THE FACTS

Whereas the facts presented by the applicant may be summarised as
follows:

The applicant is a Norwegian citizen, born in .... and residing in
Oslo. He is a mining engineer and lawyer by training.

1. In 1957 the applicant was appointed ad interim Head of Division
(byråsjef) in the Ministry of Industry and Handicrafts (Department for
industri og håndverk) and in 1962 this appointment was made permanent.
In addition to being in charge of the Ministry's Mining Division
(Bergverkskontoret) the applicant had a number of other
responsibilities in connection with the Ministry's work. Inter alia,
he was a member of the Board of A/S G., a mining company owned by the
Norwegian State, and was responsible for the planning and execution of
tests and pilot-plant projects in relation to the use of Spitsbergen
coal for cooking purposes.

2. From the applicant's statements and numerous documents he has
submitted, it appears that on .. October 1963, the Oslo City Court
(byrett) issued a warrant authorising the search of his home in Oslo
and of a summer cottage on suspicion of his having committed offenses
in office. On .. October, 1963 the applicant was remanded in custody
on suspicion of gross breach of confidence. The applicant remained in
custody for 244 days until .. June 1964. It appears that except for the
first day, the applicant was detained in a hospital during the entire
period.

The applicant complains that the police seized and removed from his
home about 7,000 documents, 5,000 of them being papers received from
the United Nations, relating to mine security, examination papers and
other irrelevant documents. He also states that he has never owned the
cottage mentioned in the search warrant.

Documents seized by the police, including the papers of his private
diaries were then stamped with the text "Oslo Police Authority -
Criminal Investigation Department". The police also allegedly supplied
the press with information emanating from documents taken from his
home.

The applicant further complains that, while in detention on remand, he
was kept in solitary confinement and refused permission to receive
visits, read newspapers, to send or receive any letters or to listen
to radio or television.

On .. December 1963, the applicant applied for permission to take out
of his home his Bible in English translation and one volume of Gibbon's
"Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire". This request was, however,
refused.

In this connection the applicant states that he has no complaint
against the prison authorities but only against the police and the
Government. According to the applicant he lodged an appeal in respect
of the restrictions to which he was subject during his detention but
his appeal was rejected by the Eidsivating Regional Court
(lagmannsrett). He has not, however, submitted copies or details of any
court decisions taken with regard to his detention.

He alleges that the conditions under which he was detained amounted to
a violation of Article 3 of the Convention.

3. On the day of the applicant's arrest a Member of Parliament
(Stortinget) put a question to the Government concerning the conditions
at the Ministry of Industry. The Prime Minister replied to this
question on .. October and stated that an enquiry would be opened. He
also gave a summary of the matters in which the applicant was involved.

On .. November 1963, the Crown Prince Regent accordingly set up a
Committee of Inquiry, consisting of three members, in order to examine
the administration of the Ministry of Industry. Mr. F. the Chief Judge
of the Oslo City court was appointed Chairman of the Committee. This
judge had previously issued the search warrant of .. October 1963.

On .. August 1964 the Committee submitted its report to the Government.
In addition to this report which was published, the Committee made a
report on certain matters relating to the mines on Spitsbergen which
was confidential for reasons of foreign policy. The former report dealt
with all aspects of the Ministry's work and included a detailed
examination of the matters which were the subject of the criminal
proceedings against the applicant. In this connection, the report
referred to statements made by the applicant and certain witnesses to
the police.

4. By a Royal decree of .. May 1965, the applicant was indicted on a
number of charges concerning offenses committed in office. The
indictment consisted of four parts:  part A dealing with matters
connected with the sale of coke produced experimentally from
Spitsbergen coal, part B concerning the filing of claims for travel
expenses and parts C and D on matters relating to the winding-up of S.
and A/S G. respectively.

The applicant's trial before the Eidsivating Regional Court opened on
.. November 1965, the Court decided, however, that parts A and B should
be referred to the jury (lagretten) separately, while the examination
of parts C and D should be adjourned in the meantime as provided in
Art. 315 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (straffeprosessloven).

Subsequently, the Court decided on .. December 1965 to split up the
proceedings further and also adjourned the examination of part B. The
jury returned its verdict as to part A on .. December. The applicant
then appealed against the verdict and requested that the Regional Court
should adjourn the proceedings until the Supreme Court (Hoyesterett)
had decided on his appeal. The Regional Court granted this request but
decided, at the same time, that part A should be disjoined from the
remainder of the charges (B), (C) and (D) as provided in Art. 134 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure, and that a separate judgment should be
given in respect of part A.

On .. January 1966, the Regional Court accordingly convicted the
applicant on two counts of aggravated breach of confidence, three
counts of aggravated embezzlement and one count of false statement
contrary to Art. 120 of the Penal Code (straffeloven) and sentenced him
to two years' imprisonment from which the period spent in detention on
remand should be deducted. He was further ordered to pay to the State
damages to the amount of 53,460 Norwegian Crowns.

The applicant appealed against conviction and sentence, on the grounds,
inter alia, that the different parts of the case should not have been
separated under Article 315 of the Code and that he had been prevented
from commenting on the details of the charges which had been adjourned.

In its judgment of .. March 1966, the Supreme Court rejected the
applicant's appeal but reduced the sentence to one year and three
months' imprisonment.

5. The proceedings as regards parts B, C and D were then resumed before
the Regional Court but the Public Prosecutor subsequently decided to
drop the charges in part B and on one of the counts in part C.
Accordingly, these parts of the case were discontinued by decisions
taken by the Regional Court on .. September 1966, and .. January 1967,
respectively.

In September 1966, the applicant challenged two members of the jury,
Mrs. R. and Mr. D., on the ground of partiality. After D. had asked to
be discharged for health reasons from his duties as a juror, the
applicant withdrew his challenge against him. The court then discharged
D..

The applicant's challenge of Mrs. R. was only based on the fact that
she was the godchild of Mr. S.., a lawyer and the owner and chairman
of the board of the newspaper Agderposten, against whom the applicant
had brought a number of private charges for libel in connection with
articles published in the paper.

In its decision of .. September 1966, the Court first held that at that
time, it had no competence to consider whether or not Mrs. R. should
have taken part in the verdict given on .. December 1965, but only her
ability to participate in the subsequent proceedings. The Court found,
however, that the mere fact that the juror concerned was the godchild
of a person who had an interest in the applicant being convicted could
not as such disqualify her. Furthermore, it was clear from Mrs. R's own
statements that her personal relationship with Mr. S. was so remote
that the affinity between them could not affect confidence in her
impartiality.

On .. June 1967, the Regional Court gave its judgment. The applicant
was this time convicted on six counts of aggravated breach of
confidence, on one of breach of confidence and of having committed
offenses against Article 120 of the Penal Code on five occasions,
whereas he was acquitted on five other counts.

Relying on the provisions of Article 62 of the Penal Code, the Court
imposed a common sentence of two years and six months' imprisonment for
the above offenses and the offenses for which he had been sentenced by
the Supreme Court on .. March 1966. He was also ordered to pay further
damages to the State to the amount of 5,000 Crowns and to A/S G. the
amount of 34,130 Crowns.

The applicant's subsequent appeal against sentence and conviction was
rejected by the Supreme Court on .. October 1967.

7. The applicant alleges violations of Articles 3 and 6 of the
Convention. He claims, in particular, that he was not given a fair
trial in accordance with Article 6 (1), and that the presumption of
innocence guaranteed under (2) of the said Article was not observed
during the proceedings. His separate complaints (besides the complaint
concerning his detention mentioned under (1) above) may be summarised
as follows:

(a)  On .. August 1964 the Prime Minister, Mr. Gerhardsen, gave a radio
and television speech in which he referred to the accusations of grave
misadministration made by many persons against the Ministry of Industry
and stated that these persons could now feel somewhat reassured since
most of the charges levelled against the Ministry were connected with
the applicant who was the only one who had acted dishonourably.

In a talk at the Bergen Press Club a few months later, the Prime
Minister referred to the extensive publicity given to the applicant's
case. He said that it was debatable whether this had not contributed
to the extent and length of the police investigations. In this
connection the Prime Minister admitted that he had been in error when
he had talked about the applicant's case without adding that the
applicant had not yet been convicted, although the Fleischer Committee
had pronounced some form of judgment.

(b)  The Committee of Inquiry, presided over by Mr. F. had exceeded its
mandate to inquire into the administration of the Ministry and
throughout its report made groundless accusations against the
applicant. The Committee never heard the applicant himself on the
matters for which he was criticised. In addition, the Committee
published without authorization statements submitted by witnesses to
the police before any court proceedings had taken place and thereby
made it impossible for the applicant to get a fair trial.

According to the applicant, one of the three members of the Committee
was a cousin of the Norwegian representative of two British firms which
had lodged tenders for the construction of a coking plant, plans for
which were examined by the Committee.

The police, with or without the knowledge of the Committee, asked a
German firm to reply to a detailed questionnaire concerning the coking
plant. This was done after the police had decided not to prefer any
charges in this respect. The sole purpose of the questionnaire was to
induce the German company to reveal certain vital information for the
benefit of the above British firms.

The applicant submits that the members of the Committee have
subsequently been convicted of libel for having given an untrue account
of the contents of a certain letter. It appears that the case is at
present pending before the Supreme Court.

(c)  The applicant claims that he was also subjected to a "trial by
newspaper" before the criminal proceedings had even started and also
during the subsequent investigations. In this connection he refers to
a large number of detrimental statements in the press published during
the autumn of 1963 which included false claims that he had taken bribes
and was living in a luxury flat above the standard he could afford on
his salary. It was further alleged that he had been an "intimate
friend" of a female scrap-dealer, who had originally laid accusations
against him and whom he was said to have threatened and beaten.
In spite of the libelous character of these articles which were partly
based on information given by the authorities the police and Public
Prosecutor took no action and the applicant was forced to bring
proceedings against about 120 of the 156 newspapers of the country.
Indeed, the Attorney General (Riksadvokaten) improperly referred to
these proceedings in his handling of the case against the applicant
and, in 1965, raised the question with the applicant's counsel as to
whether the applicant should undergo a mental examination in view of
the many libel actions.

(d)  According to the applicant, the police carried out the
investigations in an improper and biased manner. In particular, the
police visited the applicant's female friends and asked them intimate
questions about the applicant. The police also put pressure on certain
witnesses to force them to change their evidence. On one occasion a
witness for the prosecution was shown a personal letter written by the
applicant in which the witness had been referred to unfavourably.

(e)  The applicant complains that he was subjected to postal censorship
as a parcel sent by him to his defence counsel had obviously been
opened at the post office and part of the contents removed. It appears
that the parcel concerned was mailed on 18 December 1964. On 8 March
1965 the applicant was informed by the postal authorities that a number
of documents had been found in an Oslo post office on 18 December. As
the documents were marked with the name of the Ministry of Industry,
it was presumed that they had accidently fallen out of a parcel sent
to or by the Ministry. They were therefore transmitted to the Ministry
which later returned all documents to the applicant with the exception
of two documents which were declared to be confidential.

(f)  The applicant alleges that he was refused permission to consult
documents which were to be used against him by the prosecution. When
the police removed all his private documents on .. October 1963, he was
not given a receipt or a list of the documents concerned. As a result
he was deprived of any chance of defending himself.

It appears that the applicant addressed himself to the Minister of
Justice in August 1966, in order to obtain access to the documents. He
was then informed that the Ministry had no competence to interfere in
this matter. The Regional Court apparently decided that the applicant
should be allowed to consult the documents in the presence of his
defence counsel.

According to the applicant, his counsel refused, however, to grant him
permission to see the case file. It appears from the applicant's
submissions that a number of documents seized in his home were returned
to him in June 1967 after the Regional Court's second judgment but
before he submitted his grounds of appeal. He claims that among these
documents he found certain receipts the existence of which had been
denied by the Public Prosecutor during the trial. Although he informed
the Supreme Court of this, no action was taken by the Court.

(g)  The applicant's right under Article 6 to have his case tried by
an independent and impartial jury was violated when one juror, Mr. D.,
asked the applicant during the trial to produce evidence in order to
show that the applicant had never voted in any elections. It was also
improper that another juror, Mrs. .., took part in the proceedings as
her godfather was one of the defendants in four criminal actions
brought by the applicant and the organiser of the defence of about 50
newspapers in libel actions brought by the applicant.

(h)  During the trial the Presiding Judge and the Public Prosecutor
repeatedly referred to a memorial prepared by the latter which
contained false information about the applicant.

This document was, however, not given to the defence an when the
applicant later asked for a copy, this request was refused by the
Presiding Judge on 17 August 1968, on the ground that the evidence
which, in accordance with Article 292, last paragraph, of the Code of
Criminal Procedure should be submitted  by the Public Prosecutor in
order to assist the Presiding Judge to conduct the proceedings. Such
a statement  was never given to the defence. For this reason, the
Presiding Judge found himself unable to provide the applicant with a
copy or give him any information regarding the statement.

(i)  The applicant complains that he had been ordered to pay damages
amounting to approximately 90,000 Crowns as compensation for the losses
which had allegedly occurred through his handling of the matters
concerned. He analyses in detail various items amounting to 69,130
Crowns and maintains that it has not been alleged that he or any of his
colleagues had ever received a penny of this amount. The "inhuman and
illegal actions" to which the authorities have subjected him are solely
based on the prosecution's claim that he had embezzled a sum of 20,000
Crowns during nine years of work in which he had handled roughly a
hundred million Crowns. During the period concerned he had dealt with
about 9,000 cases. After four years' of investigations he had been
prosecuted for having acted contrary to the law on 16 occasions and
convicted on 13 of these counts. He submits that, in fact, he has never
embezzled anything and the Court would never have accepted the Public
Prosecutor's claim if the latter had put forward the receipts he had
in his possession instead of embezzling them.

The applicant claims that he submitted detailed information in order
to show that the figures relied on by the prosecution were inaccurate.
The Courts failed, however, to mention any of these arguments in their
decisions.

(j)  The applicant also alleges that the auditor consulted by the
police during the investigations and subsequently heard by the Regional
Court as an expert witness, falsely stated on .. April 1967, that all
the books and documents relating to the sale of certain material from
A/S G. had been destroyed. However, two days later the applicant found
the books concerned and submitted copies for perjury against the
auditor but was later informed that no investigations would be
undertaken by the police.

(k)  The applicant maintains that it must be contrary to "any legal
rule" that the female scrap-dealer was allowed to give evidence to show
that she had been an informer during the war and that she had been
sentenced to imprisonment for blackmail. She was also allowed to give
her evidence behind closed doors on the grounds that she suffered from
nerve trouble. Her evidence was intended to give the impression that
her income over a period of years had largely gone to "other persons"
, i.e. the applicant. In fact, her money had been used for other
purposes which could be proved by documents she had hidden.

(l)  The applicant further complains that his official defence counsel,
Mr. T. forced his sister to pay a fee of 25,000 Crowns in spite of the
fact that he had already been paid. Later an amount of 3,750 Crowns was
reimbursed and the applicant was given a receipt for a further 6,000
in order to present it to the Minister of Justice which, however,
refused to pay the amount.

The applicant states that his counsel refused him permission to examine
the documents in the case file. After the trial the applicant again
requested to see the documents concerned as he was certain that a
number of these had been "embezzled". However, Mr. T. and his son, who
had taken over the case from his father, still refused to hand over the
documents to the applicant or another lawyer instructed by him. Part
of the documents had to be handed over to the applicant as a result of
an order issued by the Court in a libel case.

(m)  The applicant maintains that certain statements in the Regional
Court's judgments of .. January 1966, and .. June 1967, were incorrect.
On the ground of two such statements the applicant brought a private
charge for libel against the three judges who had taken part in these
decisions. On .. June 1968, the Oslo City Court dismissed, however, the
case on the ground that the action had been brought one day too late
and therefore was statute-barred. This decision was set aside by the
Agder Regional Court on .. November  1968, but finally on .. February
1969,  the Supreme Court by two votes against one, confirmed the City
Court's decision.

8. The applicant has also made frequent references to the various court
proceedings brought by him against newspapers and a news agency for
libel. It appears that about 70 such cases have been terminated
although five cases are apparently still pending before the Supreme
Court. The applicant has, however, declared that in his present
application he does not wish to make any complaints in this respect.

THE LAW

Whereas, insofar as the applicant complains of his detention on remand
and the conditions under which he was detained, Article 26 (Art. 26)
of the Convention provides that the Commission may only deal with a
matter "within a period of six months from the date on which the final
decision was taken"; whereas the applicant has not submitted any
information as to the decisions taken by the competent courts in
respect of his detention; whereas, however, the applicant was released
from detention on remand on .. June 1964, and it can, therefore, be
assumed that any court decision relating to his detention was taken
prior to his release; whereas the present application was not submitted
to the Commission until 5 November 1967, that is more than six months
after the date of any such decision; whereas, furthermore, an
examination of the case does not disclose the existence of any special
circumstances which might have interrupted or suspended the running of
that period; whereas it follows that this part of the application has
been lodged out of time (Articles 26 and 27 (3) (Art. 26, 27-3), of the
Convention);

Whereas, as to the applicant's complaints regarding the seizure of
documents in his house, Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention also
provides that the Commission may only deal with a matter after all
domestic remedies have been exhausted according to the generally
recognised rules of international law; and whereas the applicant had
the possibility of making to the City Court and, subsequently, to the
Regional Court a formal application for the return of any documents
which had been seized; whereas the applicant has again not submitted
any information as to any decisions taken by the competent courts in
this regard and he has therefore failed to show that he availed himself
of the remedies available to him in this respect under Norwegian law;
whereas therefore, the condition as to the exhaustion of domestic
remedies laid down in Articles 26 and 27 (3) (Art. 26, 27-3) of that
Convention has not been complied with by the applicant;

Whereas, the applicant then complains that the manner in which the F.
Committee carried out its inquiry violated Article 6 (Art. 6) of the
Convention which provides (paragraph (1) (Art. 6-1)), that in "the
determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal
charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing
within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal
established by law";

Whereas it is clear that the F. Committee was a committee of inquiry
set up for the sole purpose of investigating and reporting to the
Government on the administration of the Ministry of Industry and it was
not therefore a tribunal concerned with the determination of the
applicant's civil rights or obligations or of any criminal charge
against him; whereas, accordingly, the provisions of Article 6
(Art. 6) of the Convention do not apply to the proceedings before this
Committee and this part of the application is thus incompatible with
the provisions of the Convention and must be rejected in accordance
with Article 27, paragraph (2) (Art. 27-2), of the Convention;

Whereas, insofar as the applicant complains of his convictions and
sentences and of the assessment of the damages he was ordered to pay,
an examination of the case as it has been submitted; including an
examination made ex officio, does not disclose any appearance of a
violation of the rights and freedoms set forth in the Convention and
especially in Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention which has been
invoked by the applicant in this regard; whereas, in respect of the
judicial decisions complained of, the Commission has frequently stated
that in accordance with Article 19 (Art. 19) of the Convention its only
task is to ensure observance of the obligations undertaken by the
Parties in the Convention; whereas, in particular, it is not competent
to deal with an application alleging that errors of law or fact have
been committed by domestic courts, except where the Commission
considers that such errors might have involved a possible violation of
any of the rights and freedoms limitatively listed in the Convention;

Whereas, in this respect, the Commission refers to its decisions Nos.
458/59 (X. v. Belgium - Yearbook, Vol. III, p. 233) and 1140/61 (X. v.
Austria - Collection of Decisions, Vol. 8, p. 57); and whereas there
is no appearance of any such violation in the proceedings complained
of;

Whereas it follows that this part of the application is manifestly
ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27, paragraph (2)
(Art. 27-2), of the Convention;

Whereas, however, the Commission has also examined separately the
applicant's various complaints concerning the conduct of the court
proceedings against him. It has first had regard to the applicant's
complaints concerning the manner in which the police and the Public
Prosecutor conducted the investigations and, in particular, to the
allegation that the prosecution lost or suppressed documentary evidence
of vital importance; whereas the Commission has considered these
complaints under the provisions of Article 6, paragraph (1) (Art. 6-1),
of the Convention, cited above, which guarantee to everyone charged
with a criminal offence "a fair and public hearing .... by an
independent and impartial tribunal ...";

Whereas the Commission observes in particular that it results from the
applicant's own submissions that the case file was made available to
his counsel before the trial and that the Regional Court also ruled
that the applicant should be allowed to consult the file in the
presence of his counsel; whereas, accordingly, the documents on which
the prosecution relied were known to the defence which also had the
opportunity of producing such further documents as it found necessary;

Whereas the Commission does not find, therefore, that the courts failed
in their duty to ensure that the applicant's defence could properly be
carried out or that his trial for these reasons took place in such
conditions as to put him unfairly at the disadvantage with the
consequence that he was not given a fair hearing within the meaning of
Article 6, paragraph (1) (Art. 6-1), of the Convention;

Whereas it follows that also this part of the application is manifestly
ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27, paragraph (2)
(Art. 27-2), of the Convention;

Whereas insofar as the applicant's complaints are directed against the
auditor heard as an expert witness at the trial and insofar as he
alleges that the auditor made false statements to his detriment, it
results from Article 19 (Art. 19) of the Convention that the sole tasks
of the Commission is to ensure the observance of the engagements
undertaken in the Convention by the High Contracting Parties, being
those members of the Council of Europe which have signed the Convention
and deposited their instruments of ratification; whereas, moreover, it
appears from Article 25 (1) (Art. 25-1), of the Convention that the
Commission can properly admit an application from a individual only if
that individual claims to be the victim of a violation of his right
under the Convention by one of the Parties which have accepted this
competence of the Commission;

Whereas it results clearly from these Articles that the Commission has
not competence ratione materiae to admit applications directed against
private individuals; whereas it follows that in this respect, this part
of the application is incompatible with the Convention within the
meaning of Article 27, paragraph (2) (Art. 27-2) (see application No.
1599/62, X. v. Austria - Yearbook, Vol. VI, p. 348);

Whereas, however, he also complains that the courts failed to take any
action when he offered evidence to them that the auditor's statements
were untrue and that thereby they also failed in their duty to ensure
that the applicant was given a fair hearing within the meaning of
Article 6 (1) (Art. 6-1) of the Convention; whereas the Commission
finds that an examination of the case as it has been submitted does not
disclose the appearance of any such violation of the Convention;
whereas it follows that, in this respect, this part of the application
is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27, paragraph
(2) (Art. 27-2), of the Convention;

Whereas the applicant further complains that the extensive publicity
given to his case by the press before and during the trial, the public
statements made by the Prime Minister and the report of the F.
Committee made it impossible for him to receive a fair trial;

Whereas the Commission has previously recognised that extensive
publicity in a criminal case may in certain circumstances affect the
right of a person charged with a criminal offence to have a fair
hearing of his case within the meaning of Article 6 (1) (Art. 6-1) of
the Convention;

Whereas the Commission has pointed out, in particular, that in cases
where laymen participate as jurors in the proceedings, this right may
be impaired by a virulent press campaign against the accused which so
influenced public opinion, and thereby the jurors, that the hearing can
no longer be considered to be a fair hearing within the meaning of the
said Article (see the decision on the admissibility of Application No.
1476/62, X v. Austria, Collection of Decisions, Vol. 11, p. 31);

Whereas it is clear that, in the present case, the proceedings against
the applicant were widely reported in the Norwegian press and certain
newspaper articles contained, particularly in connection with the
applicant's arrest in 1963, detrimental statements regarding the
applicant's abilities, character and private life; whereas the
applicant was a high official in the Ministry of Industry the
administration of which had recently given rise to criticism in
Parliament and in the press and the institution of criminal proceedings
against one of the Ministry's senior officials on suspicion of his
having committed offenses in the exercise of his duties would
inevitably be given much attention by the public; whereas the
statements made by the Prime Minister in Parliament and elsewhere in
reply to the accusations of mal-administration made against the
Ministry and in commenting on the report of the F. Committee on
conditions at the Ministry must be seen against this background and may
be considered as having been designed as authoritative comment on a
matter of public interest;

Whereas, in any event, the Commission does not find that an examination
of the case, discloses any evidence which could lead to the conclusions
that the jurors or the judges were influenced by this publicity in
reaching their decisions more than a year later, namely in 1965 and
1966, as to the applicant's guilt or that the applicant was in any way
prejudiced by this publicity during the extensive examination of his
appeals by the Supreme Court, which, it should be noted, sits without
a jury;

Whereas it follows that this part of the application is manifestly
ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27, paragraph (2)
(Art. 27-2), of the Convention;

Whereas the applicant has also specifically alleged that two members
of the jury were prejudiced against him;

Whereas the Commission observes first, as regards the juror Mrs. R.
whom the applicant challenged during the second part of the trial, that
the applicant has only based his allegation of bias on her part on the
ground that she was the godchild of a person who allegedly had an
interest in the applicant being convicted; whereas the Supreme Court
itself dealt with this question in its judgment of .. October 1967, and
confirmed the trial court's rejection of the applicant's challenge;
whereas the latter court had found that this circumstance alone could
not disqualify her as a juror and that her personal relationship with
her godfather was so remote that the connection between them could not
affect confidence in her impartiality; whereas the Commission, having
examined the case as it has been submitted by the applicant, finds no
reason to adopt an opinion other than that of the Supreme Court;
whereas, therefore, this part of the application is also manifestly
ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27, paragraph (2)
(Art. 27-2), of the Convention;

Whereas, secondly, as regards the other juror who allegedly asked the
applicant whether he could prove that he had never voted in any
elections, it is recalled that, under Article 26 (Art. 26) of the
Convention, the Commission may only deal with a matter after all
domestic remedies have been exhausted according to the generally
recognised rules of international law; whereas the applicant did not
formally challenge this juror on grounds of bias which he could have
done during the trial; whereas, therefore, he has not exhausted the
remedies available to him under Norwegian law; whereas, therefore, the
condition as to the exhaustion of domestic remedies laid down in
Articles 26 and 27 (3) (Art. 26, 27-3) of the Convention has not been
complied with by the applicant;

Whereas, in regard to the applicant's complaint that the female
scrap-dealer was allowed to give evidence against him behind closed
doors and that he was not allowed to introduce evidence in order to
cast doubt on her credibility, an examination of the case as it has
been submitted, including an examination made ex officio, does again
not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms
set forth in the Convention and in particular of the applicant's right
to a fair hearing under Article 6 (Art. 6); whereas the Commission
particularly notes the reason given by the Court for a private hearing
of the witness concerned was, according to the applicant, the need for
the protection of a nervous witness;

Whereas it follows that this part of the application is manifestly
ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27, paragraph (2)
(Art. 27-2), of the Convention;

Whereas the applicant further complains that during the trial the
Presiding Judge and the Public Prosecutor repeatedly referred to a
memorial prepared by the latter which was never communicated to the
applicant or his counsel and which allegedly contained a number of
incorrect statements;

Whereas this complaint again raises a question as to whether there has
been a violation of the applicant's right under Article 6 (1)
(Art. 6-1), to a fair trial and, in particular, of the principle of
equality of arms which the Commission has frequently stated to be an
essential element of the notion of fair hearing mentioned in the said
Article (see e.g. the Reports Ofner and Hopfinger v. Austria, Yearbook,
Vol. VI, p. 696, and Nos. 596/59 and 789/60, Pataki and Dunshirn v.
Austria, Yearbook, Vol. VI, p. 730-732; see also European Court of
Human Rights, Neumeister judgment of 27 June 1968 "As to the Law",
paragraph 22 and Delcourt judgment of 17 January 1970, "As to the Law",
paragraph 28);

Whereas, the Commission notes that Article 292, last paragraph, of the
Norwegian Code of Criminal Procedure stipulates that the Public
Prosecutor should, before the trial, submit to the Presiding Judge
together with the indictment a short statement of the case and of the
evidence concerned; whereas it appears from the letter of 17 August
1968, from the Presiding Judge that the document to which the applicant
refers was submitted to him by the Public Prosecutor in pursuance of
this provision of the Code, the purpose of which is to provide, for
administration as to the problems of law and fact which are likely to
arise during the trial having regard to Article 329 (1), of the Code
under which the accused shall be examined by he Presiding Judge and not
by the prosecution or the defence;

Whereas, the Commission has examined the applicant's complaint
concerning the application to his particular case of the provisions of
Article 292, last paragraph, of the Code; whereas in this regard the
Commission first observes that the applicant has only stated generally
that the Public Prosecutor's submission contained inaccuracies without
indicating in what way it was incorrect; whereas the Commission further
observes that under the relevant provision of the Code of Criminal
Procedure (Article 349) the verdict may only be based on evidence taken
during the trial;

Whereas, to the extent any material from the Public Prosecutor's
statement may have been referred to during the trial, neither the
applicant nor his counsel seems to have made any objection during the
trial itself or the ensuing appeal proceedings on account of inaccurate
information contained in the statement as now alleged by the applicant;

Whereas, in any event, the Commission finds that an examination of the
particular circumstances of the present case, does not warrant the
conclusion that the Public Prosecutor's submission in fact prejudiced
the applicant's right to a fair hearing and thereby violated the
provisions of Article 6 (Art. 6) in that respect;

Whereas it follows that this part of the application is manifestly
ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 27,
paragraph (2) (Art. 27-2), of the Convention;

Whereas, insofar as the applicant's complaints are directed against his
defence counsels, it is recalled that the Commission has no competence
ratione personae to admit applications directed against private
individuals;

Whereas it follows that this part of the application is manifestly
ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27, paragraph (2)
(Art. 27-2), of the Convention;

Whereas the applicant also complains that his correspondence has been
subject to censorship; whereas the Commission has in this connection
had regard to the provisions of Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention
which, inter alia, guarantee to everyone the right to respect for his
correspondence;

Whereas the applicant has only referred to one particular occasion on
which he contends that the authorities have interfered with his
correspondence, i.e. the alleged opening and removal of certain
documents from a parcel sent by him to his lawyer in December 1964;

Whereas the Commission finds that there is no evidence to support the
applicant's allegation that the parcel concerned was opened by the
authorities for the purpose of controlling his correspondence at a time
when he was no longer in detention; whereas the Commission has also
considered the forwarding to the Ministry of Industry of the documents
which, according to the postal authorities' letter to the applicant
marked with the Ministry's name but gave no indication of the sender
or addressee of the mail matter concerned; whereas the Commission here
finds that this was a reasonable course to be adopted by the post
office and that there was thereby no interference with the applicant's
right under Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention to respect for his
correspondence; n

Whereas it follows that this part of the application is manifestly
ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27, paragraph (2)
(Art. 27-2), of the Convention;

Whereas, in regard to the applicant's complaint that the Public
Prosecutor refused to prosecute on the charges laid by him against the
trial judges and the auditor who had been heard as an expert witness
at the trial, it is to be observed that the Convention, under the terms
of Article 1 (Art. 1), guarantees only the rights and freedoms set
forth in Section I of the Convention; and whereas, under Article 25 (1)
(Art. 25-1), only the alleged violation of one of those rights and
freedoms by a Contracting Party can be the subject of an application
presented by a person, non-governmental organisation or group of
individuals; whereas otherwise its examination is outside the
competence of the Commission ratione materiae; whereas no right to have
criminal proceedings instituted against judges or private individuals
is as such included among the rights and freedoms set forth in the
Convention; whereas in this respect the Commission refers to its
previous decisions No. 864/60, X v. Austria, Collection of Decisions,
Vol. 9, p. 17 and No. 2343/64, X v. Austria, Yearbook, Vol. X, p. 176,
(as regards judges) and No. 1599/62, X. v. Austria, Yearbook, Vol. VI,
p. 348 and No. 2116/62, X. v. Federal Republic of Germany, Collection
of Decisions, Vol. 23, p. 10 (as regards private individuals); whereas
it follows that this part of the application is incompatible with the
provisions of the Convention within the meaning of Article 27,
paragraph (2) (Art. 27-2), of the Convention;

Whereas, finally, insofar as the applicant complains of the manner in
which the courts handled the private charge brought by him against the
judges who had participated at his trial, an examination of the case
as it has been submitted, including an examination made ex officio,
does not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and
freedoms set forth in the Convention and in particular of the
applicant's right under Article 6, paragraph (1) (Art. 6-1), of the
Convention to a fair hearing of his case; whereas, in this connection,
the Commission notes that the Supreme Court came to the conclusion that
the applicant's action had been brought out of time; whereas it follows
that the application is also in this respect manifestly ill-founded
within the meaning of Article 27, paragraph (2) (Art. 27-2), of the
Convention;

Now therefore the Commission DECLARES THIS APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE