THE FACTS

The facts of the case as submitted by the applicant may be summarised
as follows:

The applicant is an Austrian citizen, born in 1924 and resident in V.
or K. near S.

From the statements and from documents submitted by him it appears that
he was arrested on .. November 1968 and remanded in custody. At the
same time preliminary investigations were instituted against him on the
suspicion of having misused official powers (Missbrauch der
Amtsgewalt).

On .. May 1969, the applicant was convicted by the Regional Criminal
Court (Landesgericht für Strafsachen) in V. of having committed this
offense and sentenced to three years' severe imprisonment with the
additional penalty of "sleeping hard" (hartes Lager) and fasting once
every three months.

From the judgment it appears that the applicant, who was between ...
and ... 1968, the personal assistance in charge of public relations
(Pressereferent) to the Austrian Minister of the Interior, had made
available to the secret organisation of a foreign country certain
secret information concerning the 9th World Youth Festivals and had
photocopied certain secret documents concerning the events in
Czechoslovakia in 1968, with the intention of passing them on to the
secret service organisation of that foreign country. The Court found
that, by reason of these acts he had misused the official powers vested
in him by to the detriment of the Republic of Austria.

The applicant lodged with the Supreme Court (Oberster Gerichtshof) in
Vienna a plea of nullity (Nichtigkeitsbeschwerde) against his
conviction and an appeal (Berufung) against his sentence. In his plea
of nullity he apparently alleged that various provisions of Article 281
of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Strafprozessordnung) had been
violated by reason of the fact that the public had been excluded during
certain parts of the trial, that certain expert opinions had not been
obtained and that the Regional Criminal Court had wrongly assessed the
evidence before it.

He apparently also alleged that procedural law had been violated in
that his conviction was based on certain information given by a former
Czech diplomat, Dr. B., and a member of the German secret service which
information had been introduced in the proceedings by means of hearsay
evidence. In fact, the Court had heard as witnesses two officials of
the Austrian Security Service, Drs. H. and P., who had given evidence
as to certain information received from Dr. B. and an unidentified
official who was employed with a secret service organisation in Munich.
H. and P. had received permission from their superiors to give evidence
as to certain facts, but no permission had been given to reveal the
identity of the foreign official, and this had been assured by the
Austrian authorities. Before the trial the applicant has requested to
summon an informed representative of the Federal Information Service
(Bundesnachrichtendienst) at Munich-Pullach and such summons had been
issued by the Court. However, the Court established during the third
day of the trial, namely on .. May 1969, that the witness so summoned
had failed to appear. The applicant alleged in this respect that such
witness should have been heard by rogatory commission in Munich and
that it had been unlawful to obtain the hearsay evidence of Drs. H. and
P.

On .. February 1970, the Supreme Court partly allowed the plea of
nullity and the appeal. It confirmed the applicant's conviction having
misused his official powers by passing on secret information concerning
the 9th World Youth Festivals, and of having attempted this offence by
photocopying certain documents, but acquitted him of the charges of
having attempted to misuse the official powers by photocopying certain
other documents. At the same time the Supreme Court reduced the
sentence to two years' and nine months' severe imprisonment with the
additional penalty of fasting once every three months.

The Supreme Court rejected the applicant's allegations that procedural
law had been violated by reason of the fact that the public had been
excluded during part of the trial and that certain expert witnesses had
not been examined by the Regional Court. It also considered that the
failure to obtain the evidence of a German secret service man by means
of a rogatory commission did not constitute any violation of the law
since the applicant had not made any application in this regard during
the trial and, in any event, any such request to a German Court would
have had no prospects of success in view of the relevant provisions of
the German Code of Criminal Procedure and international custom in this
respect.

The Supreme Court then dealt with the question of the alleged hearsay
evidence given by Drs. H. and P. during the trial. It found that it
was, in principle, not permissible, both under the relevant provisions
of the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure and under Article 6 (3) (d)
of the Convention on Human Rights to obtain hearsay evidence where it
is possible to obtain direct evidence on the subject matter concerned.

Interpreting Article 6 3 (d) of the Convention, the Supreme Court said:

"Under Article 6 3 (d) of the Convention, the accused person has the
right - already emerging from Article 249 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure - 'to examine or have examined witnesses against him'.
However, 'witnesses against him' within the meaning of the Convention
are only such persons who have directly observed the burdening facts,
as otherwise the right to examine them would have no meaning. Neither
the accused nor his counsel would be in a position to ask significant
questions or make relevant allegations with regard to the evidence
given by an official whose licence to testify in court has been
restricted to the effect that he may not disclose the source of his
information. The right to examine witnesses about evidence submitted
by such organs whose identity must be concealed by means of an official
restriction on the authorization to testify is therefore as such
excluded from the prohibition expressly contained in Article 6 3 (d)
of the Convention,, namely to stop witnesses from being questioned by
the defendant."

The Supreme Court continued to say that, only where a witness was
otherwise unattainable was it possible to introduce in the proceedings
the evidence to be given by that person by examining a third person.
However, a witness whose identity may not be disclosed was not for that
reason an unattainable witness. Thus it was not possible to examine
witnesses who are allowed only to give fragmentary evidence as to facts
reported to them by third persons but must conceal the source of their
information.

However, the Supreme Court found that those general considerations were
not directly applicable in the present case. The unidentified informer
was not a secret service agent but a high official employed with the
Federal Information Service in Munich, being an organisation whose
identity was sufficiently clear. Moreover, an informed representative
of that service had been summoned to appear at the trial but had failed
to come. Having regard to this situation it was clear that, even if the
name of the official concerned had been revealed, he would have
similarly failed to appear at the trial and the Austrian authorities
had no power to ensure the appearance of a foreign government official.
Consequently, the witness was not unavailable by reason of the refusal
of permission to give evidence, but he was, in fact, unattainable which
justified the hearing of hearsay evidence.

Apart from this it was for the Court to assess the facts and appreciate
the evidence before it and the court's findings in this respect were
not subject to review on appeal. On the other hand, where the Court
wrongly assessed the law in regard to the facts established, the
judgment must be set aside. This was required in respect of certain
documents which, according to the facts established, were no longer
secret at the time when they were photocopied. Consequently, the
conviction had been quashed in these regards.

Complaints

The applicant now complained that his right to examine or have examined
witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of
witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against
him, had been violated in his case.

He explained that before the trial started he had made and application
to the Regional Criminal Court to summon an informed representative of
the Munich Federal Information Service. However, the fact that Drs. H.
and P. had not been granted permission to disclose in court the
identity of the person from whom they had received their information,
prevented him from examining these witnesses in this respect and also
from obtaining the attendance and examination of the person concerned.
Moreover, the Court had failed to obtain the evidence of that person
by means of a rogatory commission.

The applicant further explained that his conviction was based primarily
on information given by Dr. B. and a member of the German secret
service. However, these persons had not been examined by the Court.
Instead the evidence of Drs. H. and P. was obtained who reported that
Dr. B. and the German secret service agent had told them, namely that
the applicant had worked for the Czech secret service and had passed
information to the German secret service. According to the applicant,
these allegations were not true and he had wished to put precise
questions to the persons concerned thus proving his innocence.

He alleged violations of Article 6 3 (d) of the Convention.

Proceedings before the Commission

The application was lodged with the Commission on 16 February 1970 and
was registered on 20 March 1970. However, on 2 April 1971 the
Commission decided to strike the application off the list on the ground
that the applicant had shown no interest in its maintenance. In fact,
there had been no communication from the applicant during a certain
period and efforts on the part of the Commission's Secretary to get in
touch with him had failed.

By letter of 25 April 1971 the applicant enquired about his application
and, after the text of the Commission's decision of 2 April 1971 had
been communicated to him the requested at once that his application
should be restored to the list of cases before the Commission. He
confirmed that he had, in fact, not lost interest in having his case
examined and gave explanations as to the reasons for his failure to
keep the Commission informed about his whereabouts. He stated that he
had been released from prison on 16 October 1970 but that he had left
forwarding addresses with the prison authorities and had also notified
the judicial authorities and the police of his whereabouts. It was true
that he had failed at once to inform the Commission of his change of
address, for which he offered his apologies, but he had assumed that
the prison authorities would forward any correspondence addressed to
him in prison or that the postal authorities would have delivered the
Secretary's letters addressed to him at his new address at K. near S.
In any event, it would have been easy for the Ministry of Justice to
ascertain his correct address.

On 23 July 1971 the Commission, in accordance with its usual practice
in such cases, considered these explanations with a view to deciding
whether the circumstances of the case as a whole justified its
restoration to the list of cases. In this connection it had special
regard to the relatively short period during which contact with the
applicant had been interrupted and found that a misunderstanding could
not be excluded. Consequently, the circumstances of this case did so
justify its restoration to the list of cases.

The Commission examined the applicant's complaint on 17 December 1971
and decided, in accordance with Rule 45, 3 (b) of the Commission's
Rules of Procedure, that notice thereof should be given to the Austrian
Government and that the parties should be invited to submit
observations in writing on the admissibility of the application.

The respondent Government submitted their observations on 18 March
1972. The applicant replied on 2 April 1972.

Submissions of the parties

1.   The respondent Government first referred to the procedure of the
Commission to restore to its list cases which have previously been
struck out. They considered that such procedure was not envisaged under
the Convention and appeared to circumvent the provisions of Article 26
of the Convention.

The Government then made submissions regarding the substance of the
applicant's complaint. They explained that the judgment of the Vienna
Regional Criminal Court, by which the applicant had been convicted and
sentenced, had been based on the evidence of numerous witnesses, of
experts, as well as on documentary evidence, including official files
and the applicant's passport.

The applicant now complained under Article 6 3 (d) of the Convention,
that certain witnesses, who were members of a German secret service
organisation and whose evidence had been introduced at the trial by
means of hearsay evidence, had not been examined either at the trial
itself or by means of rogatory commissions in the Federal Republic of
Germany. However, under Article 2 of the Treaty of 22 September 1958
between the Republic of Austria and the Federal Republic of Germany
regarding mutual assistance in legal matters, such assistance was not
granted where the proceedings concerned relate to political matters or
are connected therewith. It was true that the Court had, in fact,
summoned witnesses in the Federal Republic of Germany to appear and
give evidence at the trial but these summonses had only been
transmitted by the German authorities to the witnesses concerned
because the authorities did not know that the proceedings concerned
related to a political matter. Otherwise, they would certainly have
refused to communicate the summonses and this would have been in
accordance with both the above Treaty and with the general rules of
international law as stated in Article 2 of the European Convention on
Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters. Austria herself had made a
reservation, inter alia, in respect of political cases and it could
therefore not expect any different treatment from other countries. It
was thus clear that the law did not permit the summoning of witnesses
or their examination by rogatory commission and where the Vienna
Regional Court had nevertheless issued such summonses it had obviously
attempted to safeguard, as much as possible, the procedural rights of
the accused.

Apart from this, the applicant had failed during the trial itself to
make applications for the examination of witnesses abroad and had
therefore not exhausted the domestic remedies in this respect.

As regards the examination by the Court of Drs. H. and P. it was not
true that they had simply given hearsay evidence. Insofar as these
witnesses had reported their contacts with foreign informers they had
clearly given direct evidence. But, insofar as they had reported what
these foreign informers had told them, the Court had fully appreciated
this element in their testimony and the Government quoted a passage in
the judgment of the V. Regional Criminal Court in support of this
allegation.

The Government submitted that it had been necessary to hear the
evidence of Drs. H. and P. because it had not been possible, in fact
and in law, to obtain the direct evidence in Court. In this respect the
Government referred to the reasoning of the Supreme Court in the
present case and also a similar decision by the Federal Court of the
Federal Republic of Germany, dated 1 August 1962.

Furthermore, in accordance with the principle of discovering the actual
truth (Prinzip der materiellen Wahrheit), the Court was bound to
examine with care the allegations made on behalf of an accused
person in the same way as those made against him. But it was not
obliged to summon all the witnesses nominated by an accused person, and
particularly not those witnesses whose evidence it considered to be
irrelevant. In this connection the Government referred to a decision
of the Netherlands Supreme Court regarding Article 6 of the Convention
and to the Commission's Report of 11 July 1960 on the case of Austria
against Italy. In the Government's submission, the applicant in the
present case would, in any event, not have gained anything by the
disclosure of the name and the official position of the foreign
informer, or by his being summoned as a witness, as he would not have
appeared at the trial, and his examination by means of a rogatory
commission in the Federal Republic of Germany was inadmissible under
the law.

The Government next referred to the principle of the free appreciation
of evidence (Grundsatz der freien Beweisführung) and submitted that
hearsay evidence was not as such excluded under Article 6 3 (d) of the
Convention as long as the Court took into consideration the particular
nature of such evidence. It was clear from the judgment in the present
case that the V. Regional Criminal Court had been clearly cognisant of
the manifold objections against hearsay evidence. Moreover, it should
be stressed that the applicant's conviction had by no means been based
only on such evidence but had been supported by a multitude of other
evidence.

In the Government's submission, the applicant was in fact challenging
in his application to the Commission the findings of fact made by the
Regional Criminal Court. However, the Commission had constantly held
that it had no competence to examine allegations that errors of law or
fact had been committed by the domestic courts and, in this connection,
had always confirmed that it was not a "court of fourth instance".

The Government submitted that, for these reasons, the application
should be declared inadmissible in accordance with Article 27 (2) and
(3) of the Convention.

2.   The applicant, in his written reply of 2 April 1972, first made
submissions explaining that he had never lost interest in his
application to the Commission. In fact it had been the Government's
fault that the Commission had been unable to contact him after his
release from prison in October 1970 and had struck his case off its
list.

The applicant then dealt with the Government's submission that the
judgment of the Vienna Regional Court had been based on the evidence
of numerous witnesses, of experts, and on an examination of his
passport and contended that this submission was wrong. In fact, as
regards experts, his counsel had requested the Court to hear expert
witnesses with regard to questions of the methods and practices
employed by intelligence services as well as questions of
constitutional law. However, the Court had refused these applications
on the ground that the evidence offered by these experts was neither
relevant or admissible. Furthermore, concerning the examination of his
passport, the applicant submitted that this evidence was not designed
to prove charges relating to espionage. Finally, as regards certain
witnesses whose evidence had been used against him, the applicant
contended that their testimony had either been contradictory in itself
or had been insufficient to prove the charges against him. In this
connection the applicant referred to the evidence of three witnesses
in particular and quoted their statements at the trial or during the
preliminary investigations.

In the applicant's submission, the two officials Drs. P. and H., on the
other hand, played a decisive part in the criminal proceedings against
him. He contended that they were regarded by the trial court as being
both experts in secret service matters and witnesses to the facts and
that it was inadmissible under the Code of Criminal Procedure to give
evidence in this double capacity. Apart from this, Dr. P. had himself
been the subject of judicial investigations in his then capacity as
Head of the State Police.

Moreover, the Court had contained itself in obtaining hearsay evidence
instead of using all possibilities which were at its disposal to arrive
at the whole truth. It was perhaps true that in the strict sense of the
law it would not have been possible to obtain evidence abroad by means
of rogatory commissions, but in practice this was nevertheless
successfully accomplished. In fact, in a case relating to espionage in
the Federal Republic of Germany (The Porst Case) the German courts had
obtained in the United States of America the evidence of a witness who
had testified against the accused.

A further contradiction emerged clearly from the Government's own
submissions when they explained, on the one hand that, contrary to the
provisions of the law, witnesses in the Federal Republic of Germany had
in fact been summoned by the Regional Court and alleged, on the other
hand, that the applicant had failed to make applications during the
trial for the summons of witnesses abroad and had therefore not
exhausted the domestic remedies. In the applicant's submission, it was
either possible or it was not possible in political cases to obtain
evidence from abroad. If it was possible, the prosecution authority
should have obtained such evidence even before the trial, but if it was
not possible the Court should not have transmitted such summonses as
requested by him. To do favours to an accused person as suggested by
the Government was neither envisaged by the law nor was it normal
procedural practice.

Moreover, through the evidence given by Drs. P. and H., the Court had
obtained the remote evidence of third persons (informers) who had
informed the undisclosed sources of information of Drs. H. and P. and
who equally remained anonymous. It was in the applicant's submission,
clear that the Court had made no attempt at obtaining the evidence of
the immediate witnesses against him and it was not true that his
conviction was based on a multitude of other evidence, as the
Government had contended. He therefore maintained that Article 6 (3)
(d) of the Convention had been disregarded and he requested the
Commission to admit his application.

THE LAW

The applicant has complained of his conviction and sentence by the
Regional Criminal Court of Vienna and of the court proceedings
concerned. However, in regard to the judicial decisions of which the
applicant complains, the Commission has frequently stated that, in
accordance with Article 19 (Art. 19) of the Convention, its only task
is to ensure the observance of the obligations undertaken by the
Parties in the Convention. In particular, the Commission is not
competent to deal with an application alleging that errors of law or
fact have been committed by domestic courts, except where it considers
that such errors might have involved a possible violation of any of the
rights and freedoms set forth in the Convention. In this respect, the
Commission refers to its established case-law (see e.g. decisions on
the admissibility of applications No. 458/59, Yearbook, Vol. 3, pp.222,
232 and No. 1140/61, Collection of Decisions, Vol. 8, pp. 57, 62).

In the present case the applicant has complained that Article 6 (3) (d)
(Art. 6-3-d) of the Convention has been violated by reason of the fact
that the Regional Criminal Court in V. failed to obtain the attendance
in court of the persons who could have given direct evidence in his
case. Instead, the Court obtained the hearsay evidence of two high
officials of the Austrian security services whose authorization to
testify in court had been limited to the extent that they were not
allowed to disclose the names of the persons who had given them
information and he had thus been prevented from examining these
witnesses in this respect or from obtaining the attendance in court and
the examination of the direct witnesses concerned. Moreover, his
conviction had been based primarily on hearsay evidence.

Article 6 (3) (d) (Art. 6-3-d) of the Convention provides that everyone
charged with a criminal offense has the right "to examine or have
examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and
examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as
witnesses against him". Interpreting this provision, the Commission has
consistently held that Article 6 (3) (d) (Art. 6-3-d) of the Convention
is aimed at ensuring in criminal proceedings equality between the
defence and the public prosecutor's office as regards the calling and
interrogation of witnesses, but does not give an accused person an
unlimited right to obtain the attendance of witnesses in court. The
domestic law of the High Contracting Parties could thus lay down
conditions for the admission and examination of witnesses provided that
such conditions were identical for witnesses on both sides. Similarly,
the competent court was free, subject to respect for the terms of the
Convention and particularly for the principle of equality established
by Article 6 (3) (d) (Art. 6-3-d) of the Convention to refuse calling
witnesses nominated by the defence for instance on the ground that the
court considered their evidence as being unlikely to assist in
ascertaining the truth (see, for example, opinion of the Commission in
its report of 31 March 1963 on application No. 788/60, Austria against
Italy, paras. 112, 115).

The Commission finds that the same considerations are applicable in
respect of an applicant's right under Article 6 (3) (d) (Art. 6-3-d)
of the Convention to examine or have examined witnesses against him as
both part of this provisions are closely interrelated. Thus, as accused
person does not have an unrestricted right under this provision to put
questions to witnesses testifying against him in court, but the
exercise of this right must be governed by the Court's appreciation
whether or not such questions are likely to assist in, and thus
necessary for, ascertaining the truth.

Two questions arise under Article 6 (3) (d) (Art. 6-3-d) of the
Convention as to the conduct by the Regional Court of the proceedings
in the present case:  first, whether or not the applicant's right to
"obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under
the same conditions as witnesses against him" has been violated by
reason of the fact that the informer himself has not appeared to give
evidence at the trial.

In this respect the Commission observes that the Regional Criminal
Court in Vienna acting in accordance with the applicant's request, had,
in fact, tried to obtain the attendance in court of any informed member
of the German Secret Service Organisation which had transmitted
information about the applicant to the Austrian authorities. However,
this attempt had failed as the witness summoned had not appeared and,
given the reservations as to political offenses in the Austro-German
Agreement relating to Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters as well as
to the European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters,
it could not have been possible for the Austrian courts to compel such
witness to appear or to obtain his evidence by means of rogatory
commissions in the Federal Republic of Germany.

In these circumstances the Commission finds that, apart from the fact
that the applicant has not made any submissions as to the nature of the
evidence of the witness whom he wished to call and whose attendance the
court failed to obtain, there were factual obstacles resulting from the
character of the charges against the applicant which prevented such
attendance rather than any deliberate act or omission on the part of
the Court for which the Austrian Government would be responsible under
the Convention.

The second question  that arises in this context is whether or not the
applicant's right "to examine or have examined witnesses against him"
has been violated by reason of the fact that the two members of the
Austrian security services who gave evidence against him, namely Drs.
H. and P. were not allowed, under an official limitation of their
authorization to testify, to disclose the names of the persons who had
supplied them with information about the applicant.

In this respect the Commission observes that it emerges clearly both
from the judgment of the Supreme Court of 11 February 1970 and from the
applicant's submissions to the Commission that, in spite of the above
limitation on their testimony, the applicant knew that the source of
the information of Drs. H. and P. was a high official of the Federal
Information Service in Munich, being an organisation whose identity was
sufficiently clear to him. He further knew that Dr. B., a former Czech
diplomat, had given information about him to the Federal Information
Service which had passed such information on to Dr. H. in Vienna. The
only element, therefore, which by reason of the official limitation to
testify, remained undisclosed and thus unknown to the applicant was the
name of the German official at the Federal Information Service with
whom Dr. H. had been in contact.

The Commission finds, however, that the applicant has not shown that
the revealing of the name of that official was, in the circumstances,
necessary as such for the Court's ascertainment of the truth of the
criminal charges against him. Indeed, the applicant himself does not
allege that he suffered any prejudice in this respect other than that
he was thus prevented from summoning this German official and from
obtaining his evidence in court. However, with regard to this
allegation, the Commission has already established that it was
impossible as a matter of fact to obtain the attendance in court of any
member of the German Secret Service Organisation concerned or otherwise
to obtain evidence directly from this organisation.

It follows that in the circumstances, there was no appearance of a
breach of the applicant's rights guaranteed under either of the
provisions of Article 6 (3) (d) (Art. 6-3-d) of the Convention.

On the other hand, there is another aspect of this situation in that
the question should be considered whether, as a result of the
applicant's right to a fair hearing within the meaning of Article 6 (1)
(Art. 6-1) of the Convention has been violated by reason of the fact
that the Regional Criminal Court in Vienna obtained, and based its
judgment on, evidence which may be described as "hearsay" evidence and
which the applicant was, by the virtue of such evidence, unable to
challenge with regard to its substance.

The Commission has examined this question ex officio and it finds that
an issue under the general provisions of Article 6 (1) (Art. 6-1) of
the Convention may arise even where it has previously established that
there is no appearance of a breach of any of the specific "minimum"
rights mentioned in para. (3) of Article 6 (Art. 6-3) including, as in
the present case, Article 6 (3) (d) (Art. 6-3-d). In this respect the
Commission refers to its opinion in the report of 15 March 1961 on
application No. 343/57, Nielsen against Denmark, para. 52.

The Commission first points out that it is a principle of law in many
countries, including Austria, that the court is free to assess the
value of whatever evidence is put before it and the Commission, as has
already been stated, has no competence to deal with allegations that
errors of law or fact have been committed by domestic courts except
where it considers that such errors might have involved a possible
violation of the rights and freedoms set forth in the Convention.

The right to which reference could be made in the present case, is the
general right set forth in Article 6 (1) (Art. 6-1) of the Convention,
that in "the determination .... of any criminal charge against him,
everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable
time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law".
However, under this provision the Commission is again not called upon
to decide whether or not the domestic courts have correctly assessed
the evidence before them, but only "whether evidence for and against
the accused has been presented in such a manner, and the proceedings
in general have been conducted in such a way, that he has had a fair
trial" (see the Commission's conclusion in its report on the Nielsen
Case, supra, para. 52).

In the present case the Commission observes that the applicant's
conviction by the Regional Criminal Court in Vienna has by no means
been based solely on the hearsay evidence given by Drs. H. and P., but
that there was other evidence weighing against him. Indeed, the
judgment of 23 July 1969 of the V. Regional Criminal Court shows that
the evidence on which the Court relied was of a variety of sources and
quality, including several witnesses whose evidence could not be
qualified as "hearsay" evidence, as well as documentary evidence and
a factual element which could be interpreted as amounting to a
confession.

Apart from this, it further emerges clearly from the above judgment
that the Regional Criminal Court in V. has been fully aware of the
nature of "hearsay" evidence and of the objections that might be raised
against it. It has therefore given a particularly careful and critical
attention to the examination and evaluation of this evidence.

Finally, there is nothing in the applicant's submissions to suggest
that he has been prevented in any way from challenging the veracity of
the statements made by Drs. H. and P. or from adducing evidence on his
behalf, or otherwise from putting his defence before the Court.

The Commission finds therefore that in the present case there has
equally been no appearance of a breach of the applicant's right to a
fair hearing within the meaning of Article 6 (1) (Art. 6-1) of the
Convention.

An examination by the Commission of the applicant's complaints as they
have been submitted, including an examination made ex officio, does
therefore not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and
freedoms set forth in the Convention and in particular in Article 6
(Art. 6).

It follows that the application is manifestly ill-founded and must be
rejected in accordance with Article 27 (2) (Art. 27-2), of the
Convention .

For these reasons, the Commission DECLARES THIS APPLICATION
INADMISSIBLE