GRAND CHAMBER

CASE OF ARVANITAKI-ROBOTI AND OTHERS v. GREECE

(Application no. 27278/03)

JUDGMENT

STRASBOURG

15 February 2008

This judgment is final but may be subject to editorial revision.

 

In the case of Arvanitaki-Roboti and Others v. Greece,

The European Court of Human Rights, sitting as a Grand Chamber composed of:

Jean-Paul Costa, President, 
 Christos Rozakis, 
 Nicolas Bratza, 
 Boštjan M. Zupančič, 
 Peer Lorenzen, 
 Rıza Türmen, 
 Karel Jungwiert, 
 Josep Casadevall, 
 Margarita Tsatsa-Nikolovska, 
 Rait Maruste, 
 Snejana Botoucharova, 
 Mindia Ugrekhelidze, 
 Vladimiro Zagrebelsky, 
 Lech Garlicki, 
 David Thór Björgvinsson, 
 Danutė Jočienė, 
 Mark Villiger, judges, 
and Vincent Berger, Jurisconsult,

Having deliberated in private on 7 March 2007 and 9 January 2008,

Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on the last-mentioned date:

PROCEDURE

1.  The case originated in an application (no. 27278/03) against the Greek Republic lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by ninety-one Greek nationals listed in the Appendix (“the applicants”), on 4 August 2003.

2.  The applicants were represented by Ms Z. Tsiliouka-Mousmoula and Mr I. Stamoulis, of the Athens Bar. The Greek Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent's delegates, Ms G. Skiani and Mr K. Georgiadis, Advisers, State Legal Council.

3.  The applicants complained, inter alia, under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, about the length of proceedings before the administrative courts.

4.  The application was allocated to the First Section of the Court (Rule 52 § 1 of the Rules of Court).

5.  On 12 November 2004 the Court decided to communicate the complaint concerning the length of proceedings to the Government. Under the provisions of Article 29 § 3 of the Convention, it decided to examine the merits of the application at the same time as its admissibility.

6.  On 18 May 2006 the Chamber constituted within the First Section to examine the case and composed of the following judges: Loukis Loucaides, Christos Rozakis, Françoise Tulkens, Elisabeth Steiner, Khanlar Hajiyev, Dean Spielmann and Sverre Erik Jebens, and Søren Nielsen, Section Registrar, declared the application partly inadmissible and concluded unanimously that there had been a violation of Article 6 § 1 on account of the excessive length of the proceedings. The Chamber also decided, by four votes to three, to award each of the applicants a sum in non-pecuniary damage, the same for all but one of the applicants.

7.  On 27 July 2006 the Government requested, in accordance with Article 43 of the Convention and Rule 73, that the case be referred to the Grand Chamber. On 13 September 2006 a panel of the Grand Chamber accepted this request.

8.  The composition of the Grand Chamber was determined according to the provisions of Articles 27 §§ 2 and 3 of the Convention and Rule 24.

9.  The applicants and the Government each filed observations on the merits (Rule 59 § 1).

10.  A hearing took place in public in the Human Rights Building, Strasbourg, on 7 March 2007 (Rule 59 § 3).

There appeared before the Court:

–  for the Government 
Ms G. Skiani, Adviser, State Legal Council, 
Mr K. Georgiadis, Adviser, State Legal Council, Agent's delegates
Mr I. Bakopoulos, Legal Assistant, State Legal Council, Counsel;

–  for the applicants 
Ms Z. Tsiliouka-Mousmoula, lawyer, 
Mr I. Stamoulis, lawyer, Counsel.

The Court heard addresses by Ms Tsiliouka-Mousmoula, Mr Stamoulis, Ms Skiani and Mr Georgiadis.

THE FACTS

I.  THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE

11.  In their capacity as doctors, the applicants are members of the National Health System (Εθνικό Σύστημα Υγείας) and are employed by the public hospital “O Evangelismos”.

12.  On 28 April 1994 they applied to the Athens Administrative Court of Appeal seeking to have set aside the hospital's refusal to pay them an allowance for overtime work, set at 1/65th of their basic salary. The sole purpose of this application was to challenge the lawfulness of the disputed administrative decision.

13.  Initially scheduled for 11 March 1996, the hearing was postponed seven times, one of these being at the applicants' request. It was eventually held on 22 November 1999. On 16 December 1999 the Athens Administrative Court of Appeal set aside the disputed administrative decision (decision no. 2684/1999).

14.  On 18 April 2000 the hospital lodged an appeal against that decision. Initially scheduled for 18 January 2001, the hearing was held on 18 October 2001, after four postponements. On 7 March 2002 the Third Division of the Supreme Administrative Court sent the case for examination by that court's seven-judge bench on account of the importance of a question concerning the way in which the document in dispute had been published (judgment no. 763/2002).

15.  On 6 February 2003, following the postponement of one hearing, the Supreme Administrative Court overturned the Athens Administrative Court of Appeal's decision. It held that the ministerial decree on which the applicants based their claim to receive an allowance for overtime work had not been published in due form and was therefore without foundation (judgment no. 307/2003).

16.  It appears from the case file that, in the meantime, the applicants had on several occasions brought actions in the administrative courts, seeking payment of various amounts in respect of allowances for overtime work allegedly owed by the public hospital in question. The total sum claimed by each applicant in this connection varied between 15,000 and 20,000 euros (EUR). It appears from the case file that these actions were dismissed by the domestic courts.

II.   RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW

17.  Article 115 § 1 of the Code of Administrative Procedure provides:

“Several persons may bring a joint action, in a single appeal, against the same act or omission, provided that the grounds advanced have, in substance, the same legal or factual basis with regard to the essential issues or are based on the same action. [A joint action may also be lodged] where the grounds advanced concern a shared right or where, in substance, the rights relied upon have the same legal or factual basis with regard to the key issues.

...”

THE LAW

I.  ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE CONVENTION

18.  The applicants alleged that the length of the proceedings before the administrative courts had breached the principle of a “reasonable time”. They relied on Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, the relevant parts of which provide:

“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal...”

19.  The Chamber concluded in its judgment of 18 May 2006 that, in the instant case, the length of the impugned proceedings had been excessive and that there had been a violation of Article 6 § 1.

20.  The Court notes that the Government's request that the case be referred to the Grand Chamber concerned only the Chamber's conclusions as to the application of Article 41 of the Convention. However, given that the case referred to the Grand Chamber necessarily embraces all aspects of the application previously examined by the Chamber in its judgment (see Sisojeva and Others v. Latvia [GC], no. 60654/00, § 61, ECHR 2007-...), the complaint alleging a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention must also be examined.

21.  For the reasons set out by the Chamber, the Court considers that there was a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.

II.  APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION

22.  Article 41 of the Convention provides:

“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”

A.  Damage

1.  The Chamber's judgment

23.  In its judgment, the Chamber held that the extension of the disputed proceedings beyond a “reasonable time” had undoubtedly caused the applicants non-pecuniary damage which would justify an award. Ruling on an equitable basis, it awarded the entire sum claimed by the applicant listed under no. 67, namely EUR 6,895, and EUR 7,000 to each of the other applicants, plus any tax that might be chargeable.

2.  The parties' submissions

24.  The applicants considered that the amount they had been awarded in respect of just satisfaction was by no means excessive but that, on the contrary, it represented the minimum that the Court could have awarded them. In their opinion, this amount was consistent with the Court's case-law in this area. It was not unreasonable if one took into consideration the financial stake for the applicants of the dispute before the domestic courts, namely EUR 17,000 - 20,000. Referring to Article 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the applicants alleged that the domestic legislation itself provided for the introduction of a joint action with a view to facilitating the administration of justice and guaranteeing prompt and effective judicial protection. Finally, they stated that a possible reduction in the just satisfaction award would send out the wrong signal to claimants who brought joint proceedings before domestic courts. In particular, in the event of a subsequent application to the Court, they would be tempted to lodge their applications individually instead of joining their cases, which would undoubtedly increase the Court's workload.

25.  The Government considered that the total amount awarded by the Chamber was exorbitant and inconsistent with the spirit of Article 41, which provided only for the award of just satisfaction for the damage sustained. They added that, when examining other cases concerning Greece in which it had found more serious violations than that of the right to a hearing within a reasonable time, the Court had awarded smaller sums. In their opinion, in cases concerning the length of proceedings, the Court should vary the application of Article 41 depending on the number of individuals involved. In particular, they considered that the costs of proceedings and the legitimate interests in issue were completely different according to whether the litigants had applied to the courts collectively or individually. The same was true in respect of the possible frustration experienced as a result of undue delay in judicial proceedings. Turning to the impugned proceedings, launched by an application to have a decision set aside, the number of applicants could have had no impact on the eventual outcome. The Government concluded that the Grand Chamber should reduce the total amount awarded by the Chamber in respect of non-pecuniary damage.

3.  The Court's assessment

26.  The Court notes at the outset that the parties have expressed no opinion as to the pecuniary damage that may have been sustained by the applicants. Accordingly, it will examine only the question of an appropriate award in respect of non-pecuniary damage in the instant case, that is, in a case concerning the length of joint proceedings before the domestic courts which were subsequently lodged collectively with the Court.

(a)  The Court's criteria

27.  It should first of all be reiterated that, where it finds a violation of a Convention provision, the Court may award the applicant an amount for the non-pecuniary damage sustained. This amount is intended to make reparation for the state of distress, inconvenience and uncertainty resulting from the violation in question (see Comingersoll S.A. v. Portugal [GC], no. 35382/97, § 29, ECHR 2000-IV). Consequently, where proceedings have been excessively long, the amount awarded in respect of non-pecuniary damage must take account of prejudice of this type which the applicant may have sustained.

28.  It is impossible, however, to account in detail for the relative importance of each of the factors taken into consideration in calculating the amount to be awarded for non-pecuniary damage, an amount which is determined on an equitable basis. Nonetheless, the case-law provides a number of guidelines on the subject (see, among other authorities, König v. Germany (Article 50), judgment of 10 March 1980, Series A no. 36, pp. 16-17, § 19, and Davies v. the United Kingdom, no. 42007/98, § 38, 16 July 2002). It is, necessary, however to specify these guidelines with regard to the non-pecuniary damage caused by the excessive length of joint proceedings.

29.  In particular, where common proceedings have been found to be excessively long, the Court must take account of the manner in which the number of participants in such proceedings may influence the level of distress, inconvenience and uncertainty affecting each of them. Thus, a high number of participants will very probably have an impact on the amount of just satisfaction to be awarded in respect of non-pecuniary damage. Such an approach is based on the fact that the number of individuals participating in common proceedings before the domestic courts is not neutral from the perspective of the non-pecuniary damage that may be sustained by each of them as a result of the length of those proceedings when compared with the non-pecuniary damage that would be sustained by an individual who had brought identical proceedings on an individual basis. Membership of a group of people who have resolved to apply to a court on the same factual or legal basis means that both the advantages and disadvantages of common proceedings will be shared.

In addition, where joint proceedings are handled and coordinated by the same representative, the costs and fees are usually lower for each applicant than they are in the case of proceedings brought by an individual, which simplifies the process of applying to the courts. Equally, the grouping together of applications usually enables a court to join related cases and may thus facilitate the proper administration of justice; it may also enable proceedings to be conducted more speedily. Thus, such proceedings offer advantages that need to be taken into consideration (see, mutatis mutandis, Scordino v. Italy (No. 1) [GC], no. 36813/97, § 268, ECHR 2006-...).

30.  On the other hand, these last characteristics of common proceedings may in turn give rise on the part of the persons concerned to an expectation that the State will act diligently in dealing with their case. Unjustified delay in this area is therefore likely to exacerbate any prejudice sustained.

31.  In addition, the Court considers that what is at stake in disputed proceedings is a relevant factor in assessing any non-pecuniary damage that may have been sustained. The more each applicant's personal interests are at stake in the proceedings, the greater the inconvenience and uncertainty to which they are subjected (see paragraph 27 above).

32.  Finally, the Court notes that it enjoys a certain discretion in the exercise of the power conferred by Article 41, as is borne out by the adjective “just” and the phrase “if necessary” (see Guzzardi v. Italy, judgment of 6 November 1980, Series A no. 39, p. 42, § 114). That being the case, and unless it concludes that the finding of a violation provides sufficient just satisfaction for the non-pecuniary damage sustained, the Court must ensure that the amount awarded is reasonable in terms of the seriousness of the violation that is found. In particular, it must take account in its assessment of the amounts already awarded in similar cases and, in the event of common proceedings, of the number of applicants and the total sum awarded to them.

(b)  Application in the present case

33.  The Court notes that, of all the elements that may be taken into consideration in determining the non-pecuniary damage sustained in the instant case, some entail a reduction, others an increase, in the amount to be awarded.

34.  With regard to those which would entail a reduction in the amount to be awarded, the Court notes, firstly, that the ninety-one applicants had acted together in bringing the proceedings in issue before the administrative courts in order to challenge the lawfulness of an administrative decision. Thus, they did not lodge separate requests before the competent courts, but were all pursuing the same objective, namely that of having the disputed decision set aside. In addition, in proceedings before the administrative courts to have a decision set aside, the number of claimants has no impact whatsoever on the outcome of the proceedings, which concern exclusively the lawfulness of the contested administrative decision. The Court therefore considers that, in comparison with civil proceedings in which claimants lodge individual claims for compensation simultaneously, the shared objective of the impugned proceedings was such as to alleviate the inconvenience and uncertainty experienced on account of their delay.

35.  With regard to those elements which would entail an increase in the amount to be awarded, the Court takes the following into account. Admittedly, the financial stakes for the applicants in the impugned proceedings were merely implicit, rather than direct. The sole purpose of those proceedings was to challenge the legality of the disputed administrative decision. Nevertheless, the applicants had already brought actions for damages before the administrative courts, seeking compensation for the delay in payment of various sums due as compensation for overtime work allegedly owed by the public hospital in question. The total amount claimed by each applicant was not insignificant; it varied between EUR 15,000 and 20,000. The Court therefore considers that what was at stake in the impugned proceedings, the outcome of which could influence the decision of the administrative courts in actions for compensation, was such as to exacerbate the prejudice sustained by the applicants on account of the protracted nature of the proceedings.

36.  Having regard to the foregoing, the Court considers that the extension of the impugned proceedings beyond a “reasonable time” undoubtedly caused the applicants non-pecuniary damage which would justify an award. It also takes into consideration the number of applicants, the nature of the violation found and the need to determine the amount in such a way that the overall sum is compatible with the relevant case-law and is reasonable in the light of what was at stake in the proceedings in question. On the basis of the above considerations, and ruling on an equitable basis, the Court awards under this head EUR 3,500 to each of the applicants, plus any tax that may be chargeable.

B.  Costs and expenses

1.  The Chamber's judgment

37.  The Chamber awarded the applicants EUR 1,500 jointly for costs and expenses, plus any tax that might be chargeable.

2.  The parties' submissions

(a)  The applicants

38.  The applicants claimed the entirety of the costs and expenses incurred in the domestic proceedings and before the Chamber and the Grand Chamber. Before the Chamber, they had submitted ten bills totalling EUR 29,120, without distinguishing between those which concerned the domestic courts and those which concerned the Court. They did not produce supporting documents with regard to the costs and expenses incurred before the Grand Chamber.

(b)  The Government

39.  The Government made no submissions on this point.

3.  The Court's assessment

40.  According to the Court's established case-law, costs and expenses will not be awarded under Article 41 unless it is established that they were actually and necessarily incurred and are also reasonable as to quantum. Furthermore, legal costs are only recoverable in so far as they relate to the violation found (see, for example, Beyeler v. Italy (just satisfaction) [GC], no. 33202/96, § 27, 28 May 2002, and Sahin v. Germany [GC], no. 30943/96, § 105, ECHR 2003-VIII).

41.  In the light of the above, and for the reasons indicated by the Chamber, the Court awards the applicants the sum already awarded by the Chamber, namely EUR 1,500 jointly, plus any tax that may be chargeable.

C.  Default interest

42.  The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT

1.  Holds, unanimously, that there has been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention;

2.  Holds, by fifteen votes to two,

(a)  that the respondent State is to pay, within three months, EUR 3,500 (three thousand five hundred euros) to each of the applicants in respect of non-pecuniary damage and EUR 1,500 (one thousand five hundred euros) to the applicants jointly in respect of costs and expenses, plus any tax that may be chargeable;

(b)  that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;

3.  Dismisses, unanimously, the remainder of the applicants' claims for just satisfaction.

Done in English and in French, and delivered at a public hearing in the Human Rights Building, Strasbourg, on 15 February 2008.

Vincent Berger Jean-Paul Costa 
 
Jurisconsult President

In accordance with Article 45 § 2 of the Convention and Rule 74 § 2 of the Rules of Court, the following separate opinions are annexed to this judgment:

-  concurring opinion of Judge Bratza joined by Judge Rozakis;

-  partly dissenting opinion of Judges Zupančič and Zagrebelsky.

J.-P.C 
V.B.

 

CONCURRING OPINION OF JUDGE BRATZA JOINED BY JUDGE ROZAKIS

While I agree with the result reached by the majority of the Grand Chamber in this case and in the related case of Kakamoukas and Others v. Greece, I prefer to explain my reasons shortly in my own words.

The starting point for consideration of the question raised in both cases is Article 41 itself. As is clear from the terms of the Article, not only is the grant by the Court of financial or other reparation to the applicant where a violation of the Convention is found a discretionary measure, but any satisfaction awarded to the injured party must be “just”. In the case of damage of a non-pecuniary nature, the term connotes that any sum awarded must reflect the nature of the Convention right violated, the gravity of the violation found and its impact on the individual applicant.

Where a violation of Article 6 of the Convention has been found on the grounds of the excessive length of domestic proceedings, it has been the usual practice of the Court to award financial compensation to the successful applicant to reflect the frustration, anxiety and inconvenience caused to the applicant by the unacceptable delays in the conduct of the proceedings for which the national courts or tribunals are responsible. Where the applicant is an individual litigant or a member of a small group of litigants who are parties to the same domestic proceedings, the award of just satisfaction has not in general caused problems. The Court, acting “on an equitable basis”, will normally award a sum which takes account of the overall length of the proceedings, the number of levels of jurisdiction through which the proceedings have passed and the extent to which the applicant may have contributed to the overall length, as well as the awards made in comparable cases against the same or other respondent States, in order to ensure, so far as possible, consistency of approach.

However, where, as in the present case, the complaint of undue length of proceedings is made by a large number of parties to the same set of civil proceedings, a further consideration comes into play, namely the proportionality of the overall award. Although it is the Convention right of each individual which is found to have been violated, the total amount of the award under Article 41 should not be out of all proportion to the nature and seriousness of the violation found in the case, including the fact that the violation found relates to the excessive length of a single set of proceedings. The importance of upholding this principle justifies the making of a substantial reduction in the amount which would have been awarded to each applicant, had he or she been the only party, or one of a small number of parties, to the proceedings.

 

In my view an award such as that made by the Chamber, totalling over € 630,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage for the excessive length of a single set of proceedings offends against this totality principle and requires to be substantially reduced.

The applicants argue that there is no justification for awarding them less than the Court would have awarded each of them had he or she been the only party to the domestic proceedings. It is further argued that to make a reduction in the award because of the number of claimants would send the wrong signal to claimants who brought joint proceedings before the domestic courts and would encourage them to lodge separate applications to the Court instead of joining their cases.

I am unable to accept either argument. As to the former, there are, as the judgment rightly points out, considerable advantages for the claimants themselves, as well as for the effective administration of justice in joining in a single set of proceedings rather than pursuing identical claims in separate proceedings. The sharing of the responsibility for the conduct of the proceedings, as well as the substantial saving of costs for the individual applicant which would normally follow from being a party to joint proceedings handled and coordinated by a single set of legal representatives, are significant benefits which must be taken into account by the Court when assessing the degree of frustration, anxiety and inconvenience caused to the individual applicants by delays in the proceedings.

I am similarly unpersuaded by the unrealistic argument that a reduction in the award which would otherwise be made would encourage applicants who are parties to the same proceedings to lodge separate applications to the Court with a consequent undesirable increase in the Court's case-load. As the practice of the Court makes clear, should such a situation arise, the separate applications would inevitably be joined by the Court in the interests of judicial economy and efficiency and would not result in the making of increased individual awards.

While views might legitimately differ as to whether the sums awarded by the Grand Chamber in the present case strike the requisite balance between compensating the individual applicants for a violation of their Convention rights and maintaining the proportionality of the overall award, I am willing to accept the sums awarded by the majority on an equitable basis.

 

PARTLY DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGES ZUPANČIČ AND ZAGREBELSKY

(Translation)

To our regret, we were unable to concur with the majority as regards the application of Article 41 of the Convention once it had been found that there had been a violation of the right to a reasonable length of proceedings in the case in issue.

The question before the Grand Chamber was whether the fact that there were numerous applicants could be included in the criteria to be used in determining the amount of compensation to be awarded in respect of non-pecuniary damage. The majority found (in paragraph 29 of the judgment) that it could, observing that “a high number of participants will very probably have an impact on the amount of just satisfaction to be awarded in respect of non-pecuniary damage”, that “the number of individuals participating in common proceedings before the domestic courts is not neutral from the perspective of the non-pecuniary damage that may be sustained by each of them as a result of the length of those proceedings when compared with the non-pecuniary damage that would be sustained by an individual who had brought identical proceedings on an individual basis” and that “membership of a group of people who have resolved to apply to a court on the same factual or legal basis means that both the advantages and disadvantages of common proceedings will be shared”.

Even though, in line with a practice which we find questionable, the judgment does not make explicit the reasoning which led to the indication of the amount to be awarded (still less does it touch on the issue of whether the level of compensation ought to be the same for each victim of the violation), the significance of the new criterion, which has resulted in a substantial reduction of the compensation in comparison to the Court's general practice, may be discerned.

In our opinion, however, there is no psychological or other reason which can justify the statement of principle adopted by the Grand Chamber. Nor can we identify in this situation any link or similarity with the area of class actions and the criteria which are used in such cases to calculate the amounts to be awarded to each of the successful parties (in respect of pecuniary damage). We consider that, whatever the number of victims, each of them must be compensated, “if necessary”, for the consequences which he or she must have suffered as a result of the violation in question. Just satisfaction is rightly provided for in Article 41 to compensate the victim of a violation in so far as possible. What was at stake in the domestic proceedings and its effects on the person of the applicant are, we believe, the decisive factors to be taken into consideration.

 

In this connection, we consider that there is no reason to take into consideration the total sum awarded to the applicants, with a view to reducing that sum in a way that affects each victim (see paragraph 32).

That being said, we would add that it is understandable that the Court was concerned by the sheer scale of the amounts in question if they were not to be reduced. In our opinion, however, this is the inevitable consequence of several questionable aspects of the Court's practice with regard to the application of Article 41 in the event of a violation of the right to a reasonable length of proceedings. These range from an almost automatic assumption that non-pecuniary damage has been sustained, without the requirement of any evidence or argument, and the use of mathematical calculation criteria which take into account the entire length of the proceedings, even the period recognised as justified, to the use in this area of scales which are unrelated to the Court's practice concerning violations which cause considerably greater suffering to the victims (Articles 2, 3, 8, 10, etc.).

In our opinion, rather than intervening after the event by introducing a new and highly questionable criterion, the Court ought to re-examine the underlying reasons for the consequences which it was seeking to avoid. 

APPENDIX

List of applicants

1.      Irini ARVANITAKI-ROBOTI

2.      Panagiotis ALFARAS-MELAINIS

3.      Aikaterini APOSTOLOPOULOU-TSAFOU

4.      Konstantinos VASSILIOU

5.      Emmanouil VAÏDAKIS

6.      Emmanouil VAÏKOUSIS

7.      Niki VASILOGIANNAKOPOULOU-ANZAOUI

8.      Grigoris VERYKOKAKIS

9.      Varvara-Georgia VLACHOPOULOU-SFYRA

10.      Eleftheria GALANAKI-KOUTSOURELAKI

11.      Ioannis GEORGILAS

12.      Kritolaos DASKALAKIS

13.      Dimitrios DIMITROGLOU

14.      Anastasia DIAMANTOPOULOU

15.      Spyros DRAKOPOULOS

16.      Nikolaos EXARCHOS

17.      Epaminondas ZAKYNTHINOS

18.      Gérard-Louis JULLIEN

19.      Penelope ILIADOU-KAPSALOPOULOU

20.      Alfredos THEODOROU

21.      Lazaros IOSIFIDIS

22.      Vassilis KADAS

23.      Kyriakos KALOGERAKIS

24.      Christina KANDARAKI-SFARNA

25.      Vassiliki KANELLOPOULOU

26.      Dimitrios KARAMITSOS

27.      Aristotelis KATSAS

28.      Serafim KLIMOPOULOS

29.      Evaggelos KOKKINAKIS

30.      Athanasios KOLIOS

31.      Vassilios KOMBOROZOS

32.      Chrysostomos KONTAXIS

33.      Despina KOROLANOGLOU

34.      Ioannis KOUTSOUVELIS

35.      Anastasia KRITHARA-KAFKIA

36.      Georgios KONSTANTINOU

37.      Koula KONSTANTINOU

38.      Georgios KONSTANTINIDIS

39.      Sophia LAMBROPOULOU-STAVROPOULOU

40.      Konstantina LARIOU-MARGARI

41.      Maria MATHIOUDAKI-AMARANTOU

42.      Dimitrios MALOVROUVAS

43.      Gerasimos MANTZARIS

44.      Athanasios MASOURAS

45.      Theodoros MAVROMATIS

46.      Chrysanthi MITSOULI-MENTZIKOF

47.      Dimitrios MINTZIAS

48.      Maria MOUTSOPOULOU-MARAGGOU

49.      Sotirios BARATSIS

50.      Nikolaos BONTOZOGLOU

51.      Petros DADIS

52.      Aikaterini PANTELIDAKI-VASSILIOU

53.      Georgios PAPAGEORGIOU

54.      Konstantinos PAPAGIANNAKOS

55.      Emmanouil PAPADAKIS

56.      Vassilios PAPADAKOS

57.      Alexandros PAPAKONSTANTINOU

58.      Spyridon PAPANDREOU

59.      Marios PARARAS

60.      Georgios PARASKEVAS

61.      Eleni PLESIA-GIAKOUMELOU

62.      Christos PEPPAS

63.      Konstantina PETRAKI

64.      Prokopis PIPIS

65.      Ersi PITSIGAVDAKI

66.      Marinos PITARIDIS

67.      Ioannis POULANTZAS

68.      Athanasios PREKATES

69.      Athanasios RAÏTSOS

70.      Georgios REKOUMIS

71.      Antonios SALMANIDIS

72.      Florentia SOTSIOU-KANDILA

73.      Ilias SOURTZIS

74.      Epaminondas STATHIS

75.      Michaïl STOKOS

76.      Eleni STOFOROU

77.      Evaggelos SYGGOUNAS

78.      Christos SYRMOS

79.      Georgios TSAOUSIS

80.      Ioannis TSERONIS

81.      Alexandra TSIROGIANNI

82.      Konstantinos TSIROGIANNIS

83.      Marina TSITSIKA

84.      Dimitrios TSOUKATOS

85.      Georgios FARMAKIS

86.      Aggeliki FERTI-PASANTOPOULOU

87.      Flora PHILIPPIDOU

88.      Evaggelos CHATZIGIANNAKIS

89.      Georgios CHATZIKONSTANTINOU

90.      Nikolaos CHATZIS

91.      Vassilios CHRISTIDIS


ARVANITAKI-ROBOTI AND OTHERS v. GREECE JUDGMENT


ARVANITAKI-ROBOTI AND OTHERS v. GREECE JUDGMENT 


ARVANITAKI-ROBOTI AND OTHERS v. GREECE JUDGMENT – CONCURRING 
OPINION OF JUDGE BRATZA JOIND BY JUDGE ROZAKIS


ARVANITAKI-ROBOTI AND OTHERS v. GREECE JUDGMENT 


ARVANITAKI-ROBOTI AND OTHERS v. GREECE JUDGMENT 


ARVANITAKI-ROBOTI AND OTHERS v. GREECE JUDGMENT  
 PARTLY DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGES ZUPANČIČ AND ZAGREBELSKY


ARVANITAKI-ROBOTI AND OTHERS v. GREECE JUDGMENT


ARVANITAKI-ROBOTI AND OTHERS v. GREECE JUDGMENT