AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF


                      Application No. 28358/95
                      by Janusz BARANOWSKI
                      against Poland


      The European Commission of Human Rights sitting in private on
8 December 1997, the following members being present:

           Mr    S. TRECHSEL, President
           Mrs   G.H. THUNE
           Mrs   J. LIDDY
           MM    E. BUSUTTIL
                 G. JÖRUNDSSON
                 A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK
                 A. WEITZEL
                 J.-C. SOYER
                 H. DANELIUS
                 F. MARTINEZ
                 C.L. ROZAKIS
                 L. LOUCAIDES
                 M.P. PELLONPÄÄ
                 B. MARXER
                 M.A. NOWICKI
                 I. CABRAL BARRETO
                 B. CONFORTI
                 N. BRATZA
                 I. BÉKÉS
                 J. MUCHA
                 D. SVÁBY
                 G. RESS
                 A. PERENIC
                 C. BÎRSAN
                 P. LORENZEN
                 K. HERNDL
                 E. BIELIUNAS
                 E.A. ALKEMA
                 M. VILA AMIGÓ
           Mrs   M. HION
           MM    R. NICOLINI
                 A. ARABADJIEV

           Mr    M. de SALVIA, Secretary to the Commission

      Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;

      Having regard to the application introduced on 24 May 1994 by
Janusz BARANOWSKI against Poland and registered on 29 August 1995 under
file No. 28358/95;

      Having regard to :

-     the reports provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure of
      the Commission;

-     the observations submitted by the respondent Government on
      6 January and 26 August 1997 and the observations in reply
      submitted by the applicant on 20 February and 21 October 1997;

      Having deliberated;

      Decides as follows:

THE FACTS

      The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be
summarised as follows.

      The applicant, a Polish citizen born in 1943, is an engineer
residing in Lódz, Poland.

A.    Particular circumstances of the case

      On 2 June 1993 the Lódz Regional Prosecutor (Prokurator
Wojewódzki) charged the applicant with fraud and detained him on
remand.

      On 25 June 1993 the Lódz Regional Court (S*d Wojewódzki), upon
the applicant's appeal, upheld the detention order.

      On 10 August 1993 the Lódz Regional Court, upon the prosecutor's
request, prolonged the applicant's detention until 31 December 1993.

      On 30 December 1993 the Lódz Regional Court, upon the request of
the Lódz Regional Prosecutor, prolonged the applicant's detention on
remand until 31 January 1994.  On 7 January 1994 the applicant filed
an appeal against the decision prolonging his detention.

      On 11 January 1994 the Lódz Regional Prosecutor lodged a bill of
indictment with the Lódz Regional Court.

      On 21 January 1994 the Lódz Regional Court referred the
applicant's appeal of 7 January 1994 to the Lódz Court of Appeal (S*d
Apelacyjny).

      On 1 February 1994 the Lódz Court of Appeal held that the
examination of the applicant's appeal of 7 January 1994 "was
purposeless" and decided that the appeal should be deemed to be a
request for release.  The court observed that the issue of decisions
on the prolongation of detention on remand was necessary only at the
investigative stage.  Therefore, after the bill of indictment was
lodged, the applicant could only at any time lodge a request for
release with the court competent to deal with his case.  As a result,
the appeal was referred back to the Lódz Regional Court.  The applicant
was informed about this decision on 18 February 1994.  However, the
Lódz Regional Court examined the appeal in question neither as a
request for release, nor in any other proceedings.

      On 1 February 1994 the applicant filed a formal notification to
the Lódz District Prosecutor (Prokurator Rejonowy).  He informed the
Prosecutor that the order for his detention had expired on 31 January
1994.  He had appealed against this order but the court had failed to
rule on his appeal.

      On 7 February and 28 March 1994 the applicant lodged requests for
release with the Lódz Regional Court.

      On 16 and 25 February, 4 March, 8 and 18 April, 20 and 30 May,
and 25 October 1994 the applicant requested the Lódz Regional Court to
give an interpretation of the detention order of 30 December 1993, in
particular whether the order in question had remained executory after
its expiry.  He submitted these requests under Section 14 of the Code
of Execution of Criminal Sentences, arguing that the fact that the
indictment had been lodged with the court did not automatically mean
that his detention was to be maintained after 31 January 1994.  He
further submitted that no provision of the Code of Criminal Procedure
provided that detention was prolonged as a result of the transfer of
the case to the court.  He asserted that the order of 30 December 1993
was not executory as he had filed an appeal against it.  Therefore, he
should have been released immediately after 31 January 1994 as his
detention as from this date lacked any legal basis.

      On 16 February 1994, J.L., the Chief Judge of the Criminal
Division of the Lódz Regional Court, sent the following letter to the
applicant:

      "You are informed that since the bill of indictment had been
      submitted to the Lódz Regional Court, that court was competent
      to deal with any matters related to your case, including
      decisions on your detention.  It is open to you to submit a
      request for release at any time and the court will then examine
      whether your detention should be continued.  You will be released
      if the court grants such request. If the court refuses to do so,
      your detention will be continued until the judgment at first
      instance is pronounced.  Therefore, your statement that your
      detention was unlawful since the order for your detention had
      expired on 31 January 1994 was erroneous."

      On 24 May 1994 the Lódz Regional Court ruled on the applicant's
requests for release dated 7 February and 28 March 1994 and held that
no circumstances justified quashing or altering the preventive measure
imposed.  The decision was based on Sections 209 and 217 para. 1 (2)
and (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure.  Apparently, before making
this decision, the court had called the evidence from three medical
experts to assess whether the applicant could be detained in view of
his state of health. On 5 July 1994 the Lódz Court of Appeal, on the
applicant's appeal, upheld the decision of the court of first instance.

      On 9 August 1994 the applicant again requested the Lódz Regional
Court to release him.  The request was dismissed on 30 August 1994.
Subsequently, on 9 September and 2 December 1994, and 4 April 1995 the
Lódz Regional Court dismissed the further requests for release lodged
by the applicant on unspecified dates.

      On 21 December 1994 a single judge, sitting as the Lódz Regional
Court, pronounced a decision on the applicant's requests submitted
under Section 14 of the Code on Execution of Criminal Sentences, which
had been filed by him between 16 February and 25 October 1994.  The
court declared that the decision of 30 December 1993 on the
prolongation of the applicant's detention until 31 January 1994 was
enforceable, even though the applicant had filed an appeal against it.
The judge further reiterated the arguments contained in the letter to
the applicant of 16 February 1994.

      On 29 December 1994 the applicant appealed against this decision.
He submitted that the court should have been composed of three judges
in conformity with the relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal
Procedure.  He again submitted that there was no legal basis for
maintaining his detention after 31 January 1994.

      On 3 January 1995 a panel of three judges sitting as the Lódz
Regional Court quashed the decision of 21 December 1994, finding that
the Court should have been composed of three judges, as submitted by
the applicant.  However, it also held that Section 14 of the Code of
Execution of Criminal Sentences was not applicable in the applicant's
case since this provision applied to cases involving doubts concerning
the execution of the sentence or the calculation of the penalty
imposed.

      On 10 January 1995 the applicant filed an appeal against this
decision.

      On 16 January 1995 the Chief Judge of the Criminal Division of
the Lódz Regional Court gave an order refusing to allow the applicant's
appeal on the basis that it was inadmissible in law.  The applicant
filed  an appeal against this decision.

      On 17 February 1995 the Lódz Regional Court confirmed the
decision of 16 January 1995, considering that it had been open to the
applicant to file an appeal against the decision of 21 December 1994,
but a further appeal was inadmissible in law since Section 14 of the
Code of Execution of Criminal Sentences did not apply to a detainee.

      In a letter of 23 May 1995 the judge J.L., replying to the
applicant's letter of 15 May 1995, stated as follows:

      "You are informed that the issue of the lawfulness of the penalty
      of detention on remand was already explained to you in detail in
      the letter of 16 February 1994 and the decision of 21 December
      1994.  As regards the above-mentioned issue, the circumstances
      of your case and the relevant law remain unchanged.  Thus, the
      explanation previously given is still valid."

      On 22 October 1996 the Lódz Regional Court quashed the order for
detention and ordered the applicant to be released under police
supervision.

      The criminal proceedings against the applicant are pending before
the court of first instance.

B.    Relevant domestic law and practice

1.    Detention on remand.

      The Polish Code of Criminal Procedure lists as "preventive
measures", inter alia, detention on remand, bail and police
supervision.  Until 4 August 1996 (i.e. the date on which a new Law of
29 June 1995 on Amendments to the Code of Criminal Procedure and Other
Criminal Statutes entered into force) a prosecutor was empowered to
impose all preventive measures as long as the investigations lasted,
whereas at present only a court may detain a suspect on remand.  Also,
the national law did not set out any statutory time-limits concerning
the length of detention on remand as regards the proceedings before
courts, but a prosecutor was obliged to determine in his decision the
period for which detention was imposed.

      Section 210 para. 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure stated (in
the version applicable at the material time):

      "Preventive measures shall be imposed by the court; before a bill
      of indictment has been lodged with the competent court, the
      measures shall be imposed by the prosecutor."

      Section 213 para. 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides:

      "1.  A preventive measure (including detention on remand) shall
      be immediately quashed or altered, if the basis therefor has
      ceased to exist or new circumstances have arisen which justify
      quashing or replacing a given measure with a more or less severe
      one."

      Section 217 subparas. 1 (2) and (4) (in the version applicable
at the material time) provided:

      "1.  Detention on remand may be imposed if:

      ...

      (2)  there is a reasonable risk that an accused will attempt to
      induce witnesses to give false testimony or to obstruct the due
      course of proceedings by any other unlawful means;

      ...

      (4)  an accused has been charged with an offence which creates
      a serious danger to society."

      There was (and still is) no specific provision governing
detention on remand after the bill of indictment had been lodged with
the competent court; however, at present, the courts are bound by the
maximum statutory time-limits for which detention on remand can be
imposed during the entire course of the proceedings.  At the material
time, according to domestic practice, once a bill of indictment had
been lodged with the court competent to deal with the case, detention
was assumed to be prolonged pending trial without any further judicial
decision being given.

2.    Bill of indictment.

      Sections 295 and 296 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, referring
to the formal requirements for a bill of indictment, state, inter alia,
that it shall contain the first name and surname of the accused and
information as to whether a preventive measure has been imposed on him,
a statement of the offence with which he is charged, a detailed
description of the facts of the case along with a statement of reasons
for the accusation, an indication of the court competent to deal with
the case and the evidence upon which the accusation is founded.

      Once the bill of indictment has been lodged with the court, the
president of the court carries out preparations for the main trial.

      Section 299 para. 1 (6) of the Code of Criminal Procedure
provides:

      "1.  The president of the court, ex officio or on the request of
      a party, shall refer the case to a court session if he finds that
      its resolution lies beyond his own competence, in particular:

      ...

      (6)  when there is a need to issue an order on a preventive
      measure."

      At the material time, according to the relevant domestic
practice, in respect of detention continuing after the last detention
order had expired and after a bill of indictment had been lodged with
a court, the courts did not make use of the procedure prescribed by the
above-mentioned provision as it was presumed that the detention
continued solely due to the fact that a bill of indictment had been
lodged and, therefore, there was no need to issue a separate decision
on the prolongation of the detention.

3.    Proceedings relating to the lawfulness of detention on remand.

      At the material time there were three different proceedings
enabling a detainee to challenge the lawfulness of his detention:
appeal to a court against a detention order made by a prosecutor,
proceedings in which courts examined requests for prolongation of
detention submitted by a prosecutor and proceedings relating to a
detainee's request for release.

      As regards the last of these, Section 214 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure (in the version applicable at the material time) stated that
an accused could at any time apply to have a preventive measure quashed
or altered.  Such an application had to be decided by the prosecutor
or, after the bill of indictment had been lodged, by the court
competent to deal with the case, within a period not exceeding three
days.

4.    Interpretation of enforceable decisions in criminal proceedings.

      Section 14 of the Code of Execution of Criminal Sentences
provides:

      "1.  The authority executing a decision, as well as everyone
      whom such a decision concerns, may request the court which has
      dealt with the case to rule on any doubts concerning the
      execution of that decision or the  calculation of the penalty
      imposed.

      2.   Everyone whom the decision on interpretation referred to in
      para. 1 concerns may appeal against such a decision."

      According to Section 205 of the Code of Execution of Criminal
Sentences, provisions of the Code referring to a "convict" are by
analogy applicable to a "detainee".  However, in the light of the
domestic practice and legal theory it is doubtful whether Section 14
of the Code applies to cases in which a person detained on remand
challenges the lawfulness of his detention since such a challenge is
normally examined in the proceedings prescribed by the Code of Criminal
Procedure (see above: 3. Proceedings relating to the lawfulness of
detention on remand).

      The proceedings relating to a request under Section 14 of the
Code of Execution of Criminal Sentences are designed to secure a
further interpretation of an enforceable decision which was not
formulated in a precise manner.  The court which is called upon to
interpret the decision in question is not competent to amend or
supplement its operative part (see the decision of the Supreme Court
No. VI KRN 14/76, 2.3.76, published in OSNPG 1976/6/59).  Accordingly,
the person concerned cannot, by lodging a request under Section 14 of
the Code, obtain his release.

5.    Request for compensation for unjustified detention.

      Chapter 50 of the Polish Code of Criminal Procedure, entitled
"Compensation for unjustified conviction, detention on remand or
arrest", provides that the State is liable for wrongful convictions or
for unjustifiedly depriving an individual of his liberty in the course
of criminal proceedings against him.

      Section 487 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (as amended)
provides, insofar as relevant:

      "1.  An accused who, as a result of the reopening of the
      criminal proceedings against him or of lodging a cassation
      appeal, has been acquitted or resentenced under a more lenient
      substantive provision, shall be entitled to compensation from the
      State Treasury for the damage which he has suffered in
      consequence of having served the whole or a part of the sentence
      imposed on him.

      ...

      4.   The provisions of the present chapter shall be applied by
      analogy to manifestly unjustified arrest or detention on remand."

      According to Section 489 of the Code, a request for compensation
for manifestly unjustified detention on remand must be lodged within
one year from the date on which the final decision terminating the
criminal proceedings in question has become final and valid in law.

      Therefore, in practice, a request under Section 487 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure cannot be lodged until the criminal proceedings
against the person concerned have been terminated (see also the
decision of the Supreme Court No. WRN 106/96, 9.1.96, published in
Prok. i Pr. 1996/6/13).  The court competent to deal with such a
request is obliged to establish whether the detention at issue was
justified in the light of all the circumstances of the case, in
particular whether the authorities considered all the factors
militating in favour of or against the detention (see, inter alia, the
decision of the Supreme Court No. II KRN 124/95, 13.10.95, published
in OSNKW 1996/1-2/7) as a finding that the detention in question was
"manifestly unjustified" is a pre-condition for awarding compensation.

      As a consequence, the proceedings relating to a request under
Section 487 of the Code of Criminal Procedure are subsequent to and
independent of these original criminal proceedings in which the
detention was imposed.  They are not designed to secure release from
detention but financial reparation for damage arising from the
execution of unjustified detention on remand.  The person concerned,
by instituting such proceedings, can retrospectively seek a ruling as
to whether his detention was justified.  He cannot, however, test the
lawfulness of his continuing detention on remand and obtain his
release.

COMPLAINTS

1.    The applicant complains under Article 5 para. 1 (c) of the
Convention that his detention after 31 January 1994 lacked any legal
basis.  He submits that the authorities assumed that his detention was
to be automatically maintained after the bill of indictment was
submitted to the Lódz Regional Court, even though the law did not
provide for this.

2.    He further complains under Article 5 para. 4 of the Convention
that he was unable to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his
continuing detention under the bill of indictment would be decided
speedily by the courts.

3.    Finally, the applicant submits that J.L. a judge of the Lódz
Regional Court, in a letter of 23 May 1995, stated that a "penalty" of
detention on remand had been imposed on the applicant.  He complains
that he had thereby been declared guilty before he had been tried or
convicted.


PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION

      The application was introduced on 24 May 1994 and registered on
29 August 1995.

      On 4 September 1996 the Commission decided to communicate the
applicant's complaints submitted under Article 5 paras. 1 (c) and 4 of
the Convention to the respondent Government and invite them to submit
observations on these complaints.

      The Government's written observations were submitted on 6 January
1997, after an extension of the time-limit fixed for that purpose.  The
applicant replied on 20 February 1997.

      The translation of the Government's observations was submitted
on 26 August 1997.

      On 26 August 1997 the Government also submitted their additional
observations.  The applicant replied thereto on 21 October 1997.  On
20 November 1997 the Govermnet responded to the applicant's reply.


THE LAW

1.    The applicant complains under Article 5 para. 1 (c)
(Art. 5-1-c) of the Convention that his detention on remand after
31 January 1994 lacked any legal basis.  He submits that the
authorities assumed that his detention was to be automatically
maintained after the bill of indictment was submitted to the Lódz
Regional Court, even though the law did not provide for this.

      Article 5 para. 1 (Art. 5-1), insofar as relevant, provides:

      "1.  Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person.
      No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following
      cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law: ...

      c.   the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the
      purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority on
      reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it
      is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an
      offence or fleeing after having done so;"

a)    Under Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention, "the Commission may
only deal with the matter after all domestic remedies have been
exhausted, according to the generally recognised rules of international
law".

      The Government submit that the applicant has not complied with
the requirements of Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention since he has
not submitted, to a competent court, a request under Section 487 of the
Polish Code of Criminal Procedure for compensation for manifestly
unjustified detention on remand.  They maintain that, in the light of
the jurisprudence of the Polish Supreme Court, this is an effective
domestic remedy enabling the person concerned to obtain a review of the
lawfulness of his detention on remand and, finally, financial
reparation where his detention has been proved unjustified.

      The applicant replies that lodging a request under Section 487
of the Code of Criminal Procedure would not result in remedying his
situation.  First of all, such a request may be submitted on the
condition that a final decision giving rise to compensation has already
been given, whereas in his case the authorities failed to issue any
decision as to the prolongation of his detention after 31 January 1994.
Secondly, on 7 February 1994, he requested the Lódz Regional Court to
release him and, on 16 February 1994, requested that court to give an
interpretation of the detention order of 30 December 1993.  These were
the only domestic channels through which he could test the lawfulness
of his detention.

      The Commission recalls that, as it has repeatedly stated, under
Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention an applicant must make normal
use of remedies likely to be effective and adequate.  It further
reiterates that where lawfulness of detention is concerned, an action
for damages against the State is not a remedy which has to be exhausted
because the right to obtain release from detention and the right to
obtain compensation for any deprivation of liberty incompatible with
Article 5 (Art. 5) are two separate rights (see No. 12747/87, Dec.
12.12.89, D.R. 64, pp. 97, 124).

      According to Polish law and practice, a request for compensation
for manifestly unjustified detention on remand under Section 487 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure enables a detainee to seek, retrospectively,
a ruling as to whether his detention in already-terminated criminal
proceedings was justified, and to obtain compensation when it was not.
The proceedings relating to such a request are designed to secure
financial reparation for damage arising from the execution of
unjustified detention on remand.  As a consequence, this is not a
remedy by which a detainee may challenge the lawfulness of his
continuing detention on remand and obtain his release.

      In the present case the Government have not provided the
Commission with any clear example from domestic practice capable of
justifying a different conclusion.  Accordingly, the Commission
considers that this complaint cannot be rejected for non-exhaustion of
domestic remedies.

b)    The Government submit that in any event the complaint is
manifestly ill-founded.  Thus, the Polish Code of Criminal Procedure
(in the version applicable at the material time) did not oblige the
court competent to deal with the case to give any further decision as
to maintaining detention after a bill of indictment has been lodged
with that court. Nor did the Code lay down any specific provision
according to which the court was obliged to prolong the period of the
applicant's detention after the previous detention order had expired.

      The applicant replies that, according to Section 299 para. 1 (6)
of the Polish Code of Criminal Procedure, the president of the court,
who carries out the preparations for the main trial after a bill of
indictment has been lodged, shall - ex officio or on the parties'
request - refer the case to a court session if there is a need to issue
an order on a preventive measure such as detention on remand.  It
follows that in the present case the court competent to deal with his
case was obliged to give a decision determining whether his detention
should be maintained after 31 January 1994, i.e. the date on which the
last detention order expired.

      In this respect the Government submit that the Lódz Regional
Court was not obliged to hold a session under Section 299 para. 1 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure, since it was, in general, not obliged
to prolong detention ordered in the course of the investigations.
Nevertheless, the court was obliged under Section 213 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, constantly to review the lawfulness of the
applicant's detention on remand.  In the present case, as from 11
January 1994, i.e. the date on which the bill of indictment was lodged,
the Lódz Provincial Court constantly examined the legal basis for the
applicant's detention.  In particular, the applicant himself lodged on
7 February and 28 March 1994 requests for release, which were dismissed
on 24 May 1994 at first instance and on 5 July 1994 on appeal.  On
these occasions the courts reviewed the reasons militating in favour
and against the applicant's detention.  As a result, the authorities
carried a consequent and fair review of the lawfulness of his
detention.

      The applicant contends that the notions of "reasonableness" and
"lawfulness" of his detention should be separated.  He admits that he
did not complain about the fact that his requests for release had been
consistently dismissed but about the fact that his detention had been
maintained after 31 January 1994 without an adequate judicial decision
being given. When he requested the courts to release him after this
date, they reviewed only the reasonableness of his detention, because
they presumed that the lodging of the bill of indictment with the court
had "automatically" resulted in providing a sufficient legal basis for
further detention.

      The Government conclude that the applicant's detention after
31 January 1994 was "lawful" within the meaning of Article 5 para. 1
(Art. 5-1) of the Convention.  It was maintained in accordance with
domestic law, in particular Sections 209, 217 subparas. 1 (2) and (4)
of the Code of Criminal Procedure and was not arbitrary.  In addition,
the relevant provisions of Polish law, in particular the Code of
Criminal Procedure, governing detention on remand after a bill of
indictment is lodged with the competent court, comply with the
requirements set out for national law in the Convention organs' case-
law as regards their accessibility and predictability.  The applicant's
detention was ordered for justified reasons.  Finally, it cannot be
said that the relevant domestic law fails to protect an individual from
arbitrariness on the part of the public authorities.

      The applicant contests these submissions, asserting that the
Polish authorities clearly violated provisions of domestic law (inter
alia, Section 214 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and Sections 14 and
205 of the Code of Execution of Criminal Sentences), in view of the
fact that they neither gave a prompt decision on the prolongation of
his detention after 31 January 1994, nor examined his requests to
interpret the detention order of 30 December 1993.  Therefore, the
authorities abused their powers by refusing to release him after 31
January 1994.

      After a preliminary examination of the present complaint in the
light of the parties' submissions, the Commission considers that it
raises serious issues of fact and law under the Convention, the
determination of which should depend on an examination of the merits.
This complaint cannot, therefore, be declared inadmissible as being
manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2
(Art. 27-2) of the Convention.  No other grounds for inadmissibility
have been established.

2.    The applicant also complains under Article 5 para. 4 (Art. 5-4)
of the Convention that he was unable to take proceedings by which the
lawfulness of his continuing detention under the bill of indictment
would be decided speedily by the courts.

      Article 5 para. 4 (Art. 5-4) of the Convention provides:

           "Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or
      detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the
      lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court
      and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful."

      The Government submit that after 31 January 1994, i.e. when the
detention order expired,  the applicant could, according to Section 214
of the Code of Criminal Procedure, lodge at any time a request for
release, which he did.  It is true that his requests for release lodged
on 7 February 1994 and 28 March 1994 were dismissed on 24 May 1994 at
first instance and on 5 July 1994 on appeal.  However, in the meantime
the courts had called medical experts to assess whether the applicant
could be detained in view of his state of health.  Therefore, even if
the applicant's requests submitted under Section 14 of the Code of
Execution of Criminal Sentences between 16 February and 25 October 1994
were not examined by the Lódz Regional Court until 21 December 1994,
it cannot be said that this was the first examination of the lawfulness
of the applicant's detention.  On the contrary, as early as on 1
February 1994 the Lódz Court of Appeal ruled that the applicant's
appeal of 7 January 1994 should be deemed to be a request for release.
This was a simple consequence of the fact that decisions on
prolongation of detention on remand were made by courts only during the
investigative stage.  The appeal in question could be examined only at
the pre-trial stage of the proceedings.  Thus, the proceedings relating
to the lawfulness of the applicant's detention were conducted without
unnecessary delay.  Accordingly, in this respect no issue arises under
Article 5 para. 4 (Art. 5-4) of the Convention.

      The applicant maintains, first, that the examination of his
requests for release could not be substituted for the examination of
his appeal of 7 January 1994 and his requests to interpret the
detention order of 30 December 1993 submitted under Section 14 of the
Code of Execution of Criminal Sentences.  Secondly, he asserts that on
1 February 1994 the Lódz Court of Appeal went beyond its discretion and
in fact refused to examine his appeal, referring it back to the Lódz
Regional Court as a request for release.  It cannot, therefore, be said
that the Lódz Court of Appeal examined the lawfulness of his detention.
Thirdly, this decision was given on the date on which the detention
order had already expired and was, therefore, late.  Fourthly, the
decisions on his requests for release of 7 February and 28 March 1994
were not given within the statutory time-limit of three days set out
in Section 214 of the Code of Criminal Procedure but only after a lapse
of several months.  Therefore, the authorities did not comply with the
requirements of Article 5 para. 4 (Art. 5-4) of the Convention.

      In respect of the applicant's requests submitted under Section
14 of the Code of Execution of Criminal Sentences, the Government
contend that the courts, even if they refused to allow the applicant's
appeal, displayed necessary diligence in the examination thereof.
However, in the light of  domestic law, legal theory and practice it
is doubtful whether the applicant was entitled to have recourse to such
proceedings.  Thus, no issue arises under Article 5 para. 4 (Art. 5-4)
of the Convention in this respect either.

      The applicant replies that his requests under Section 14 of the
Code of Execution of Criminal Sentences could constitute a remedy
enabling him to challenge the lawfulness of his detention after the
order for his detention had expired, provided the courts examined them
speedily.  However, they failed to do so: the first request was
submitted on 16 February 1994 and examined only on 21 December 1994,
i.e. after a lapse of more than ten months.  In addition, he was not
allowed to appeal against the decision of the Lódz Regional Court of
3 January 1995.  Therefore, in this respect he was deprived of his
right to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention
would be speedily decided after the bill of indictment had been lodged
with the court.

      Having examined this complaint the Commission finds that it
raises serious questions of fact and law which are of such complexity
that their determination should depend on an examination of the merits.
This part of the application cannot, therefore, be regarded as being
manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2
(Art. 27-2) of the Convention, and no other ground for declaring it
inadmissible has been established.

3.     The applicant also complains that J.L., a judge of the Lódz
Regional Court, in his letter of 23 May 1995, stated that a "penalty
of detention on remand had been imposed on the applicant".  He
complains that he had thereby been declared guilty before he had been
tried or convicted.

      This complaint, which also concerns the alleged lack of
impartiality of a judge, falls within the scope of both paras. 1 and
2 of Article 6 (Art. 6-1, 6-2) of the Convention, which, insofar as
relevant, read as follows:

      "1.  In the determination of ... any criminal charge against
      him, everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by an ...
      impartial tribunal established by law. ...

      2.   Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed
      innocent until proved guilty according to law."

      The Commission notes that, on the one hand, the contested letter
related to the imposition of a preventive measure (i.e. detention on
remand) on the applicant.  In it, judge J.L. also referred to a
previous letter of 16 February 1994 which had explained certain
procedures relating to the applicant's detention on remand.

      In the Commission's view, it does not transpire from these
letters that the judge was in any way biased in that he had a
preconceived opinion on the applicant or his case.  Nor does it appear
that the views expressed in the letter breached the presumption of
innocence guaranteed under para. 2 of Article 6 (Art. 6-2).
Furthermore, the criminal proceedings against the applicant are still
pending.  The Commission cannot, therefore, speculate as to how his
trial will continue, in particular whether the applicant will be
acquitted or convicted and on what basis the courts concerned will
reach their final decision in his case.

      It follows  that the remainder of the application is inadmissible
as being manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para.
2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

      For these reasons, the Commission, unanimously,

      DECLARES ADMISSIBLE, without prejudging the merits, the
      applicant's complaint that his detention on remand was unlawful
      and the complaint about the conduct of the proceedings relating
      to the lawfulness of his continuing detention under the bill of
      indictment after the detention order of 30 December 1993 expired;

      DECLARES INADMISSIBLE the remainder of the application.


        M. de SALVIA                        S. TRECHSEL
         Secretary                           President
     to the Commission                    of the Commission