In the case of Singh v. the United Kingdom (1),

        The European Court of Human Rights, sitting, in
accordance with Article 43 (art. 43) of the Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms ("the
Convention") and the relevant provisions of Rules of Court A (2),
as a Chamber composed of the following judges:

        Mr  R. Ryssdal, President,
        Mr  F. Gölcüklü,
        Mr  R. Macdonald,
        Mr  A. Spielmann,
        Mr  N. Valticos,
        Mrs E. Palm,
        Mr  F. Bigi,
        Sir John Freeland,
        Mr  P. Jambrek,

and also of Mr H. Petzold, Registrar, and Mr P.J. Mahoney, Deputy
Registrar,

        Having deliberated in private on 28 September 1995 and
26 January 1996,

        Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on the
last-mentioned date:
_______________
Notes by the Registrar

1.  The case is numbered 56/1994/503/585.  The first number is
the case's position on the list of cases referred to the Court
in the relevant year (second number).  The last two numbers
indicate the case's position on the list of cases referred to the
Court since its creation and on the list of the corresponding
originating applications to the Commission.

2.  Rules A apply to all cases referred to the Court before the
entry into force of Protocol No. 9 (P9) (1 October 1994) and
thereafter only to cases concerning States not bound by that
Protocol (P9).  They correspond to the Rules that came into force
on 1 January 1983, as amended several times subsequently.
_______________

PROCEDURE

1.      The case was referred to the Court on 8 December 1994 by
the European Commission of Human Rights ("the Commission") and
on 23 December 1994 by the Government of the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland ("the Government"), within the
three-month period laid down by Article 32 para. 1 and Article 47
(art. 32-1, art. 47) of the Convention.  It originated in an
application (no. 23389/94) against the United Kingdom lodged with
the Commission under Article 25 (art. 25) on 25 January 1994 by
a British citizen, Mr Prem Singh.

        The Commission's request referred to Articles 44 and 48
(art. 44, art. 48) and to the declaration whereby the United
Kingdom recognised the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court
(Article 46) (art. 46); the Government's application referred to
Article 48 (art. 48).  The object of the request and of the
application was to obtain a decision as to whether the facts of
the case disclosed a breach by the respondent State of its
obligations under Article 5 para. 4 (art. 5-4) of the Convention.

2.      In response to the enquiry made in accordance with
Rule 33 para. 3 (d) of Rules of Court A, the applicant stated
that he wished to take part in the proceedings and designated the
lawyer who would represent him (Rule 30).

3.      The President of the Court decided that in the interests
of the proper administration of justice this case and the case
of Hussain v. the United Kingdom (no. 55/1994/502/584) should be
heard by the same Chamber (Rule 21 para. 6) and that a joint
hearing should be held.

        The Chamber to be constituted included ex officio
Sir John Freeland, the elected judge of British nationality
(Article 43 of the Convention) (art. 43), and Mr R. Ryssdal, the
President of the Court (Rule 21 para. 3 (b)).  On
27 January 1995, in the presence of the Registrar, the President
drew by lot the names of the other seven members, namely
Mr F. Gölcüklü, Mr R. Macdonald, Mr A. Spielmann, Mr N. Valticos,
Mrs E. Palm, Mr F. Bigi and Mr P. Jambrek (Article 43 in fine of
the Convention and Rule 21 para. 4) (art. 43).

4.      As President of the Chamber (Rule 21 para. 5),
Mr Ryssdal, acting through the Registrar, consulted the Agent of
the Government, the applicant's lawyer and the Delegate of the
Commission on the organisation of the proceedings (Rules 37
para. 1 and 38).  Pursuant to the order made in consequence, the
Registrar received the Government's memorial on 13 April 1995 and
the applicant's memorial on 3 May.  The Secretary to the
Commission informed the Registrar that the Delegate would submit
his observations at the hearing.

5.      In accordance with the President's decision, the hearing
took place in public in the Human Rights Building, Strasbourg,
on 27 September 1995.  The Court had held a preparatory meeting
beforehand.

        There appeared before the Court:

(a) for the Government

Mr I. Christie, Foreign and Commonwealth Office,               Agent,
Mr D. Pannick QC,
Mr M. Shaw, Barrister-at-Law,                                Counsel,
Mr H. Carter,
Mr H. Bayne,
Mr R. Harrington, Home Office,                              Advisers;

(b) for the Commission

Mr N. Bratza,                                               Delegate;

(c) for the applicant

Mr E. Fitzgerald QC,
Mr J. Cooper, Barrister-at-Law,                              Counsel,
Mr R. King,                                                Solicitor.

        The Court heard addresses by Mr Bratza, Mr Fitzgerald and
Mr Pannick.

AS TO THE FACTS

I.      Circumstances of the case

6.      Mr Prem Singh was born in 1957 and is currently resident
in Wakefield, West Yorkshire.

7.      On 19 February 1973, the applicant - then aged 15 - was
convicted at Leeds Crown Court of the murder of a 72-year-old
woman.  He had broken into her home, strangled her, cut her
throat and had sexual intercourse with her at around the time of
her death.  Mr Singh received a mandatory sentence of detention
"during Her Majesty's pleasure" pursuant to section 53 (1) of the
Children and Young Persons Act 1933 (as amended) (see
paragraph 29 below).  Its effect was to render the applicant
"liable to be detained in such a place and under such conditions
as the Secretary of State [for the Home Department] may direct".

8.      In October 1990, having served the punitive part of his
sentence ("tariff" - see paragraph 33 below), Mr Singh was
released on licence.

9.      On 11 March 1991 the applicant was arrested and
interviewed at Southmead police station, Bristol, in connection
with a number of alleged offences involving deception, and one
of using threatening behaviour.  He denied the allegations.

10.     On 12 March 1991 the Parole Board considered Mr Singh's
case, and on 21 March 1991 his life licence was revoked by the
Secretary of State on its recommendation.

        On 21 March 1991 the applicant received a formal notice
of the reasons for this decision, which he was entitled to by
virtue of section 62 (3) of the Criminal Justice Act 1967 (see
paragraph 43 below).  It informed him that the Secretary of State
had revoked his licence in the light of:

        "(i)  Reports indicating that you had lied to and misled
        your supervising officers and avoided telling them of a
        variety of significant events following your release on
        licence.

        (ii)  Your arrest and subsequent appearances before
        Bristol Magistrates on several criminal charges including
        fraud and using threatening behaviour, set against the
        circumstances surrounding the offence for which you were
        given a life sentence in 1973, make it impossible for the
        Secretary of State to be satisfied that your continued
        presence in the community did not constitute a risk to
        the public."

11.     On 27 August 1991, having complained to the Avon
Probation Service about its recommendation, Mr Singh received a
more detailed explanation of his recall in a letter from the
chief probation officer.  The reason given for his recall was not
the alleged offences (which were a matter for the court), but
rather his failure to provide accurate information about his
circumstances to his supervising probation officer.  The letter
cited specifically his failure to inform her about the purchase
of a motor vehicle; getting a job and giving false information
to his employers about his age and character; having a
relationship and not telling his girlfriend all about his
background; and falling into arrears with his rent.

12.     Mr Singh denied the accuracy of most of these
allegations, and asked the Parole Board to review the merits of
the revocation of his licence.  Under section 62 (4) of the
Criminal Justice Act 1967 (now section 39 (4) of the Criminal
Justice Act 1991 - see paragraph 43 below), the Parole Board was
empowered at this stage to take a binding decision for Mr Singh's
immediate release.

13.     The Parole Board considered the applicant's case on
27 August and 19 December 1991.  It had before it a number of
reports from the probation service and the police, none of which
was disclosed to the applicant.  On 19 December 1991 the Board
decided against recommending Mr Singh's immediate release.  He
was not told the reasons for this decision.

14.     On 2 March 1992 the criminal charges against Mr Singh
(see paragraph 9 above) were dismissed because the prosecution
had presented the indictment out of time.

        Mr Singh asked for his case to be reconsidered in the
light of this development, and the Secretary of State accordingly
referred it back to the Parole Board, under the procedure set out
in section 61 (1) of the Criminal Justice Act 1967 (see
paragraph 34 below).  On 30 July 1992 the Board again declined
to recommend Mr Singh's release.

15.     The applicant then sought judicial review (see
paragraph 47 below) of the two decisions of the Parole Board of
19 December 1991 and 30 July 1992.

        On 20 April 1993 the Divisional Court quashed the Parole
Board's decision of 19 December 1991 on the ground that there had
been a breach of natural justice because of the Board's failure
to disclose to Mr Singh all the reports before it.  The court
held that the applicant was entitled to a fresh consideration by
the Parole Board under the terms of section 39 (4) of the
Criminal Justice Act 1991, at which the Board would be empowered
to order (not merely to recommend) his release (see paragraph 43
below).  Lord Justice Evans found, inter alia, that:

        "[Mr Singh's] status is that of a person whose continued
        detention can only be justified if the test of
        dangerousness, meaning an unacceptable risk of physical
        danger to the life or limb of the public, is satisfied"
        (R. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex
        parte Prem Singh, unreported, transcript pp. 26F-27B)

        He further commented that the disclosed facts "scarcely
seem able to support a positive answer to [this question]".

16.     As a result of the Divisional Court's decision, Mr Singh
received a complete file of the documents which were before the
Parole Board.  This included a number of detailed probation
reports alleging deception of his supervising officers by
Mr Singh, and also several hundred pages of witness statements
obtained by the police in connection with the criminal charges
which had been dismissed (see paragraphs 9 and 14 above).

17.     With the help of his solicitor, Mr Singh made written
representations to the Parole Board.  He denied the allegations
contained in the letter from the chief probation officer that he
had deceived his supervising probation officer (see paragraph 11
above) and supported his case with witness statements from his
girlfriend and landlady.

18.     On 18 June 1993 the Parole Board considered Mr Singh's
case.  He was not permitted to be present at the review and had
no opportunity to give oral evidence or to question those who had
made allegations against him.

        The Board decided not to recommend release, and gave the
following reasons:

        "The Panel accepted that Mr Singh's representations
        answered some matters which were of concern to his
        probation officer.  However, there was a lack of openness
        in his dealings with the Probation Service.  The Panel
        also considered that the conduct which led to the
        criminal charges indicated a serious kind of
        deceptiveness.  His behaviour under supervision led the
        Panel to conclude that the nature of his personality and
        behaviour had not changed significantly since the
        original offence at the age of 15.  His failure to comply
        with the discipline of licence supervision, bearing in
        mind the original offence, gives rise to considerable
        concern."

19.     Mr Singh applied for judicial review of this decision,
but he withdrew his application on or about 7 March 1994 because
he had been offered an early review of his case by the Parole
Board.

20.     In June 1994 the Parole Board reconsidered Mr Singh's
case in accordance with section 35 (2) of the Criminal
Justice Act 1991 (see paragraph 35 below).  Mr Singh entered
detailed representations and the file before the Board was
disclosed to him; it contained recent reports from probation
officers, from a psychologist working with Mr Singh and from the
Local Review Committee (see paragraph 46 below).  All the reports
which made a specific recommendation were in favour of the
applicant's release as soon as possible via a pre-release hostel.

21.     As the applicant was informed on 21 July 1994 the Parole
Board unanimously recommended his release subject to six months
in a pre-release employment scheme.  The reasons given were as
follows:

        "On the evidence presented to [the panel], they
        considered Prem Singh no longer constituted a danger to
        life or limb of committing further life threatening
        offences to justify his continued detention since his
        recall in March 1991."

22.     The applicant was also informed on 21 July 1994 that the
Secretary of State was "not prepared to accept this
recommendation and [did not agree] to [the applicant's] release".
The Secretary of State so decided in exercise of his statutory
powers (see paragraph 43 below).

23.     By a communication of 8 September 1994 the applicant was
given the reasons for the Secretary of State's decision.  These
were that Mr Singh had misled the probation service after his
release in October 1990 and had appeared before the magistrates
on several criminal charges, although these had subsequently been
dismissed on technical grounds.  Thus, he had been recalled to
prison "following serious breaches of the trust placed in [him]
as a life licensee".  The Secretary of State was unable to assess
accurately whether he was still a threat to the public, because
he had spent the three and a quarter years since his recall in
a closed prison.  He considered that Mr Singh's relationship with
the probation service needed to be tested in the "more
challenging environment of an open prison".  For these reasons,
he believed that Mr Singh should be transferred to an open prison
for further testing.  His next formal review by the Parole Board
would begin in October 1995.

24.     Mr Singh applied for judicial review of the Secretary of
State's decision.

        On 16 March 1995 the Divisional Court quashed the
Secretary of State's decision and ordered him to reconsider it.
The court found, inter alia, that the correct test to be applied
was whether Mr Singh constituted a danger to the "life or limb"
of the public, and that the reasoning process of the Secretary
of State had been flawed because he had not properly explained
how the findings he had made related to the test of dangerousness
(R. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte
Prem Singh (no. 2), unreported).

25.     In September 1995 Mr Singh joined a pre-release
employment scheme.  His provisional date for release is
18 March 1996.

II.     Relevant domestic law and practice

        A.    Categorisation of detention in the case of murderers

26.     A person who unlawfully kills another with intent to kill
or cause grievous bodily harm is guilty of murder.  English law
imposes a mandatory sentence for the offence of murder:
"detention during Her Majesty's pleasure" if the offender is
under the age of 18 (section 53 (1) of the Children and Young
Persons Act 1933 (as amended) - see paragraph 29 below); "custody
for life" if the offender is between 18 and 20 years old
(section 8 (1) of the Criminal Justice Act 1982); and "life
imprisonment" for an offender aged 21 or over (section 1 (1) of
the Murder (Abolition of Death Penalty) Act 1965).

        Mandatory life sentences are fixed by law in contrast to
discretionary life sentences, which can be imposed at the
discretion of the trial judge on persons convicted of certain
violent or sexual offences (for example manslaughter, rape,
robbery).  The principles underlying the passing of a
discretionary life sentence are:

        (i)   that the offence is grave and

        (ii)  that there are exceptional circumstances which
        demonstrate that the offender is a danger to the public
        and that it is not possible to say when that danger will
        subside.

        Discretionary life sentences are indeterminate so that
"the prisoner's progress may be monitored ... so that he will be
kept in custody only so long as public safety may be jeopardised
by his being let loose at large" (R. v. Wilkinson [1983] 5
Criminal Appeal Reports 105, 108).

        B.    Detention during Her Majesty's pleasure

27.     The notion of detention during Her Majesty's pleasure has
its origins in statutory form in an Act of 1800 for "the safe
custody of insane persons charged with offences" (Criminal
Lunatics Act), which provided that defendants acquitted of a
charge of murder, treason or felony on the grounds of insanity
at the time of the offence were to be detained in "strict custody
until His Majesty's pleasure shall be known" and described their
custody as being "during His [Majesty's] pleasure".

28.     In 1908, detention during His Majesty's pleasure was
introduced in respect of offenders aged between 10 and 16.  It
was extended to cover those under the age of 18 at the time of
conviction (1933) and further extended to cover persons under the
age of 18 at the time when the offence was committed (1948).

29.     The provision in force at present is section 53 (1) of
the Children and Young Persons Act 1933 (as amended) ("the
1933 Act") which provides:

        "A person convicted of an offence who appears to the
        court to have been under the age of eighteen years at the
        time the offence was committed shall not, if he is
        convicted of murder, be sentenced to imprisonment for
        life, nor shall sentence of death be pronounced on or
        recorded against any such person; but in lieu thereof the
        court shall ... sentence him to be detained during Her
        Majesty's pleasure and, if so sentenced he shall be
        liable to be detained in such a place and under such
        conditions as the Secretary of State may direct."

30.     In the case of R. v. Secretary of State for the Home
Department, ex parte Prem Singh (20 April 1993, cited above at
paragraph 15) Lord Justice Evans in the Divisional Court held as
follows in respect of detention "during Her Majesty's pleasure":

        "At the time of sentencing, the detention orders under
        section 53 were mandatory.  It is indeed the statutory
        equivalent for young persons of the mandatory life
        sentence for murder.  But the sentence itself is closer
        in substance to the discretionary sentence of which part
        is punitive (retribution and deterrence) and the balance
        justified only by the interests of public safety when the
        test of dangerousness is satisfied.  The fact that the
        mandatory life prisoner may be given similar rights as
        regards release on licence does not alter the fact that
        the mandatory life sentence is justifiable as punishment
        for the whole of its period: see R. v. Secretary of State
        Ex. p. Doody & Others [1993] Q.B. 157 and Wynne v. UK
        (E.C.H.R. 1st December 1992).  The order for detention
        under section 53 is by its terms both discretionary and
        indeterminate: it provides for detention 'during Her
        Majesty's pleasure' ... I would decide the present case
        on the narrow ground that, notwithstanding Home Office
        and Parole Board practice, the applicant should be
        regarded as equivalent to a discretionary life prisoner
        for the purpose of deciding whether Wilson rather than
        Payne governs his case."

        (transcript, pp. 24C-25B)

        The court accordingly held that the applicant should be
afforded the same opportunity as would be given to a
discretionary life prisoner to see the material before the Parole
Board when it decided whether he should be released after his
recall to prison on revocation of his licence.

        The Parole Board has changed its policy accordingly.

31.     However, in a statement in Parliament made on
27 July 1993 (see paragraph 38 below), the Secretary of State,
Mr Michael Howard, explained that he included in the category of
"mandatory life sentence prisoners" those

        "persons who are, or will be, detained during Her
        Majesty's pleasure under section 53 (1) of the Children
        and Young Persons Act 1933 ..."

32.     In R. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex
parte T. and Others [1994] Queen's Bench 378, 390D, Lord Justice
Kennedy in the Divisional Court (with whom Mr Justice Pill
agreed) said:

        "I see no reason to regard him as having any special
        status because he was sentenced to detention [during Her
        Majesty's pleasure] rather than to life imprisonment,
        despite what was said by Evans LJ when giving judgment in
        Reg. v. Parole Board, ex parte Singh (Prem)
        (20 April 1993, unreported).  The issues in that case
        were very different from those with which we are
        concerned.  If Hickey had not been sent to hospital he
        could hope to benefit from the provisions of
        section 35 (2) of the 1991 Act [on mandatory life
        prisoners] ...  It will be recalled that in Hickey's case
        the offence was murder, so the sentence was mandatory not
        discretionary."

        On appeal the Court of Appeal stated that in respect of
a person sentenced to detention during Her Majesty's pleasure
under section 53 (1) of the 1933 Act for the offence of murder,
the relevant provisions on release were those in section 35 (2)
of the Criminal Justice Act 1991 (see paragraph 35 below), and
not those relating to a discretionary life prisoner (R.
v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Hickey
[1995] 1 All England Law Reports 479, 488).

        C.    Release on licence

33.     Persons sentenced to mandatory and discretionary life
imprisonment, custody for life and those detained during Her
Majesty's pleasure have a "tariff" set in relation to that period
of imprisonment they should serve to satisfy the requirements of
retribution and deterrence.  After the expiry of the tariff, the
prisoner becomes eligible for release on licence.  Applicable
provisions and practice in respect of the fixing of the tariff
and release on licence have been subject to change in recent
years, in particular following the coming into force on
1 October 1992 of the Criminal Justice Act 1991 ("the 1991 Act").

        1.    General procedure

34.     Section 61 (1) of the Criminal Justice Act 1967 ("the
1967 Act") provided, inter alia, that the Secretary of State, on
the recommendation of the Parole Board and after consultation
with the Lord Chief Justice and the trial judge, may "release on
licence a person serving a sentence of imprisonment for life or
custody for life or a person detained under section 53 of the
Children and Young Persons Act 1933".  In this respect no
difference was made between discretionary and mandatory life
prisoners.

35.     By virtue of section 35 (2) of the 1991 Act, persons
detained during Her Majesty's pleasure and those life prisoners
who are not discretionary life prisoners (see paragraph 26
above), may be released on licence by the Secretary of State, if
recommended to do so by the Parole Board and after consultation
with the Lord Chief Justice and the trial judge.  The decision
on whether to release still lies, therefore, with the Secretary
of State.

36.     The Secretary of State also decides the length of a
prisoner's tariff.  Subsequently to a House of Lords judgment of
24 June 1993 (R. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department,
ex parte Doody [1994] 1 Appeal Cases 531, 567G), the view of the
trial judge is made known to the prisoner after his trial as is
the opinion of the Lord Chief Justice.  The prisoner is afforded
the opportunity to make representations to the Secretary of State
who then proceeds to fix the tariff.  Where the Secretary of
State decides to depart from the judicial recommendation he is
obliged to give reasons.  As a matter of practice the prisoner
is informed of the Secretary of State's final decision.

        In the second, post-punitive phase of detention the
prisoner knows that "the penal consequence of his crime has been
exhausted" (ibid., 557A).

37.     A statement of policy issued by Sir Leon Brittan, then
Secretary of State for the Home Department, on 13 November 1983
indicated that release on licence following expiry of the tariff
depended on whether the person was considered no longer to pose
a risk to the public.

38.     On 27 July 1993, the Secretary of State, Mr Michael
Howard, made a statement of policy in relation to mandatory life
prisoners, stating, inter alia, that before any such prisoner is
released on licence he

        "will consider not only, (a) whether the period served by
        the prisoner is adequate to satisfy the requirements of
        retribution and deterrence and, (b) whether it is safe to
        release the prisoner, but also (c) the public
        acceptability of early release.  This means that I will
        only exercise my discretion to release if I am satisfied
        that to do so will not threaten the maintenance of public
        confidence in the system of criminal justice".

39.     In a number of recent court cases involving persons
detained during Her Majesty's pleasure, it has been stated that
the correct test for post-tariff detention was to be whether the
offender continued to constitute a danger to the public (R.
v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Cox,
3 September 1991; R. v. Secretary of State for the Home
Department, ex parte Prem Singh, 20 April 1993 - cited above at
paragraph 15; R. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department,
ex parte Prem Singh (no. 2), 16 March 1995).

        2.    Procedure applicable to discretionary life prisoners

40.     The 1991 Act instituted changes to the regime applying to
the release of discretionary life prisoners following the
decision of the European Court of Human Rights in the case of
Thynne, Wilson and Gunnell v. the United Kingdom (judgment of
25 October 1990, Series A no. 190-A).

41.     Pursuant to section 34 of the 1991 Act, the tariff of a
discretionary life prisoner is now fixed in open court by the
trial judge after conviction.  After the tariff has expired, the
prisoner may require the Secretary of State to refer his case to
the Parole Board which has the power to order his release if it
is satisfied that it is no longer necessary for the protection
of the public that the prisoner should be confined.

        Pursuant to the Parole Board Rules 1992 which came into
force on 1 October 1992, a prisoner is entitled to an oral
hearing, to disclosure of all evidence before the panel (see
paragraph 45 below) and to legal representation.  There is
provision enabling a prisoner to apply to call witnesses on his
behalf and to cross-examine those who have written reports about
him.

42.     For the purposes of the 1991 Act, persons detained during
Her Majesty's pleasure are not regarded as discretionary life
prisoners (section 43 (2)).

        D.    Revocation of licences

43.     Recall to prison of a person released on licence was
governed by section 62 of the 1967 Act which reads:

        "(1)  Where the Parole Board recommends the recall of any
        person who is subject to a licence under section 60 or 61
        of this Act, the Secretary of State may revoke that
        person's licence and recall him to prison.

        (2)   The Secretary of State may revoke the licence of any
        such person and recall him as aforesaid without
        consulting the Board, where it appears to him that it is
        expedient in the public interest to recall that person
        before such consultation is practicable.

        (3)   A person recalled to prison under the foregoing
        provisions of this section may make representations ...

        (4)   The Secretary of State shall refer to the Board the
        case of a person recalled under subsection (1) of this
        section who makes representations under the last
        foregoing subsection and shall in any event so refer the
        case of a person returned to prison after being recalled
        under subsection (2) of this section.

        (5)   Where the Board recommends the immediate release on
        licence of a person whose case is referred to it under
        this section, the Secretary of State shall give effect to
        the recommendation ...

        ..."

44.     Section 39 of the 1991 Act has added that a person
recalled to prison shall be informed of the reasons for his
recall and of his right to make representations in writing.

        E.    Parole Board and Local Review Committees

45.     Section 59 of the 1967 Act set out the constitution and
functions of the Parole Board:

        "(1)  For the purposes of exercising the function
        conferred on it by this Part of this Act as respects
        England and Wales there shall be a body known as the
        Parole Board ... consisting of a chairman and not less
        than four other members appointed by the Secretary of
        State.

        ...

        (4)   The following provisions shall have effect with
        respect to the proceedings of the Board on any case
        referred to it, that is to say -

              (a)  the Board shall deal with the case on
              consideration of any documents given to it by the
              Secretary of State and of any reports it has called
              for and any information whether oral or in writing
              that it has obtained; and

              (b)  if in any particular case the Board thinks it
              is necessary to interview the persons to whom the
              case relates before reaching a decision, the Board
              may request one of its members to interview him and
              shall take into account the report of that
              interview by that member ...

        (5)   The documents to be given by the Secretary of State
        to the Board under the last foregoing subsection shall
        include -

              (a)  where the case referred to the Board is one of
              release under section 60 or 61 of this Act, any
              written representations made by the person to whom
              the case relates in connection with or since his
              last interview in accordance with rules under the
              next following subsection;

              (b)  where the case so referred relates to a person
              recalled under section 62 of this Act, any written
              representations made under that section."

        As to the constitution of the Parole Board, Schedule 2 to
the 1967 Act further provides:

        "1.   The Parole Board shall include among its members -

              (a)  a person who holds or has held judicial office;

              (b)  a registered medical practitioner who is a
              psychiatrist;

              (c)  a person appearing to the Secretary of State to
              have knowledge and experience of the supervision or
              after care of discharged prisoners;

              (d)  a person appearing to the Secretary of State to
              have made a study of the causes of delinquency or
              the treatment of offenders."

        The Parole Board always counts among its members three
High Court judges, three circuit judges and a recorder.  Cases
referred to the Board may be dealt with by three or more members
of the Board (Parole Board Rules 1967).  In practice, the Board
sits in small panels, including, in the case of life prisoners,
a High Court judge and a psychiatrist.  The judges on the Board
are appointed by the Home Secretary (section 59 (1) of the
1967 Act) after consultation with the Lord Chief Justice.

        With the exception of the new rules concerning
discretionary life prisoners, similar provisions apply under the
1991 Act.

46.     Under section 59 (6) of the 1967 Act the Secretary of
State established for every prison a Local Review Committee with
the function of advising him on the suitability for release on
licence of prisoners.  It was the practice to obtain this
assessment before referring a case to the Parole Board.  Before
the Local Review Committee reviewed a case, a member of the
committee would interview the prisoner if he was willing to be
interviewed.

        The first review by the Local Review Committee was
normally fixed to take place three years before the expiry of the
tariff.

        Local Review Committees were abolished by the Parole
Board Rules 1992.  The prisoner is now interviewed by a member
of the Parole Board.

        F.    Judicial review

47.     Persons serving a sentence of detention during Her
Majesty's pleasure may institute proceedings in the High Court
to obtain judicial review of any decision of the Parole Board or
of the Secretary of State if those decisions are taken in breach
of the relevant statutory requirements or if they are otherwise
tainted by illegality, irrationality or procedural impropriety
(Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil
Service, [1984] 3 All England Law Reports 935, 950-51).

PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION

48.     Mr Singh applied to the Commission on 25 January 1994.
He relied on Article 5 para. 4 (art. 5-4) of the Convention,
complaining that he should be entitled to have the lawfulness of
his continued detention determined by a court and that the Parole
Board in its powers and procedures failed to offer the requisite
safeguards.

49.     The Commission declared the application (no. 23389/94)
admissible on 30 June 1994.  In its report of 11 October 1994
(Article 31) (art. 31), it expressed the unanimous opinion that
there had been a violation of Article 5 para. 4 (art. 5-4) of the
Convention.

        The full text of the Commission's opinion is reproduced
as an annex to this judgment (1).
_______________
Note by the Registrar

1.  For practical reasons this annex will appear only with the
printed version of the judgment (in Reports of Judgments and
Decisions - 1996), but a copy of the Commission's report is
obtainable from the registry.
_______________

FINAL SUBMISSIONS MADE TO THE COURT

50.     At the hearing, the Agent of the Government invited the
Court to conclude that, in the present case, there had been no
breach of the Convention.

        The applicant, for his part, asked the Court to uphold
his complaints and declare that his rights under Article 5
para. 4 (art. 5-4) had been violated, both by the denial of a
review by a court-like body and by the denial at any time of an
oral hearing at which he could have put his case for release in
person.

AS TO THE LAW

I.      SCOPE OF THE CASE

51.     In his memorial to the Court and at the hearing the
applicant complained of the secretive and unfair manner in which
his tariff (see paragraph 33 above) had been established.

52.     The Court notes that this particular complaint was not
dealt with by the Commission in its report or admissibility
decision and that, as pointed out by the Delegate of the
Commission, it is uncertain whether it can be regarded as falling
within the compass of the case before the Court as delimited by
the Commission's decision on admissibility (see, inter alia, the
Powell and Rayner v. the United Kingdom judgment of
21 February 1990, Series A no. 172, p. 13, para. 29).

        In any event, given the fact that the applicant's
punitive period has now expired, the Court does not consider it
necessary to examine this complaint.

        The scope of the case before the Court is therefore
confined to the issues under Article 5 para. 4 (art. 5-4) raised
in connection with the applicant's current situation, that is
post-tariff detention.

II.     ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 PARA. 4 (art. 5-4) OF THE
        CONVENTION

53.     Mr Singh complained that he had not been able either on
his recall to prison in 1991 or at reasonable intervals
thereafter to have the case of his continued detention during Her
Majesty's pleasure (see paragraph 26 above) heard by a court.
He invoked Article 5 para. 4 (art. 5-4) of the Convention which
provides:

        "Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or
        detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which
        the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily
        by a court and his release ordered if the detention is
        not lawful."

54.     The Court will first examine whether, having regard to
the particular features of detention during Her Majesty's
pleasure, the requirements of Article 5 para. 4 (art. 5-4) are
satisfied by the original trial and appeal proceedings or, on the
contrary, whether that provision confers an additional right to
challenge the lawfulness of the continued detention before a
court.

        A.    Whether the requisite judicial control was
              incorporated in the original conviction

55.     In the applicant's submission, a sentence of detention
during Her Majesty's pleasure differed from the mandatory life
sentence imposed on adults (see paragraph 26 above), which the
Court examined in its Wynne v. the United Kingdom judgment of
18 July 1994 (Series A no. 294-A), in that the former is not
solely based on the gravity of the offence but takes into account
the age of the offender.  The principle that crimes committed by
young persons should not be punished as severely as the crimes
of adults is, in the applicant's submission, contained in all
civilised penal codes.  In this respect, the purpose of a
sentence of detention during Her Majesty's pleasure is not wholly
punitive in character but partly punitive and partly preventive.

        In support of his argument the applicant referred to the
historical origins of the expression "during Her Majesty's
pleasure" (the Criminal Lunatics Act 1800 and the Children's Act
1908 - see paragraphs 27 and 29 above) in which context it had
a clear preventive purpose.  He further referred to the wording
of section 53 of the 1933 Act ("a person [under 18] ... shall
not, if ... convicted of murder, be sentenced to imprisonment for
life" - see paragraph 29 above) and to the indeterminacy of the
very formula used in the sentence ("during Her Majesty's
pleasure").

        In view of the above, the applicant concluded that a
sentence of detention under section 53 was closer in its
indeterminacy and preventive objectives to a discretionary life
sentence, as examined by the Court in the case of Thynne, Wilson
and Gunnell cited above than to a mandatory life sentence.  As
in that case, after the tariff has expired, the only legitimate
basis for the applicant's continued detention would be a finding
of his continued dangerousness, a characteristic susceptible to
change with the passage of time (ibid., p. 30, para. 76).  This
was particularly so in the case of offenders who could be as
young as ten at the time of the commission of the offence.  It
follows that at that phase in the execution of his sentence, the
applicant was entitled under Article 5 para. 4 (art. 5-4) to have
the lawfulness of his continued detention and of any re-detention
determined by a court at reasonable intervals.

56.     The Commission agreed in substance with the applicant's
submissions and added that the absence of the word "life" in the
sentence reinforced its indeterminate character.

57.     The Government, for their part, contended that the
sentence of detention during Her Majesty's pleasure has an
essentially punitive character and is imposed automatically on
all juvenile murderers on the strength of the gravity of their
offence, regardless of their mental state or dangerousness.  This
explains why under the Criminal Justice Act 1991 the same release
procedures govern both mandatory life sentences passed on adults
and sentences of detention during Her Majesty's pleasure and why
the same administrative policies are applied to both (see
paragraphs 31 and 35 above).  Furthermore, after the tariff
period has elapsed, not only the prisoner's dangerousness but
also the acceptability to the public of his early release must
be considered with a view to maintaining public confidence in the
system of criminal justice (see paragraph 38 above).

        It was further contended that, apart from the fact that
persons sentenced to detention during Her Majesty's pleasure
would not be detained in a prison during the early stages of
their detention but in a special institution for young offenders,
the sentence was nothing more than the statutory equivalent for
young persons of the mandatory life sentence for adults.  In
these circumstances, the issues in the present case were
practically identical to those in the Wynne case (cited above at
paragraph 55) where the Court found that the original trial and
appeal proceedings satisfied the requirements of Article 5
para. 4 (art. 5-4) of the Convention.

58.     The Court notes at the outset that, as has been commonly
accepted, the central issue in the present case is whether
detention during Her Majesty's pleasure, given its nature and
purpose, should be assimilated, under the case-law on the
Convention, to a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment or
rather to a discretionary sentence of life imprisonment.  In
dealing with this issue the Court must therefore decide whether
the substance of a sentence of detention under section 53 is more
closely related to that at the heart of the cases of Weeks v. the
United Kingdom (judgment of 2 March 1987, Series A no. 114) and
Thynne, Wilson and Gunnell (cited above at paragraph 40) or to
that in the more recent Wynne case (cited at paragraph 55).

59.     It is true, as submitted by the Government, that a
sentence of detention during Her Majesty's pleasure is mandatory:
it is fixed by law and is imposed automatically in all cases
where persons under the age of 18 are convicted of murder, the
trial judge having no discretion.  It is also the case that the
1991 Act as well as recent policy statements treat the sentence
at issue in the present case in an identical manner to mandatory
life sentences as regards proceedings for release on licence and
recall (see paragraphs 31 and 35 above).

        On the other hand, it is undisputed that, in its
statutory origins, the expression "during Her Majesty's pleasure"
had a clearly preventive purpose and that - unlike sentences of
life custody or life imprisonment - the word "life" is not
mentioned in the description of the sentence.

60.     Nevertheless, important as these arguments may be for the
understanding of the sentence of detention under section 53 in
English law, the decisive issue in the present context is whether
the nature and, above all, the purpose of that sentence are such
as to require the lawfulness of the continued detention to be
examined by a court satisfying the requirements of Article 5
para. 4 (art. 5-4).

61.     It is recalled that the applicant was sentenced to be
detained during Her Majesty's pleasure because of his young age
at the time of the commission of the offence.  In the case of
young persons convicted of serious crimes, the corresponding
sentence undoubtedly contains a punitive element and accordingly
a tariff is set to reflect the requirements of retribution and
deterrence.  However, an indeterminate term of detention for a
convicted young person, which may be as long as that person's
life, can only be justified by considerations based on the need
to protect the public.

        These considerations, centred on an assessment of the
young offender's character and mental state and of his or her
resulting dangerousness to society, must of necessity take into
account any developments in the young offender's personality and
attitude as he or she grows older.  A failure to have regard to
the changes that inevitably occur with maturation would mean that
young persons detained under section 53 would be treated as
having forfeited their liberty for the rest of their lives, a
situation which, as the applicant and the Delegate of the
Commission pointed out, might give rise to questions under
Article 3 (art. 3) of the Convention.

62.     Against this background the Court concludes that the
applicant's sentence, after the expiration of his tariff, is more
comparable to a discretionary life sentence.  This was, albeit
in a different context, the view expressed by the Divisional
Court in its judgment of 20 April 1993 (R. v. Secretary of State
for the Home Department, ex parte Prem Singh - see paragraphs 15
and 30 above).

        The decisive ground for the applicant's continued
detention was and continues to be his dangerousness to society,
as the Divisional Court restated on 16 March 1995 (R.
v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte
Prem Singh (no. 2) - see paragraph 24 above), a characteristic
susceptible to change with the passage of time.  Accordingly, new
issues of lawfulness may arise in the course of detention and the
applicant is entitled under Article 5 para. 4 (art. 5-4) to take
proceedings to have these issues decided by a court at reasonable
intervals as well as to have the lawfulness of any re-detention
determined by a court (see, mutatis mutandis, the above-mentioned
Thynne, Wilson and Gunnell judgment, p. 30, para. 76).

        B.    Whether the available remedies satisfied the
              requirements of Article 5 para. 4 (art. 5-4)

63.     The Government accepted that if, contrary to their
submissions, Article 5 para. 4 (art. 5-4) did confer additional
rights to challenge the lawfulness of the applicant's continued
detention, there would have been a breach of that provision but
only to the extent that the Parole Board had no general power to
order the release of the applicant after the expiry of his
tariff.

        In reply to the applicant's submission that the
importance and the nature of the issue, that is the detainee's
mental state, called for an oral hearing, including the
possibility of calling and questioning witnesses, the Government
recalled that Article 5 para. 4 (art. 5-4) does not confer an
absolute right to an adversarial procedure and that to the extent
that fairness did require an oral hearing, this could be secured
by bringing judicial review proceedings.

64.     The Commission found that the Parole Board's lack of
decision-making power meant that it could not be regarded as a
body satisfying the requirements of Article 5 para. 4 (art. 5-4).
As to the need for an oral hearing, the Delegate of the
Commission added that judicial review "is a very uncertain remedy
given the fact that express provision is made for an oral hearing
in the case of discretionary life prisoners, but not in the case
of persons detained during Her Majesty's pleasure".

65.     The Court recalls that Article 5 para. 4 (art. 5-4) does
not guarantee a right to judicial control of such scope as to
empower the "court" on all aspects of the case, including
questions of expediency, to substitute its own discretion for
that of the decision-making authority; the review should,
nevertheless, be wide enough to bear on those conditions which,
according to the Convention, are essential for the lawful
detention of a person subject to the special type of deprivation
of liberty ordered against the applicant (see, inter alia, the
above-mentioned Weeks judgment, p. 29, para. 59, the E. v. Norway
judgment of 29 August 1990, Series A no. 181-A, p. 21, para. 50,
and the above-mentioned Thynne, Wilson and Gunnell judgment,
p. 30, para. 79).

66.     As in Thynne, Wilson and Gunnell (p. 30, para. 80) and
despite the new policy allowing persons detained under section 53
of the 1933 Act the opportunity to see the material before the
Parole Board (see paragraphs 15 and 30 above), the Court sees no
reason to depart from its findings in the case of Weeks (cited
above, pp. 29-33, paras. 60-69) that the Parole Board does not
satisfy the requirements of Article 5 para. 4 (art. 5-4).
Indeed, to the extent to which the Parole Board cannot order the
release of a prisoner this is not contested by the Government.
However, the lack of adversarial proceedings before the Parole
Board also prevents it from being regarded as a court or
court-like body for the purposes of Article 5 para. 4 (art. 5-4).

67.     The Court recalls in this context that, in matters of
such crucial importance as the deprivation of liberty and where
questions arise which involve, for example, an assessment of the
applicant's character or mental state, it has held that it may
be essential to the fairness of the proceedings that the
applicant be present at an oral hearing (see, mutatis mutandis,
the Kremzow v. Austria judgment of 21 September 1993, Series A
no. 268-B, p. 45, para. 67).

68.           The Court is of the view that, in a situation such
as that of the applicant, where a substantial term of
imprisonment may be at stake and where characteristics pertaining
to his personality and level of maturity are of importance in
deciding on his dangerousness, Article 5 para. 4 (art. 5-4)
requires an oral hearing in the context of an adversarial
procedure involving legal representation and the possibility of
calling and questioning witnesses.

69.     It is not an answer to this requirement that the
applicant might have been able to obtain an oral hearing by
instituting proceedings for judicial review.  In the first place,
Article 5 para. 4 (art. 5-4) presupposes the existence of a
procedure in conformity with its requirements without the
necessity of instituting separate legal proceedings in order to
bring it about.  In the second place, like the Delegate of the
Commission, the Court is not convinced that the applicant's
possibility of obtaining an oral hearing by way of proceedings
for judicial review is sufficiently certain to be regarded as
satisfying the requirements of Article 5 para. 4 (art. 5-4) of
the Convention.

        C.    Recapitulation

70.     In conclusion, the Court finds that there has been a
violation of Article 5 para. 4 (art. 5-4) of the Convention in
that the applicant, after the expiry of his tariff, was unable
to bring before a court with the powers and procedural guarantees
satisfying that provision (art. 5-4) the case of his continued
detention during Her Majesty's pleasure or of his re-detention
following the revocation of his licence.

III.    APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 50 (art. 50) OF THE CONVENTION

71.     Article 50 (art. 50) of the Convention provides as
follows:

        "If the Court finds that a decision or a measure taken by
        a legal authority or any other authority of a High
        Contracting Party is completely or partially in conflict
        with the obligations arising from the ... Convention, and
        if the internal law of the said Party allows only partial
        reparation to be made for the consequences of this
        decision or measure, the decision of the Court shall, if
        necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured
        party."

        The applicant's claims under this provision (art. 50)
were for compensation for non-pecuniary damage and reimbursement
of legal costs and expenses referable to the proceedings before
the Convention institutions.

        A.    Damage

72.     The applicant adopted the terms of the claim for
compensation in the case of Hussain v. the United Kingdom
(judgment of 21 February 1996, Reports of Judgments and Decisions
1996-I, p. 272, para. 65) and, additionally, sought compensation
for the "material and moral damages" caused by the Parole Board's
failure to recommend his release in the 1991 and 1993 proceedings
and by the Secretary of State's denial of the Parole Board's
recommendation for release in July 1994.  He quantified his claim
at £100,000 or, if the Court were only to find a causal link
between the violation found and his continued detention as
of July 1994, at £25,000.

73.     The Court notes that, had the Parole Board's
recommendations been binding on the Secretary of State, the
applicant would have joined a pre-release employment scheme
in July 1994.  On the basis of the evidence before it, however,
it cannot speculate as to what the applicant's conduct would have
been and whether he would have been eventually released.  As to
the moral damage allegedly suffered, the Court shares the
Government's view that, in the circumstances, the finding of a
violation constitutes sufficient just satisfaction for the
purposes of Article 50 (art. 50).

        B.    Costs and expenses

74.     For the legal costs and expenses in bringing his case
before the Convention institutions, the applicant claimed the sum
of £22,058.73 inclusive of value added tax.

75.     The Government found the sum claimed excessive.

76.     In the light of the criteria emerging from its case-law,
the Court holds that the applicant should be awarded the amount
of £13,000 less 15,421 French francs already paid by way of legal
aid in respect of fees and travel and subsistence expenses.

        C.    Default interest

77.     According to the information available to the Court, the
statutory rate of interest applicable in the United Kingdom at
the date of adoption of the present judgment is 8% per annum.

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY

1.      Holds that there has been a violation of Article 5
        para. 4 (art. 5-4) of the Convention in that the
        applicant, after the expiry of his punitive period, was
        unable to bring before a court the case of his continued
        detention or of his re-detention following the revocation
        of his licence;

2.      Holds that the present judgment constitutes in itself
        sufficient just satisfaction for any non-pecuniary damage
        sustained;

3.      Holds

        (a) that the respondent State is to pay to the applicant,
        within three months, in respect of legal costs and
        expenses, £13,000 (thirteen thousand pounds sterling),
        less 15,421 (fifteen thousand four hundred and
        twenty-one) French francs already paid by way of legal
        aid, to be converted into pounds sterling at the rate of
        exchange applicable on the date of delivery of the
        present judgment;

        (b) that simple interest at an annual rate of 8% shall be
        payable from the expiry of the above-mentioned three
        months until settlement;

4.      Dismisses the remainder of the claim for just
        satisfaction.

        Done in English and in French, and delivered at a public
hearing in the Human Rights Building, Strasbourg, on
21 February 1996.

Signed: Rolv RYSSDAL
        President

Signed: Herbert PETZOLD
        Registrar