THE FACTS Whereas the facts as presented by the Applicant may be summarised as follows: The Applicant is a Swedish citizen, born in 1908, and living at Älvdalen (Sweden). 1. He first wrote to the Commission in September, 1964, complaining that, as a result of a decision taken by the authorities, the local hospital at Älvdalen could no longer receive as many patients as before, and that, in particular, women awaiting their confinement were obliged to go to the hospital at Mora, which is situated at some distance from Älvdalen. He considered that this was contrary to Article 3 of the Convention. He did not raise this allegation in the Application form which he later submitted, or in any of his subsequent pleadings, and it is possible, therefore, that he did not intend to pursue this particular complaint. 2. The Applicant also complains of three decisions given on .. July, 1962, by the Ovansiljan District Court for Land Cases (Ovansiljans domsagas ägodelningsrätt). He has submitted the text of two of these decisions, but has failed to explain the contents of the third decision. It seems that he appealed against the three decisions and that - presumably after his appeal had been rejected by the Svea Court of Appeal (hovrätt) - the Supreme Court (Högsta domstolen), on .. May, 1964, decided not to grant him leave to have his further appeal examined by the Supreme Court. As regards the two decisions submitted by the Applicant, the contents may be summarised as follows: (a) During certain proceedings regarding the partition of land which had previously been the joint property of the inhabitants of the village of Brunnsberg, a dispute arose as to whether a certain forest area belonged to the inhabitants of this village or whether it was the property of the Crown. The Applicant and certain other persons maintained that the forest area had been in the possession of the village community already in the 15th century, and he referred to certain provisions in Swedish law, according to which property to a piece of land may be founded on "possession since time immemorial" (urminnes hävd), even if no legal title regarding the acquisition of the land can be shown to exist. On the other hand, the State maintained that the forest area belonged to the Crown since this area was an integral part of a larger piece of land in regard to which the Crown had been officially registered as being the owner. The dispute was referred to the District Court for Land Cases, which heard the case on .. June, 1962. The Applicant and another person appeared before the Court and asked for an adjournment of the hearing until .. October, 1962, so as to give them an opportunity to instruct a lawyer in the case. It appears from the procès-verbal of the Court that this request was rejected by the Court. Consequently, the Applicant and his colleague pleaded in person before the Court, and they also submitted a number of documents in support of their opinion that the forest belonged to the village community. They also asked for legal aid in the case. The representative of the State contested the statements of the other party, and maintained that the land in dispute belonged to the Crown. The Court, by its judgment of .. July, 1962, ruled that the forest area was the property of the Crown and at the same time rejected the request for legal aid. The Applicant alleges that, as a result of this judgment as upheld on appeal, he and the other members of the village community had been deprived of their property, and he has submitted substantial documentation in order to show their right of property. He also adds that the District Court had rejected their claims without giving them a fair hearing; in this respect, he points out that an adjournment was not granted by the Court, and that he was not given adequate opportunity to present his case and to call evidence. A fair hearing had also been refused by the Supreme Court which had not admitted his appeal. The Applicant invokes Articles 1, 2, 6, paragraphs (1), (3) (a), (b), (c), (d), and (e), 13 and 14 of the Convention. (b) While considering that they were the owners of certain land (a special sort of meadows, called "myrslogar"), the Applicant and other persons requested that the authorities should determine, by an official act, the exact boundaries of their land. As the State contested that the Applicant and the other persons concerned were owners, the dispute regarding the ownership was referred to the District Court for Land Cases. In its judgment of .. July, 1962, the District Court stated that, in regard to the right of property to some of the meadows concerned, the Supreme Court had, already in 1944, made a final ruling and that, therefore, the District Court could not re-examine the question of ownership. As regards the remaining parts of the land in dispute, the District Court arrived at the conclusion that the Crown was the owner. By the same judgment, the District Court also rejected the request for legal aid submitted by the Applicant and other persons. It seems that the Applicant had also asked for an adjournment of the proceedings in this case, but that his request had been rejected by the District Court. The Applicant maintains that the Supreme Court's decision of 1944 could not be binding on him, since he had not been a party to the proceedings in 1944. Consequently, the District Court ought not to have based its judgment on this previous decision. The Applicant also refers to a number of documents which, in his opinion, support his assertion that he and the other persons concerned are the real owners of the meadows. He also invokes certain decisions given by the Supreme Court. The Applicant apparently relies on the same provisions of the Convention as mentioned above under (a). 3. The Applicant also complains of certain expropriation proceedings and his complaint, in this respect, may be summarised as follows: In regard to the expropriation of certain land for defence purposes, the State instituted proceedings against the Community of Brunnsberg as being the owner of the land. The case was dealt with by the Ovansiljan Expropriation Court (Ovansiljans domsagas expropriationsdomstol). In addition to the representatives of the Crown and the Brunnsberg Village, the present Applicant also appeared before the Court, claiming compensation for the expropriation of the ground that he owned a share of the property concerned. By judgment of .. December, 1965, the Expropriation Court agreed to the proposed measure of expropriation and fixed the compensation to be paid by the State. As regards the Applicant, however, the Court concluded that it had in no way been shown that the expropriation concerned his right and that, therefore, his claims and submissions could not be examined by the Court. There is no indication that the Application lodged an appeal from this decision. The Applicant alleges that the Court was not impartial, since one of the lay judges (nämndemän) had a personal interest in the outcome of the proceedings. In this respect, he submits that the lay judge concerned owned land in the parish of Älvdalen and that the land-owners in that parish held a joint interest in the property which was subject to expropriation. It appears from the procès-verbal of the Court that he had raised this point before the Court but that the Court had found, after deliberation, that there were no circumstances which could prevent the judge concerned from participating in the case. On this point, the Applicant invokes Articles, 6, paragraph (1), 13 and 14 of the Convention. The Applicant has also submitted a number of documents intended to show that he had a certain right in the expropriated land and that, consequently, the Court ought to have decided on his claims in the case. It seems that he also objects to the measure of expropriation as such, which he considers as a violation of the right of property. THE LAW Whereas, in so far as the Applicant complains of the hospital facilities at Älvdalen (paragraph 1 of the statement of facts), it is to be observed that, according to Article 25 (Art. 25) of the Convention, the Commission may receive petitions from any person "claiming to be the victim" of a violation of a right or freedom guaranteed by the Convention; Whereas, in the present case, the Applicant alleges that Article 3 (Art. 3) of the Convention is violated by reason of the inadequate hospital facilities at Älvdalen; whereas, however, he does not claim to be himself a victim of this violation of the Convention; Whereas it follows that, in regard to this complaint, the conditions under which the Commission may receive an application from an individual are not satisfied; and whereas therefore this part of the Application is incompatible with the provisions of the Convention within the meaning of Article 27, paragraph (2) (Art. 27-2), thereof; Whereas, in so far as the Applicant complains that he was refused legal aid in the different proceedings before the District Court for Land Cases (paragraph 2 (a) and (b) of the statement of facts), the Commission has had regard both to Article 6, paragraph (1) (Art. 6-1),and to Article 6, paragraph (3) (c) (Art. 6-3-c), of the Convention; Whereas, in respect of Article 6, paragraph (3) (c) (Art. 6-3-c), it is to be observed that the Convention, under the terms of Article 1 (Art. 1), guarantees only the rights and freedoms set forth in Section I of the Convention; and whereas under Article 25, paragraph (1) (Art. 25-1), only the alleged violation of one of those rights and freedoms by a Contracting Party can be the subject of an Application presented by a person, non-governmental organisation or group of individuals; whereas otherwise its examination is outside the competence of the Commission ratione materiae; whereas it is true that, under Article 6, paragraph (3) (c) (Art. 6-3-c),of the Convention, everyone charged with a criminal offence has the right, subject to certain conditions, to be granted free legal assistance; whereas, however, as the Commission has frequently stated, the right to free legal aid in civil cases is not as such included among the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Convention; whereas it follows that the Application in so far as it relates to Article 6, paragraph (3) (c) (Art. 6-3-c), is incompatible with this provision of the Convention within the meaning of Article 27, paragraph (2) (Art. 27-2); Whereas the Commission has also had regard to the general clause of Article 6, paragraph (1) (Art. 6-1), of the Convention; whereas it results from this provision that, in the determination of his civil rights, everyone is entitled to a fair hearing; and whereas an examination of the case as it has been submitted does not show that the refusal to grant the Applicant free legal aid constituted in any way a violation of this right; whereas it follows that the Application, in so far as it relates to Article 6, paragraph (1) (Art. 6-1), is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27, paragraph (2) (Art. 27-2),of the Convention; Whereas the Applicant further complains of the fact that the proceedings before the District Court were not adjourned and alleges that in general he was not granted a fair hearing (paragraph 2 (a) and (b) of the statement of facts); whereas he also complains that in one case the District Court based itself on a previous court decision which was not binding on him (paragraph 2 (b) of the statement of facts); Whereas in these respects an examination of the case as it has been submitted does not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set forth in the Convention and in particular in Article 6 (Art. 6); whereas it follows that these parts of the Application are manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27, paragraph (2) (Art. 27-2), of the Convention; Whereas, in regard to the Applicant's complaints as to the conclusion reached by the Courts regarding the ownership of certain land (paragraph 2 (a) and (b) of the statement of facts), an examination of the case as it has been submitted does not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set forth in the Convention and the Protocol; Whereas, in respect of the judicial decisions complained of, the Commission has frequently stated that in accordance with Article 19 (Art. 19) of the Convention its only task is to ensure observance of the obligations undertaken by the Parties in the Convention; whereas, in particular, it is not competent to deal with an application alleging that errors of law or fact have been committed by domestic courts, except where the Commission considers that such errors might have involved a possible violation of any of the rights and freedoms limitatively listed in the Convention; whereas, in this respect, the Commission refers to its decisions Nos. 458/59 (X. v. Belgium - Yearbook III, page 233) and 1140/61 (X v. Austria - Collection of Decisions, Volume 8, page 57); and whereas there is no appearance of a violation in the proceedings complained of; whereas it follows that this part of the Application is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27, paragraph (2) (Art. 27-2), of the Convention; Whereas, in so far as the Applicant complains of the decision of the Expropriation Court and the proceedings before that Court (paragraph 3 of the statement of facts), it is to be observed that, under Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention, the Commission may only deal with a matter after all domestic remedies have been exhausted according to the generally recognised rules of international law; whereas Swedish law provides for an appeal to the Court of Appeal (hovrätt) and for a further appeal to the Supreme Court (Högsta domstolen) in respect of the refusal of a lower court to let a third person participate in civil proceedings (Chapter 49, sections 4 and 5, and Chapter 54, section 3, of the Swedish Code of Procedure); and whereas the Applicant apparently failed to appeal from the Expropriation Court's decision of .. December, 1965 which included the Court's refusal to recognise him as party in the proceedings concerned; whereas, therefore, he has not exhausted the remedies available to him under Swedish law; whereas, moreover, an examination of the case as it has been submitted does not disclosethe existence of any special circumstances which might have absolved the Applicant, according to the generally recognised rules of international law, from exhausting the domestic remedies at his disposal; whereas, therefore, the condition as to the exhaustion of domestic remedies laid down in Articles 26 and 27, paragraph (3) (Art. 26, 27-3),of the Convention has not been complied with by the Applicant. Now therefore the Commission declares this Application inadmissible.