commission finds no appearance of a violation of Article
3 (Art. 3) of the Convention in the present case;

Whereas the Applicant's complaint also gives rise to the question
whether there has been a violation of Article 1 of the Protocol (P1-1)
which in its first paragraph guarantees to everyone "the peaceful
enjoyment of his possessions" and further provides that "no one shall
be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and
subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general
principles of international law"; whereas the Commission has not
considered it necessary to examine the present complaint in relation
to the first paragraph of Article 1 (Art. 1) since it is clear that the
second paragraph of that Article (Art. 1-2) expressly reserves the
right of a State "to enforce such laws as it deems necessary ... to
secure the payment of taxes or other contributions"; whereas, having
regard to this provision, it is also clear that Article 1 of the
Protocol (P1-1) has not been violated in the present case;

Whereas it follows that this part of the Application is manifestly
ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27, paragraph (2)
(Art. 27-2), of the Convention;

Whereas, in regard to the alleged violations of Article 6 (Art. 6) of
the Convention, the Commission first observes that paragraphs (2) and
(3) of this Article (Art. 6-2, 6-3) are clearly not applicable to the
circumstances of the present case since these paragraphs only concern
persons "charged with a criminal offense";

Whereas, however, Article 6, paragraph (1) (Art. 6-1), gives everyone
certain procedural guarantees "in the determination of his civil rights
and obligations or of any criminal charge against him"; whereas,
consequently, the question arises whether the proceedings in the
present case concerned the determination of the Applicant's civil
rights or obligations;

Whereas the proceedings before the Supreme Court complained of by the
Applicant concerned the determination of his contributions to social
security schemes; whereas, in previous cases (Applications Nos.
2145/64, Collection of Decisions, Volume 18, page 1, and 1904/63,
2029/63, 2094/63 and 2217/64, Collection of Decisions, Volume 19, page
106), the Commission has already found that Article 6, paragraph (1)
(Art. 6-1) was not applicable to certain proceedings regarding
taxation;

Whereas the Commission stated in these previous decisions that the
proceedings complained of concerned a matter falling under public law
and not under private law, although the fiscal measures concerned might
have had repercussions on the property rights of the Applicant;

Whereas the same reasoning applies to the proceedings complained of in
the present case; whereas it follows that these proceedings did not
concern the determination of the Applicant's civil rights and
obligations within the meaning of Article 6, paragraph (1) (Art. 6-1),
of the Convention and that the complaint as to these proceedings falls
outside the competence of the Commission ratione materiae;

Whereas, therefore, this part of the Application is incompatible with
the provisions of the Convention within the meaning of Article 27,
paragraph (2) (Art. 27-2), of the Convention.

Now therefore the Commission declares this Application INADMISSIBLE.