THE FACTS

Whereas the facts presented by the applicant may be summarised as
follows:

The applicant is a citizen of the United Kingdom, born in 1923 and
residing in Coventry. He is the leader of the British Z. Movement. When
lodging his application he was detained in prison at Aylesbury.

On .. November, 1966, the applicant was arrested on suspicion of having
committed offenses under Section 6 of the Race Relations Act, 1965. The
said Section reads as follows:

"A person shall be guilty of an offence under this Section if, with
intent to stir up hatred against any section of the public in Great
Britain distinguished by colour, race, or ethnic or national origins
- (a) he publishes or distributes written matter which is threatening,
abusive or insulting; or (b) he uses in any public place or at any
public meeting words which are threatening, abusive or insulting, being
matters or words likely to stir up hatred against that section on
grounds of colour, race or ethnic or national origins."

On .. January, 1967, at Devon Assizes the applicant was convicted on
two counts of conspiracy to contravene and one count of inciting to
contravene the provisions of the said Section 6 of the Race Relations
Act and sentenced to a total term of eighteen months' imprisonment. The
applicant, who pleaded not guilty, conducted his own defence. At the
same time , one Y., a discharged Navy rating and 19 years of age, was
convicted on charges of incitement to racial hatred and conspiracy to
commit such offence.

The applicant's application for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal
against his conviction and sentence was refused by a single judge on
.. March, 1967. The applicant complains that it was not within the
judge's discretion to refuse his application, since it was based on a
point of law, namely that the trial judge had misdirected the jury. In
particular, the applicant alleged that the judge had advised the jury
to disregard the criterion of "insult", one of the vital elements of
Section 6 of the Race Relations Act. The applicant considers that the
refusal is only understandable as an act of political discrimination
contrary to Article 14 of the Convention. He maintains that the finding
of the single judge that he had not indicated with clarity the alleged
point of law was wrong as he had adequately described it. On the other
hand, he had not been able to give precise references to or quote the
transcript of the trial since he had not received a copy in time
despite his request for such a copy. Having been informed that this
application could only be decided by the judge himself, at the same
time as he decided his application for leave to appeal, he notified the
Court that he wished to purchase a copy. He was then told that, as he
had applied of a free copy, he had to await the decision on this,
before he would be able to purchase a copy.

The applicant did not renew his application for leave to appeal to the
Full Court. He submits that he abandoned his application in view of a
statement on the back of the form by which he was given notice of the
refusal of the single judge. According to the applicant, this statement
advised the appellant not to persevere with his application to the Full
Court in disregard of the single judge's refusal, as this, if
unsuccessful, was likely to result in substantial loss of remission
time for good conduct. Rather than allow the likelihood that further
political prejudice would uphold the refusal and, as a result, by
causing forfeiture of remission in effect increase his sentence, he did
not renew his application.

In May 1967, the applicant addressed himself to a Member of Parliament
who made representations to the Home Secretary. On .. July, 1967, the
Home Office replied, however, that the Home Secretary could not re-try
a case or act as a further court of appeal either as regards conviction
or sentence nor did he think it proper to comment on the sentence
passed in a particular case. The Home Secretary found no grounds which
could justify any interference with the trial court's decision.

In November 1967, the Member of Parliament concerned again made
detailed representations to the Home Secretary specifically regarding
the alleged misdirection of the jury and alleged denial of the
applicant's right to appeal, but without success. The applicant himself
petitioned the Home Secretary on these particular grounds but again the
Home Secretary refused to take any action. This refusal was notified
to the applicant on .. December, 1967.

On .. December, 1967, the applicant was notified that the Lord
Chancellor to whom he had similarly applied would take no action to
remedy the alleged injustices in his case.

The applicant's specific complaints .- besides the above-mentioned
alleged violation of Article 14 of the Convention - can be summarised
as follows:

(a)  Section 6 of the Race Relations Act in its interpretation and
application in the applicant's case violates the right to freedom and
expression guaranteed by Article 10 of the Convention. He submits that
the two leaflets and the pamphlet concerned, although factually
critical of coloured immigration and Jewish influence, were devoid of
any abusive or threatening language, or advocacy or provocation of
violence, but insisted on a parliamentary solution of the problems
involved.

The applicant complains that Section 6 of the Act prohibits even fair
and factual criticism of certain racially differentiated sections of
the public, thereby providing for some the privilege of immunity from
criticism at the price of the loss to others of legitimate free speech.
The said Section cannot, in the applicant's opinion, be justified under
Article 10, paragraph (2), of the Convention.

(b)  The applicant alleges that, in consequence of his conviction being
contrary to Article 10, he has been wrongfully deprived of his liberty
while serving his sentence in violation of Article 5 of the Convention.
He further alleges violation of Article 4 by having been subjected to
compulsory labour while wrongfully deprived of his liberty.

(c)  Even if Section 6 of the Race Relations Act should be deemed
consistent with Article 10 of the Convention, the applicant submits
that the process of his conviction under it violated Article 5 of the
Convention since he was denied the right to appeal prescribed by the
law of the United Kingdom.

(d)  In the outcome of the applicant's case, the authorities of the
United Kingdom have failed to implement Article 13 of the Convention
which provides that a victim of a violation of the Convention shall
have an effective remedy before a national authority.

THE LAW

Whereas, in regard to the applicant's complaints regarding his
conviction under the Race Relations Act and the court proceedings
concerned, it is to be observed that, under Article 16 (Art. 16) of the
Convention, the Commission may only deal with a matter after all
domestic remedies have been exhausted according to the generally
recognised rules of international law;

Whereas the applicant had the possibility of renewing his application
for leave to appeal to the Full Court but failed to avail himself of
this possibility; whereas the mere fact that the applicant subsequently
submitted his case to the Home Secretary does not constitute a remedy
for the purpose of Article 16 (Art. 16) of the Convention; whereas,
therefore, he has not exhausted the remedies available to him under
English law;

Whereas, moreover, an examination of the case as it has been submitted,
including an examination made ex officio, does not disclose the
existence of any special circumstances which might have absolved the
applicant, according to the generally recognised rules of international
law, from pursuing his application for leave to appeal; whereas, in
particular, the alleged cautionary note on the form whereby the
applicant was informed of the single judge's refusal to grant him leave
to appeal could not be considered as absolving him from exhausting the
remedy available to him;

Whereas, therefore, the condition as to the exhaustion of domestic
remedies laid down in Articles 26 and 27, paragraph (3) (Art. 26, 27-3)
of that Convention has not been complied with by the applicant;

Whereas, insofar as the applicant complains separately that Section 6
of the Race Relations Act, both generally and as applied to him,
violates the freedom of expression guaranteed by Article 10 (Art. 10)
of the Convention, the Commission first recalls that it has frequently
stated that it is not its task to examine in abstracto the conformity
of domestic legislation with the provisions of the Convention (see e.g.
application No. 290/57 - X. v. Ireland, Yearbook, Vol. 3, p. 214);

Whereas the question, therefore, which remains to be determined is
whether or not the application of the above statutory provision to the
applicant in the present case was inconsistent with the Convention;

Whereas, again having regard to the rule concerning the exhaustion of
domestic remedies, it is true that the applicant could not specifically
rely on Article 10 (Art. 10) of the Convention in order to appeal
against his conviction under Section 6 of the Race Relations Act;
whereas, however, the Commission refers to its previous jurisprudence
according to which an applicant's omission to use, on a particular
point, one of the remedies available to him, is sufficient to
constitute non-exhaustion of domestic remedies provided that, by
raising this point, and this point alone, before the domestic courts,
he would have had some chance of winning his whole appeal (Application
No. 712/60 - Retimag S.A. v. the Federal Republic of Germany, Yearbook,
Vol. 4, p. 384);

Whereas the Commission has already rejected the applicant's complaint
under Section 6 of the Race Relations Act on the ground of
non-exhaustion of domestic remedies; whereas it follows that the
condition as to exhaustion of domestic remedies laid down in Articles
26 and 27, paragraph (3) (Art. 26, 27-3), of the Convention has again
not been complied with by the applicant with regard to this part of
this application;

Whereas, insofar as the applicant complains of having been wrongfully
deprived of his liberty, it is clear that the applicant had been
convicted by the judgment of a competent court which had become res
judicata, and was therefore lawfully detained in accordance with the
provisions of Article 5, paragraph (1) (a) (Art. 5-1-a) of the
Convention;

Whereas the applicant further complains that he was subjected to
compulsory labour while serving his sentence; whereas it is true that
Article 4, paragraph (2) (Art. 4-2), of the Convention stipulates that
"No one shall be required to perform forced or compulsory labour";

Whereas, however, paragraph (3) of the said Article (Art. 4-3) states
that for the "purpose of this Article the term 'forced or compulsory'
labour shall not include ... any work required to be done in the
ordinary course of detention imposed according to the provisions of
Article 5 (Art. 5) of the Convention".

Whereas the Commission has already found that the applicant's detention
was imposed by the competent court in a lawful manner; whereas,
accordingly, the work performed during his detention is covered by
Article 4, paragraph (3) (a) (Art. 4-3-a), taken in conjunction with
Article 5 (Art. 5) (see the Commission's decision on the admissibility
of applications Nos. 3134/67, 3172/67 and 3188 to 3206/67, Twenty-one
detained persons v. the Federal Republic of Germany, Collection of
Decisions, Vol. 27, p. 97);

Whereas, in conclusion, t he Commission finds that an examination of
these parts of the application, including an examination ex officio,
does not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and
freedoms set forth in the Convention and in particular in Articles 4
and 5 (Art. 4, 5); whereas it follows that, in this respect, the
application is also manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of
Article 27, paragraph (2) (Art. 27-2), of the Convention;

Whereas the applicant finally complains that the United Kingdom
Government was responsible for a breach of Article 13 (Art. 13) of the
Convention in that it failed to provide him with an effective remedy
before a national authority; whereas, however, this provision relates
exclusively to a remedy in respect of a violation of one of the rights
and freedoms set forth in the Convention (see the Commission's
decisions on the admissibility of Application No. 472/59 - X. v.
Federal Republic of Germany, Yearbook, Vol. 3, p. 207, No. 655/59 - X.
v.the Federal Republic of Germany, ibid. p. 280, and No. 3325/67 X.,
Y., Z., V. and W. v. the United Kingdom, Collection of Decisions, Vol.
25, p. 117); whereas the applicant, not having established even the
appearance of a violation of one of the other rights invoked by him,
there is in the present case no basis for the application of Article
13 (Art. 13) of the Convention; whereas it follows that this part of
the application is incompatible within the meaning of Article 27,
paragraph (2) (Art. 27-2), of the Convention;

Now therefore the Commission DECLARES THIS APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE