THE FACTS

Whereas the facts presented by the applicant may be summarised as
follows:

The applicant is an Austrian citizen, born in 1934 and at present
detained in prison at G..

By judgment of .. August 1968 the Regional Court (Kreisgericht) of K.
convicted the applicant of manslaughter and gave him an eight years'
sentence. The applicant, who had already been previously convicted of
manslaughter, was found guilty of having killed an inmate of the prison
at S. during a dispute. The applicant, who at the time of the crime
served a sentence in the same prison for a crime previously committed,
was known as being a dangerous cut-throat. The applicant defended
himself with the allegation, that he had fought a mock fight with his
victim to show that a man with a knife was superior to a karate fighter
such as was the applicant's victim. The Court, however, based its
decision on the evidence given by other inmates of the prison who were
present when the crime took place and who confirmed that no such
sportive fight took place, but a harsh dispute between the two men.

The applicant appealed against this judgment to the Supreme Court
(Oberster Gerichtshof). He insisted on the fact that he had not
intended to do any harm to his victim but that the only purpose of his
attacking the latter was to perform a sportive fight to which his
victim had agreed before-hand. By decision of .. November 1968 the
Supreme Court decided to have an oral hearing of the applicant's case
and that the applicant should be represented at this hearing by his
counsel only, and that he should consequently not personally be
present. In the same decision the Supreme Court appointed an ex officio
counsel on the applicant's behalf for that purpose.

By judgment of .. December 1968, the Supreme Court dismissed the
applicant's appeal. The Court stated that the lower court's judgment
was right and that the applicant's allegations were not confirmed by
the evidence given by the witnesses at the trial.

The applicant thereafter lodged applications for a retrial. He
requested the hearing of several new witnesses and he alleged that the
witnesses who had been heard at his trial had given wrong evidence. The
applicant also requested that one of these witnesses should be
medically examined as to his state of mind, since it appeared to him
that this witness was not fully responsible for his statements and
actions. The applicant indicated that these new witnesses could confirm
that his victim was indeed killed during a mock fight only and not in
the course of
a dispute.

By decision (Beschluss) of .. July 1969, the Regional Court of W.
dismissed the applicant's request. The Court held that even assuming
that these witnesses confirmed the applicant's allegations, his crime
would still qualify as manslaughter since a fight of such a nature
could not be considered as being a sportive performance. The Court also
stated that the applicant's allegations contained no relevant new facts
and did not satisfy the conditions for re-trial within the meaning of
Article 353 (1) of the Austrian Code of Penal Procedure
(Strafprozessordnung).

The applicant now complains:

- that he is innocent and that the witnesses had given false evidence
  in his case;
- that his ex officio counsel had neglected his duties since he had not
 looked into the files and since he had not consulted the applicant
 on the contents of his appeal to the Supreme Court;
- and that he had been punished twice for the same offence, since he
  also received an additional disciplinary penalty apart from that
  given by the Court.

The applicant alleges violations of the Convention.

THE LAW

Whereas, in the first place the applicant's allegation that he was
wrongly convicted and that the witnesses heard at the trial had given
false evidence in his case; whereas and examination of the case as it
ha been submitted, including an examination made ex officio, does not
disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set
forth in the Convention; whereas, in respect of the judicial
decisions complained of, the Commission has frequently stated that in
accordance with Article 19 (Art. 19) of the Convention its only task
is to ensure the observance of the obligations undertaken by the
Parties to the Convention; whereas, in particular, it is not competent
to deal with an application alleging that errors of law or fact have
been committed by domestic courts, except where the Commission
considers that such errors might have involved a possible violation of
any of the rights and freedoms limitatively listed in the Convention;
whereas, in this respect, the Commission refers to its decisions (Nos.
458/59 ( X. v. Belgium - Yearbook, Vol. III, p. 233) and 1140/61 (X.
v. Austria - Collection of Decisions, Vol. 8, p. 57)); and whereas
there is no appearance of a violation in the proceedings complained of;

Whereas it follows that this part of the application is manifestly
ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27, paragraph (2)
(Art. 27-2), of the Convention;

Whereas, insofar as the applicant's complaints are directed against his
lawyer, it results from Article 19 (Art. 19) of the Convention that the
sole task of the Commission is to ensure the observance of the
engagements undertaken in the Convention by the High Contracting
Parties, being those Members of the Council of Europe which have signed
the Convention and deposited their instruments of ratification;

Whereas, moreover, it appears from Article 25 (1) (Art. 25-1) of the
Convention that the Commission can properly admit an application from
an individual only if that individual claims to be the victim of a
violation of his rights under the Convention by one of the Parties
which have accepted this competence of the Commission;

Whereas it results clearly from these Articles that the Commission has
no competence ratione personae to admit Amnesty Acts directed against
private individuals; whereas it follows that this part of the
application is incompatible with the Convention within the meaning of
Article 27, paragraph (2) (Art. 27-2), of the Convention (see
Application No. 1599/62, Yearbook, Vol. VI, pages 348, 356);

Whereas, insofar as the above complaint gives rise to the question
whether the Supreme Court failed to ensure that the applicant's defence
was properly carried out with the consequence that he was not given a
fair hearing within the meaning of Article 6, paragraph (1) (Art. 6-1),
of the Convention, an examination of the case as it has been submitted,
including an examination made ex officio, does not disclose any
appearance of a violation of this right; whereas it follows that, in
this respect, the application is manifestly ill-founded within the
meaning of Article 27, paragraph (2) (Art. 27-2), of the Convention;

Whereas the applicant further complains that he had been punished twice
for the same offence since an additional disciplinary sanction was
imposed upon him as a result of the incident concerned apart from the
penalty which the Courts imposed; whereas this complaint might give
rise to the question whether or not the principle of ne bis in idem is
guaranteed by the Convention; whereas this principle, however, is not
as such included amongst the rights and freedoms set forth in the
Convention but there might be the question whether it might not be
considered under Article 6, paragraph (1) (Art. 6-1), of the Convention
which guarantees to everyone a fair trial; whereas, however, in the
present circumstances this question does not need to be examined
further since the applicant has not, in fact, been punished twice for
the same offence as the criminal proceedings and disciplinary
proceedings in question concerned different aspects of the same
incident and impose different sanctions of different categories;
whereas, consequently, this part of the application is manifestly
ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 27,
paragraph (2) (Art. 27-2), of the Convention;

Whereas, finally, in regard to the applicant's complaints relating to
his claim for a retrial and the court proceedings concerned, it is to
be observed that the Convention, under the terms of Article 1 (Art. 1),
guarantees only the rights and freedoms set forth in Section I of the
Convention; and whereas, under Article 25 (1) (Art. 25-1) of the
Convention, only the alleged violation of one of those right and
freedoms by a Contracting Party can be the subject of an application
presented by a person, non-governmental organisation or group of
individuals;

Whereas otherwise its examination is outside the competence of the
Commission ratione materiae; whereas the right to a retrial is not as
such included among the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the
Convention; and whereas, in accordance with the Commission's constant
jurisprudence, proceedings concerning applications for retrial fall
outside the scope of Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention (see
Applications Nos. 864/60, X. v. Austria - Yearbook, Vol. V, p. 96);
whereas it follows that this part of the application is incompatible
with the provisions of the Convention within the meaning of Article 27,
paragraph (2) (Art. 27-2), thereof;

Now therefore the Commission DECLARES THIS APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE