AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
Application no. 35179/97
by Inga ALLARD
The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting on 22 May 2001 as a Chamber composed of
Mrs W. Thomassen, President,
Mrs E. Palm,
Mr Gaukur Jörundsson,
Mr R. Türmen,
Mr C. Bîrsan,
Mr J. Casadevall,
Mr R. Maruste, judges,
and Mr M. O. Boyle, Section Registrar,
Having regard to the above application introduced with the European Commission of Human Rights on 27 November 1996 and registered on 6 March 1997,
Having regard to Article 5 § 2 of Protocol No. 11 to the Convention, by which the competence to examine the application was transferred to the Court,
Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant,
Having deliberated, decides as follows:
The applicant is a Swedish national, born in 1947 and living in Spånga. She is represented before the Court by Mr P. Lindquist, a lawyer practising in Tyresö. The respondent Government are represented by Mrs E. Jagander, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
A. The circumstances of the case
The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.
In 1935 the applicant’s mother and her four siblings jointly inherited two estates – Marum 1:6 and Marum 1:8 – from their father. The ownership of the estates, consisting of several islands in the archipelago of Stockholm, were then over the years partly passed on to other members of the family. Disagreements arose between the family members. Some of them wished to divide the property (klyvning) and, thus, dissolve the joint ownership, but the applicant’s mother opposed this idea.
On the land managed by the applicant’s mother – which formed part of Marum 1:8 – she owned a number of houses. Two of the houses were used by the applicant’s two sisters. A third house situated on the property was considered too small for the applicant’s needs and it was, therefore, decided to enlarge it. Thus, the applicant applied to the Building Committee (byggnadsnämnden) of Österåker for a building permit. On 9 September 1987, finding that the enlargement could not be accepted as the house in question was situated too close to the shore, the Committee nevertheless granted a permit for the erection of a new house further away from the shore. The new house was erected in 1988.
On 4 August 1989 the applicant’s mother died, leaving four children, i.e. the applicant, her brother and her two sisters. However, no distribution of the mother’s estate was made before 1991. By a partial division in June 1991, the new house was assigned to the applicant.
On 21 December 1989 practically all the other joint owners of the two estates instituted proceedings against the applicant in the District Court (tingsrätten) of Södra Roslag, claiming that she be obliged to remove the new house on Marum 1:8 as it had been erected without their consent, contrary to the requirements of the Act on Joint Ownership (Lagen om samäganderätt, 1904:48; “the 1904 Act”). The applicant opposed the claim and argued, inter alia, that it was her mother who had built the house and that, accordingly, it belonged to her mother’s estate. Thus, the applicant was not the right adversary party to the claim.
By a judgment of 10 May 1990 the District Court decided that the applicant was to remove the house, at the risk of having it demolished at her expense. The court stated, inter alia, that it was the applicant who owned the house and that she had erected it without the necessary permission from all the other joint owners.
In 1991 one of the joint owners applied for a sale of Marum 1:6 and Marum 1:8 at a public auction. On 22 May 1992 the District Court decided to stay those proceedings.
On 22 February 1994 the District Court’s removal judgment was upheld on appeal by the Svea Court of Appeal (Svea hovrätt).
The applicant appealed to the Supreme Court (Högsta domstolen) requesting, inter alia, that the case be declared dormant pending the outcome of division proceedings which she had instituted in October 1990. In these proceedings, the applicant claimed that the joint ownership of the two estates should be dissolved and individual plots be assigned to the family members. Following several decisions taken by the Real Estate Formation Authority (Fastighetsbildningsmyndigheten; “the REFA”) and the courts, the case had been referred back to the REFA for re-examination and, on 1 December 1995, the REFA had decided to allow the creation of four individual plots on Marum 1:8. However, the REFA had rejected the applicant’s claim for the creation of an individual plot around the new house on account of the Court of Appeal’s judgment that that house be removed. The applicant had appealed against the REFA’s decision to the Real Estate Court (fastighetsdomstolen) in Stockholm. As an alternative ground for declaring the case before the Supreme Court dormant, the applicant referred to the fact that, in March 1995, she had requested the District Court to give a declaratory judgment on the question of ownership of the new house.
By a decision of 4 March 1996 the Supreme Court rejected the applicant’s request to have the removal proceedings stayed and refused her leave to appeal against the Court of Appeal’s judgment.
Following the Supreme Court’s decision, several family members requested that the Enforcement Office (kronofogdemyndigheten) enforce the removal judgment. On 7 March 1996 the Office ordered the applicant to remove the house before 3 April 1996 at the risk of having the house demolished by the Office at her own expense. By a later decision the time-limit was extended until 19 April 1996.
On 14 March 1996, at the Real Estate Court’s request, the Central Office of the National Land Survey (Lantmäteriverket) submitted its opinion in the division proceedings. It considered that the removal judgment did not prevent the creation of an individual plot around the disputed house. On the contrary, this could preserve the house and reduce the risk of adverse consequences for the applicant. Thus, the Central Office recommended that the applicant be assigned an individual plot.
However, on 3 April 1996 the Enforcement Office refused the applicant a further postponement of the enforcement of the removal judgment. On 15 May 1996 the District Court upheld the Enforcement Office’s decisions and rejected the applicant’s request for a postponement of the enforcement. Subsequently, the Enforcement Office, on 20 May 1996, decided that the house was to be demolished by a construction firm on 3 June 1996.
The applicant appealed to the Court of Appeal, requesting an immediate stay of the demolition order. She claimed that the enforcement of the removal judgment should be stayed until the division proceedings or, in the alternative, the ownership proceedings had been concluded. She also claimed that she had not been given the opportunity to remove the house herself in accordance with the District Court’s judgment of 10 May 1990. Allegedly, she had started to dismantle the house but was not able to complete the work before 3 June 1996. Furthermore, the applicant requested a three week respite to substantiate her appeal.
By a decision of 31 May 1996 the Court of Appeal ordered the applicant to complete her appeal by 12 a.m. on 5 June 1996. On the same day, i.e. on 31 May, the Court of Appeal received a letter from the applicant, in which she requested an immediate stay of the demolition order. She claimed, inter alia, that the enforcement of the removal judgment should be stayed until the division proceedings had been concluded or, in the alternative, until the Real Estate Court had decided on the question. She also requested a three week respite to substantiate her appeal.
The appellate court’s order for the completion of the appeal – which was sent to the applicant’s address in Spånga – was allegedly not received by the applicant until the evening of 5 June, as she had been at the site of the disputed house. In the morning of 6 June she sent a telefax to the appellate court, requesting a ten day respite for the completion of her appeal.
However, already on 4 June 1996 the Court of Appeal had examined the case and decided not to grant the applicant leave to appeal against the District Court’s decision of 15 May 1996. Thus, no further stay of the enforcement proceedings was granted. It appears from the court files that the applicant called the Court of Appeal on 6 June and received the information that the case had been examined on 4 June and that regard had been had to the contents of the applicant’s letter of 31 May. On 5 July 1996 the Supreme Court refused leave to appeal against the appellate court’s decision.
Consequently, the disputed house was demolished by a construction firm. The applicant had claimed that her appeal against the District Court’s decision of 15 May 1996 hindered enforcement of the removal judgment. However, this claim was rejected by the Enforcement Office on 31 May 1996, referring to chapter 3, section 21 of the Enforcement Code (Utsökningsbalken). The demolition of the house began on 3 June 1996 and was concluded ten days later. On 25 June 1996 the Enforcement Office declared that the house had been demolished and, thus, the removal judgment adequately enforced. However, this decision was appealed against by the other joint owners as the building material had not been removed from the property. On 13 September 1996 the District Court, finding in favour of the appellants, quashed the Enforcement Office’s decision that the enforcement had been finalised and referred the matter back to the Office. Leave to appeal against the District Court’s decision was refused by the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court on 30 September and 25 October 1996, respectively. On 27 September 1996 the Enforcement Office ordered the applicant to remove the building material from the property before 29 October 1996.
Further, on 6 August 1996 the Enforcement Office ordered the applicant to pay the enforcement costs of 114,796 Swedish kronor (SEK). The applicant appealed and applied for legal aid in the matter. By a decision of 9 September 1996 the District Court rejected the applicant’s application for legal aid on the ground that she did not have a legitimate interest to have the matter examined as the enforcement had been concluded. The applicant’s further appeal was rejected by the Court of Appeal on 13 December 1996. On 28 April 1997 the Supreme Court refused leave to appeal.
On 22 November 1996 the Real Estate Court gave judgment in the division proceedings. It decided that Marum 1:8 should be divided into six individuals plots and one common plot. The applicant was awarded a plot where the now demolished house had been situated. In this respect, the Real Estate Court thus agreed with the opinion given by the Central Office of the National Land Survey on 14 March 1996. The Real Estate Court’s judgment was upheld on appeal by the Court of Appeal on 2 November 1998. On 14 April 2000 the Supreme Court refused leave to appeal.
By a judgment of 26 November 1996 the District Court determined another removal case which had been instituted by the applicant and her sister in 1994. Apparently in response to the removal proceedings brought against the applicant, they had claimed that several other joint owners of Marum 1:6 and 1:8 should remove buildings they had erected on the estates. However, the District Court rejected the claims, finding that the buildings had been erected before 1991 – when the applicant and her sister, through the partial division of their mother’s estate, became joint owners of the two properties – and that the joint owners at the time had expressly or tacitly consented to the various building projects. Further, considering that the claimants had not had a legitimate interest in having their claims examined, the court also decided that further litigation in this respect should not be paid through public legal aid. Thus, with effect from the date of the judgment, the legal aid previously awarded was withdrawn. The applicant and her sister appealed against the judgment and claimed, inter alia, that the District Court’s decision on legal aid should be quashed. However, on 3 October 1997 the Court of Appeal upheld the legal aid decision. On 16 January 1998 the Supreme Court refused leave to appeal. Stating that they were unable to plead their case properly without legal aid, the applicant and her sister, by letter to the Court of Appeal of 1 November 1999, withdrew most parts of their claims in the removal case.
By a declaratory judgment of 10 July 1997 in proceedings concerning the ownership of the disputed house the District Court agreed with the applicant’s claim, lodged with the court in March 1995, that the disputed house had been erected on her mother’s behalf and thus formed part of the mother’s estate. Accordingly, at the time of the District Court’s removal judgment of 10 May 1990, the house did not belong to the applicant. Thus, in this respect, the court came to a different conclusion than it had done in the removal judgment. Following an appeal, the declaratory judgment was upheld by the Court of Appeal on 26 February 1998. No further appeal was made and the appellate court’s judgment consequently gained legal force.
By decisions of 24 February 1997 and 29 February 2000 the Building Committee granted the applicant building permits for the reconstruction of the demolished house and the erection of two smaller outbuildings.
B. Relevant domestic law and practice
Domestic provisions of relevance in the present case are found in the Act on Joint Ownership (“the 1904 Act”), the Act on Administration of Certain Jointly Owned Agricultural Property (Lagen om förvaltning av vissa samägda jordbruksfastigheter, 1989:31; “the 1989 Act”), the Real Estate Formation Act (Fastighetsbildningslagen, 1970:988; “the 1970 Act”), the Enforcement Code and the Code of Judicial Procedure (Rättegångsbalken).
1. Joint ownership
At the time of the erection of the disputed house, the ownership of Marum 1:6 and 1:8 was regulated by the 1904 Act. Section 2 provided that a joint owner wishing to dispose of real estate had to have the permission of all other joint owners. According to Supreme Court case-law, a joint owner who was of the opinion that another joint owner had acted in conflict with section 2 – i.e. had not obtained the necessary permits – could challenge the action in court (Nytt juridiskt arkiv (“NJA”) 1990 p. 184; the same right to institute proceedings is afforded to a joint owner under the 1989 Act, cf. NJA 1992 p. 769). Under section 3, a joint owner who disapproved of the administration or use of the real estate could request the court to appoint an administrator. Further, under section 6, a joint owner had the right to apply for a sale of the real estate at a public auction. The only possibility for another joint owner to prevent such a sale was to request division proceedings in accordance with section 7. If such proceedings had been instituted, the court could not decide on the question of a sale until the division proceedings had been concluded.
As the real estates in the present case are assessed, for tax purposes, as agricultural properties, the provisions of the 1989 Act are applicable as from 1 July 1989. The relevant provisions of that Act are essentially the same as the 1904 Act.
2. Real estate formation
Under chapter 11, section 1 of the 1970 Act, jointly owned real estate may, on application by a joint owner to the REFA, be divided into individual plots, provided that each created plot is deemed permanently suitable for its purpose in accordance with chapter 3, section 1. Chapter 11, section 3, subsection 4 provides that if, by a court order, real estate is to be offered for sale at a public auction, the estate may be divided only if no sale has taken place.
3. Procedure and enforcement
Rules on enforcement are laid down in the Enforcement Code. According to chapter 3, sections 1 and 3, a court judgment may be enforced as soon as it has gained legal force. Section 21 of the same chapter deals with objections against enforcement. Such objections may only be raised in respect of circumstances that have occurred after the enforceable judgment and the Enforcement Office is accordingly not entitled to reconsider the judgment itself. Thus, under section 21, subsection 1, enforcement cannot take place if the defendant shows that he or she has fulfilled the obligation set forth in the judgment in question. Further, according to subsection 2, enforcement shall not take place if the defendant claims that there are any other circumstances which constitute a hindrance to enforcement, provided that the court finds that the objection cannot be disregarded. This subsection aims at substantive objections, e.g. an objection that property, which the defendant is obliged to deliver, has been conveyed or pledged.
Under chapter 16, section 12 a of the Enforcement Code, an application for enforcement becomes void if the applicant in the enforcement proceedings grants the defendant a respite which lasts for more than six months from the date of the application. However, there are no rules applicable in this case which empower the Enforcement Office to grant the defendant a respite on his or her own request. A decision by the Office to refuse postponement of the enforcement proceedings may, in accordance with chapter 18, section 1 of the Code, be appealed to a court.
When it is of utmost importance for the determination of an action that a question subject to other court proceedings be determined first, the court may, under chapter 32, section 5 of the Code of Judicial Procedure, order a stay of proceedings (vilandeförklaring). According to the travaux préparatoires (NJA II 1943, p. 417), the relation between two court proceedings may be such that the decision in the latter set of proceedings has a binding effect on the outcome of the former set of proceedings. An action for monetary compensation for damage to real property and another action concerning the ownership of the real property is given as an example. The outcome of one set of proceedings may also have evidential significance in another set of proceedings. In these situations the relevant court has to decide whether it is in the interests of all concerned parties to stay the proceedings or not.
1. The applicant complains that the demolition of the disputed house on Marum 1:8 has violated her right to respect for her home and her right to the peaceful enjoyment of her possessions. She submits that the enforcement of the demolition order should have been postponed until the division proceedings had been concluded or, in the alternative, until the ownership of the house had been determined in the court proceedings she instituted for that purpose. She claims that there was no general interest involved in the demolition of the house, nor could the other joint owners have any objective interest in having the house removed as the site of the house has been used by her mother and herself for many years and the house could not be seen from the houses belonging to the other joint owners. In any event, the demolition was not proportionate in the circumstances of the case. In this connection, the applicant alleges that the value of the demolished house could be estimated at SEK 700,000. She invokes Article 8 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention.
2. The applicant complains also that she was denied legal aid in the proceedings relating to the enforcement costs. She claims that the refusal to award her legal aid infringed her possibilities to appeal in that case. Moreover, she complains that the decision to withdraw her legal aid in the removal proceedings against the other joint owners was not impartial and, thus, violated her right to a fair hearing. In these respects, she invokes Article 6 of the Convention.
1. The applicant complains that the demolition of the disputed house has violated her right to respect for her home and her right to the peaceful enjoyment of her possessions under Article 8 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, respectively. Article 8 reads as follows:
“1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”
Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 provides the following:
“Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law.
The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.”
The Court recalls that this complaint has been communicated to the respondent Government only in regard to Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.
The Government first submit that the house was demolished at a time when it clearly belonged to the applicant. The Government admit that, due to the demolition of the house, the applicant was deprived of her possessions within the meaning of the second sentence of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. However, it is contended that this deprivation was justified under the terms of that Article for the following reasons.
Firstly, the deprivation was made “in the public interest”. A necessary requirement of a functioning joint ownership is that all joint owners give their permission to a disposition of the estate, as laid down in the above-mentioned 1904 and 1989 Acts. As the disputed house had been erected without the consent of the other joint owners, the deprivation clearly had a legitimate “public interest”. Also, having in mind the legal security of the parties involved in court proceedings, a court may decide to stay proceedings only when there are very strong reasons for it. Rules preventing one party from delaying court proceedings and enforcement of judgments are essential in order to maintain an efficient court system, which in turn is in the interest of the public.
Secondly, the deprivation was subject to “conditions provided for by law”. Every significant procedural and material aspect of the removal case and the subsequent question of enforcement were regulated by written law readily available to the applicant. It is also evident that the applicant was fully aware of the relevant law, as she herself instituted proceedings in 1994 against some of her fellow owners, requesting that houses they had built on the property be removed.
Thirdly, with regard to the proportionality of the interference with the applicant’s rights, the Government emphasise that the disputed house was erected in 1988 contrary to the law, i.e. without the consent of the other joint owners. The fact that a building permit had been granted does not change this situation, as a building committee is not required to verify questions regarding ownership of the real estate but shall only concern itself with planning conditions. When the applicant was assigned the house through the partial division of her mother’s estate in 1991, the applicant was in the same legal position as her mother had been. In order to comply with the law, permission to erect the house should have been sought from the other joint owners before the house was built. If they had refused, there would have been two options: either to apply for a sale of the real estate at a public auction or to institute division proceedings. Since the law was not complied with, the other owners were entitled to claim that the house be removed. In view of this, the courts rightfully did not grant the applicant’s requests for a stay of proceedings or a stay of enforcement because of the division proceedings instituted after the house had been erected. A decision granting her requests would have favoured her over the other owners. In balancing the applicant’s right to maintain a house built contrary to the law and the other owners’ right to have the real estate restored by means of efficient court proceedings, it is the Government’s position that the interests of the other owners must be given priority. Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 should not be used to safeguard a measure that has been in conflict with the law from the outset, as unlawful behaviour as such does not deserve the protection of the law. By building the house the applicant – or rather her mother – anticipated events that were likely to take place later on, such as the division of the real estate into individual plots.
In conclusion, the Government contend that the applicant’s complaint is manifestly ill-founded.
The applicant submits that, as shown by the District Court’s declaratory judgment of 10 July 1997, she was not the owner of the house when the removal proceedings were initiated and thus not the right adversary party in those proceedings. She claims that she was not given an opportunity to present all evidence regarding the ownership question until she requested a declaratory judgment on this issue. Allegedly, the ownership question is of relevance to the determination whether her rights were violated when the house was demolished.
The applicant further states that, as noted by the Government, the 1904 and 1989 Acts provide for two alternatives – sale at a public auction or division of the estate – in case of disagreement between joint owners. However, the law does not regulate the situation when one owner has taken certain measures which are not acceptable to the other owners. It is therefore alleged that the demolition of the house was not subject to “conditions provided for by law”. Also, the courts refused to stay the removal proceedings despite the fact that there were ongoing proceedings regarding the two alternative courses of action prescribed by the law. In any event, the disputed house was situated on land which had been managed and exclusively used by the applicant’s mother, the applicant herself and her sisters and that land has subsequently been assigned to the applicant. The house could not even be seen from the parts of the estates used by the other joint owners. Thus, they could have had no interest in having the house demolished. Their only aim was to do harm to the applicant, as she had refused to sell her part of the estates and the house to them. Moreover, the Building Committee examined the case and granted a permit to build the disputed house and thus found that it did not contravene any “public interest”. The applicant asserts therefore that the deprivation of her possession was neither in the interest of the other joint owners nor in the “public interest”.
In regard to the Government’s assertions as to proportionality, the applicant claims that it is irrelevant that the division proceedings were instituted after the house had been erected, as the erection of the house did not affect the courts’ decisions in the division proceedings. Allegedly, the applicant would have been assigned the same plot even if the disputed house had not existed, as there were already other buildings on that plot which she owned. Having regard to this and the assertion that the demolition of the house was neither in the interest of the other joint owners nor in the “public interest”, the applicant claims that the interference with her rights was not proportional.
The Court considers, in the light of the parties’ submissions, that the applicant’s complaint raises complex issues of law and fact under the Convention, the determination of which should depend on an examination of the merits of the application. The Court concludes, therefore, that this part of the application is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. No other grounds for declaring it inadmissible have been established.
2. The applicant complains also that the decisions to refuse her legal aid were biased and unfair and denied her adequate access to the appeal procedure in the proceedings relating to the enforcement costs. She invokes Article 6 of the Convention which, in so far as relevant, provides as follows:
“1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by an independent and impartial tribunal ...
3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights:
(c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require;
The Court considers firstly that the applicant has not presented any circumstances which could lead to the conclusion that the courts taking the legal aid decisions were not impartial within the meaning of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. The question remains, however, whether the denial of legal aid prevented the applicant from having effective access to court.
In this respect, the Court recalls that Article 6 § 1 does not specifically guarantee the right to free legal aid in matters relating to civil rights and obligations, this right being specified only in Article 6 § 3 (c) with regard to criminal charges. However, in the Airey case (Airey v. Ireland judgment of 9 October 1979, Series A no. 32) the Court stated that the right of access to court guaranteed by Article 6 § 1 is a right which is “practical and effective” and not merely “theoretical and illusory”. It further stated the following (pp. 15-16, § 26):
“... Article 6 § 1 may sometimes compel a State to provide for the assistance of a lawyer when such assistance proves indispensable for an effective access to court either because legal representation is rendered compulsory, as is done by the domestic law of certain Contracting States for various types of litigation, or by reason of the complexity of the procedure or of the case.”
In the present case, the Court notes, as far as the case regarding the enforcement costs is concerned, that the applicant’s liability to pay those costs had already been decided by the District Court’s removal judgment of 10 May 1990, in which the court stated that, if she did not remove the house, it would be demolished at her expense. With respect to the removal case lodged by the applicant and her sister against the other joint owners, the Court notes that these proceedings were instituted in 1994, apparently several years after the buildings they sought to have removed had been erected. All their claims were rejected, as the District Court, in its judgment of 26 November 1996, found it clear that the building projects in question had had the express or tacit approval of those who were joint owners at the time when the buildings were erected. In both the case concerning enforcement costs and the removal case the District Court concluded that the claimants did not have a legitimate interest in having their claims examined. In the removal case the court, however, accepted that the costs of the proceedings until and including its judgment be covered by public legal aid.
In the above circumstances, the Court accepts that the District Court could reasonably conclude that there was no legitimate interest involved which called for the litigation to be paid by public legal aid. In particular, the question of the enforcement costs had already been determined in other proceedings and the removal case rather appears to have been brought by the applicant and her sister in retaliation upon the other joint owners. Thus, the decisions on legal aid did not breach the applicant’s rights under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.
It follows that this part of the application is inadmissible as being manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.
For these reasons, the Court unanimously
Declares admissible, without prejudging the merits, the applicant’s complaint that her rights under Article 8 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention have been violated due to the demolition of her house;
Declares inadmissible the remainder of the application.
Michael O’Boyle Wilhelmina Thomassen
ALLARD v. SWEDEN DECISION
ALLARD v. SWEDEN DECISION