THE FACTS

Whereas the facts presented by the applicant may be summarised as
follows:

The applicant is a citizen of the United Kingdom, born in 1936 and at
present detained at Parkhurst Prison. The applicant's case has been
presented to the Commission by a Mrs Y, allegedly his fianceĢe acting
under a "power of attorney" dated .. January 1969.

From statements and numerous documents submitted it appears that the
applicant was charged together with his friend, a, with having on ..
January 1968, committed robbery with violence and having murdered a
jeweller, B. They were convicted on .. May 1968 by the Central Criminal
Court in London and sentenced to 7 years' imprisonment for robbery with
violence and to life imprisonment for murder with a recommendation that
they should serve a minimum sentence of 20 years.

The applicant and his co-accused applied for leave to appeal to the
Court of Appeal, Criminal Division which, in a judgment of .. April
1969, granted them leave to appeal only as regards their conviction for
murder. On .. May 1969, the same Court of Appeal quashed the conviction
on that ground and set aside the sentence of life imprisonment.
Consequently, they now only have to serve a sentence of seven years'
imprisonment for robbery with violence.

The applicant states that an important piece of evidence - a part of
an envelope bearing the name of the victim and allegedly found on him
five days after the murder - had in fact been "planted" on him by
police officers. He alleges that the detective sergeants who carried
out the investigations totally disregarded the Police Regulations for
Suspects Search Procedure. The applicant points out that the trial
judge in his summing-up to the jury drew their attention to this
possibility. According to the applicant this was also an issue in the
Court of Appeal when the court considered it most likely that parts of
the envelope had been planted by the police on the property of the
accused.

The applicant further maintains that the trial judge at the Central
Criminal Court failed to give correct directions to the jury regarding
to reliability of the evidence of certain witnesses had allegedly
committed perjury and others were brought before the court at a very
late stage of the proceedings. He also maintains that the judge spoke
in favour of the prosecution. From the judgment of the Court of Appeal
it appears that misdirection on a point of law only, namely when the
judge stated that the charges of robbery and murder against the
applicant and his co-accused should stand or fall together. Further the
Court of Appeal is examining the applicant's allegation that the trial
judge spoke in favour of the prosecution, found that the trial judge
at one point was "going slightly more in favour of the defence".

The applicant further maintains that his counsel was suddenly unable
to appear in court and that his new counsel whom he met for only 45
minutes before the trial did not follow his instructions and showed
incompetence in putting his case to the court. For this reason he had
another counsel representing him before the Court of Appeal.

Finally, the applicant alleges that because of his conviction for
murder he was classified as a category "A" prisoner and for one year
he was treated as such. This, in view of his innocence, he alleges,
amounts to inhuman and degrading treatment.

The applicant alleges violations of Articles 2, paragraph (1), 3, 5,
paragraphs (1), (2) and (5), 6, paragraphs (2), (3) (a), (b) and (d),
and 13 of the Convention, and requests the Commission to establish his
innocence so that he can be pardoned and released from imprisonment.

THE LAW

Whereas, in regard to the applicant's complaints concerning his
conviction and sentence and the proceedings relating thereto, an
examination of the case as it has been submitted does not disclose any
appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set forth in the
Convention and especially in the Articles invoked by the applicant;

Whereas, in respect of the judicial decisions complained of, the
Commission has frequently stated that in accordance with Article 19
(Art. 19) of the Convention its only task is to ensure observance of
the obligations undertaken by the Parties in the Convention; whereas,
in particular, it is not competent to deal with an application alleging
that errors of law or the Commission considers that such errors might
have involved a possible violation of any of the rights and freedoms
limitatively listed in the Convention; whereas, in this respect, the
Commission refers to its decisions No.s 458/59 (X. v. Belgium -
Yearbook, Vol. III, p. 233) and 1140/61 (X. v. Austria - Collection of
Decisions, Vol. 8, p. 57); and whereas there is no appearance of a
violation in the proceedings complained of;

Whereas it follows that this part of the application is manifestly
ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27, paragraph (2)
(Art. 27-2), of the Convention;

Whereas, in regard to the applicant's specific complaints of the
alleged partiality of the trial judge, the Commission had regard to
Article 6, paragraph (1) (Art. 6-1), of the Convention; whereas the
said Article provides that, in the determination of any criminal charge
against him everyone is entitled to a fair hearing by an impartial
tribunal;

Whereas the Commission considered the summing up of the trial judge and
the very detailed judgment of the Court of Appeal of .. April 1969;
whereas it appears from the latter decision that these allegations made
in the applicant's appeal were carefully examined by the Court of
Appeal and rejected on reasonable grounds; whereas, indeed the
Commission finds no reason to depart from the opinion of the Court of
Appeal on this point (see for instance Applications Nos. 2038/63, X.
v. Federal Republic of Germany, and 2758/66, X. v. Belgium);

Whereas, therefore, no violation of the rights and freedoms set forth
in the Convention, and in particular in Article 6, paragraph (1)
(Art. 6-1), of the Convention has been established; whereas it follows
that this part of the Application is manifestly ill-founded within the
meaning of Article 27, paragraph (3) (Art. 27-3), of the Convention;

Whereas, insofar as the applicant's complaints are directed against his
lawyer, it results from Article 19 (Art. 19) of the Convention that the
sole task of the Commission is to ensure the observance of the
engagements undertaken in the Convention by the High Contracting
Parties, being those Members of the Council of Europe which have signed
the Convention and deposited their instruments of ratification;

Whereas, moreover, it appears from Article 25, paragraph (1)
(Art. 25-1), of the Convention that the Commission can properly admit
an application from a individual only if that individual claims to be
the victim of a violation by one of the High Contracting Parties of the
rights set forth in the Convention provided that the Party in question
has accepted this competence of the Commission; whereas it results
clearly from these Articles that the Commission refers to its previous
decisions Nos. 172/56 (S. v. Sweden - Yearbook, Vol. I, p. 211) and
852/60 (S. v. Federal Republic of Germany - ibid. IV, p. 346); whereas
it follows that this part of the application is incompatible within the
meaning of Article 27, paragraph (2) (Art. 27-2), of the Convention;

Whereas, finally, in regard to the applicant's complaint that his
classification as a category "A" prisoner on the basis of his
conviction for murder constituted in view of his subsequent acquittal,
inhuman and degrading treatment, and examination of the case as it has
been submitted, does not disclose any appearance of a violation of
rights and freedoms set forth in the Convention and in particular in
Article 3 (Art. 3); whereas it follows that his part of the application
is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27, paragraph
(2) (Art. 27-2), of the Convention;

Now therefore the Commission DECLARES THIS APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE