AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
Application no. 52792/99
by Sofiika VASILEVA
The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting on 30 April 2002 as a Chamber composed of
Mr C.L. Rozakis, President,
Mrs F. Tulkens,
Mr G. Bonello,
Mr P. Lorenzen,
Mrs N. Vajić,
Mr E. Levits,
Mr A. Kovler,
Mr V. Zagrebelsky, judges,
and Mr E. Fribergh, Section Registrar,
Having regard to the above application introduced on 10 August 1999 and registered on 22 November 1999,
Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant,
Having deliberated, decides as follows:
The applicant is a Bulgarian national, born in 1928 and living in Aarhus, Denmark. The respondent Government are represented by their Agent, Mr Hans Klingenberg of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Co-Agent Ms Nina Holst-Christensen of the Ministry of Justice.
A. Particular circumstances of the case
The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.
On 11 August 1995 on a public bus in the city of Aarhus the applicant was accused by a ticket inspector of having travelled without a valid ticket. Following a dispute on this matter the police were called and since the applicant at their request refused to give her name and address, she was arrested at 9.30 p.m. in accordance with section 755, subsection 1, cf. section 750 of the Administration of Justice Act (Retsplejeloven) and brought to the Aarhus police station. From the case file it appears that having been deprived of her personal belongings, the applicant was put in a waiting room at 9.45 p.m. and after a visit to the toilet at 11.00 p.m. she was moved to a detention cell. On 12 August 1995 at 10.45 a.m. the applicant revealed her identity and she was released at 11.00 a.m. Immediately thereafter she collapsed and was hospitalised for three days diagnosed with high blood pressure.
The charge with the offence of refusing to reveal her identity was not followed up by an indictment. The outcome of the applicant’s dispute with the bus company is unknown.
On 16 August 1995 the applicant complained to the Chief Constable of Aarhus (Politimesteren i Aarhus) that she had been detained and been allowed only one visit to the toilet. She submitted also that the detention cell was equipped with a dirty mattress and that she had been deprived of her belongings before her incarceration. Finally, she maintained that several times she had pointed out in vain her need of medicine, and that she had not been attended to by a doctor as promised.
In a letter of 14 September 1995 the Chief Constable provided his comments on the course of event, stating inter alia that the applicant was not in possession of any papers which could have revealed her identity, that she appeared hysterical and refused to reveal her identity and that in the light thereof for security reasons she was placed in a detention cell. Furthermore, the Chief Constable noted that during the detention the applicant was regularly attended to and called upon through the intercommunication system but that each approach was met with screaming and continuing refusal to reveal her identity, that the applicant at no time had drawn attention to the fact that she needed medicine and that visits to the toilet generally are provided for when requested, but that the applicant had not made any request in this respect. Finally, it was noted that the temperature in the cell was constant and suitable for a stay.
On 12 October 1995 the applicant also complained to the secretary of the Local Board of Complaint (Lokalnævnet), which dealt with complaints of police conduct. The applicant was informed that her complaint would be presented before the Board when the police officers involved had been heard. However, having received a note on the case prepared by the Police on 14 December 1995, the Board returned the file to the Chief Constable without taking any decision since, with effect from 1 January 1996, the law regarding complaints of police conduct was amended, henceforward authorising the Regional State Prosecutors (Statsadvokaterne) to decide in these matters.
It appears that the Local Board of Complaint informed the applicant of the change of authority on 18 January 1996.
The facts surrounding an incident which took place on 26 January 1996 is disputed by the parties. The Government submit that a police officer in Aarhus was told by an anonymous person that an elderly woman (i.e. the applicant) had not been seen for some time, so the person was afraid that the woman was lying ill and helpless in her flat. As the police officer upon his arrival received no reply despite repeated calling and knocking the landlord was summoned to unlock the door. The applicant then appeared from the living room. She was pleased with the care shown and in general had certain questions concerning the pending complaint. The applicant submits that the police officer summoned the landlord, who possessed a key to her flat, in order to ensure that she would open the door. She was ill, but had to listen to the police officer for an hour. He told her to go to the police station and sign a document that she would drop the case. She alleges that for this he offered her 250 Danish kroner (DKK) to pay the penalty fare to the public bus company. When leaving he repeated in a commanding voice, that she had to go to the police station and “solve the matter”.
On 14 March 1996 the police officer wrote a letter to the applicant to make an appointment for a visit since he had tried to reach her. It appears from the letter that the Chief Superintendent at Aarhus Police had asked him to speak to the applicant again. On 12 April 1996 the police officer contacted the applicant at her residence, where he spoke with her about the case.
In a letter of 14 June 1996 to the Regional State Prosecutor in Viborg (Statsadvokaten i Viborg) the applicant emphasised that she claimed compensation. The State Prosecutor thereupon requested the file and an opinion from the Chief Constable. On 16 July 1996, however, the case was remitted from the Regional State Prosecutor to the Chief Constable for consideration. The Chief Constable decided on the matter on 18 July 1996, and in so far as relevant his letter of the same day to the applicant reads as follows:
“In connection with your previous complaint ... you received a ... letter of 14 September 1995 from Chief Superintendent HJH. [My] reply to your complaint... will not differ essentially from the content of [that letter].
However, in view of your relatively advanced age I find reason to regret that you were not, as promised, attended to by a doctor in connection with your stay in the detention cell.
In general, I find the fact that you were taken to the police station, that you were placed in the detention cell, and that the length of your stay in the detention cell from 11.00 p.m. until your release the following day at 11.00 a.m., totalling 12 hours can be ascribed substantially to your conduct and unwillingness to assist in replying to the question on which the police needed clarification.
This decision can be appealed against to the Ministry of Justice...
The claim for compensation made by you as regards the deprivation of liberty will be decided by the Regional State Prosecutor, who has received a copy of this letter”.
The applicant did not appeal to the Ministry of Justice against the Chief Constable’s decision, but on 31 July 1996 she complained against the decision to the Regional State Prosecutor.
On 29 October 1996 she furthermore contacted the Prosecutor General about the case, for which reason he requested the Regional State Prosecutor to submit an opinion and forward the case file, which was done on 12 November 1996. Moreover, the applicant wrote to the Prosecutor General on 17 January 1997 informing him that twice a police officer had visited her and allegedly tried to make her withdraw the case. By letter of 30 January 1997 the Prosecutor General answered the applicant that the Regional State Prosecutor had to decide on the matter first, and that thereafter, if necessary, she could appeal against the decision. Thus, he remitted the file to the Regional State Prosecutor, noting that the letter of 17 January 1997 possibly contained a new grievance concerning the police visits.
On 6 February 1997, the Regional State Prosecutor upheld the Chief Constable’s decision of 18 July 1996 and refused the applicant’s claim for compensation. At the same time the Regional State Prosecutor advised the applicant that his decision on compensation could be appealed against to the Prosecutor General and that any complaint about the conduct of police officers could be lodged with the Regional State Prosecutor in accordance with the rules under Chapter 93 b of the Administration of Justice Act. In addition he enclosed information from the Ministry of Justice on the examination of complaints about police officers.
On 5 and 12 March 1997 in accordance with section 1018 e of the Administration of Justice Act the applicant appealed to the Prosecutor General against the Regional State Prosecutor’s decision to refuse her compensation for the detention. On 25 November 1997 the Prosecutor General upheld the decision. Moreover, he advised the applicant on the right to lodge a complaint about the conduct of police officers in accordance with the rules under Chapter 93 b of the Administration of Justice Act.
Thereafter the applicant brought her claim for compensation pursuant to section 1018 a of the Administration of Justice Act before the City Court of Aarhus (Retten i Aarhus). The prosecution maintained that the applicant’s behaviour necessitated the arrest and the length of the detention. A court session was held on 26 June 1998, in which the applicant, represented by counsel was heard. Witnesses were heard on 17 September 1998.
By judgment of 25 September 1998 the City Court decided as follows:
“As the [applicant] did not disclose her name and address to the two [named] police officers, she infringed section 750 of the Administration of Justice Act, which authorises the imposition of a fine. Thus, pursuant to section 755, subsection 1 of the Administration of Justice Act the [applicant] could be arrested.
Also, when brought to the police station immediately after the arrest the [applicant] refused to reveal her name and address and consequently, she was put in a waiting room. It is unknown, which efforts were taken to identify the [applicant] in the period between 11.00 p.m. and 06.30 a.m. during which, the 67 year old [applicant] was placed in the detention cell at least for some time, and during which according to the information available she was denied medical treatment. Having regard to the fact that the [applicant] was detained for breaching section 750 of the Administration of Justice Act, the police officers on duty were under an obligation continuously to make attempts to establish her identity, and to secure that the detention did not exceed a period proportionate to the cause of the detention cf. the principles in section 760, subsection 1 and section 755, subsection 4 of the Administration of Justice Act. Under these circumstances, the court finds that there was no reason to extend the detention until the following day 11.00 a.m. Accordingly, the [applicant] is entitled to compensation in the amount of DKK 2,200 pursuant to section 1018 a, subsection 1 of the Administration of Justice Act.”
The prosecution appealed against the judgment to the High Court of Western Denmark (Vestre Landsret) which on 11 February 1999 gave judgment against the applicant. The court stated as follows:
“Having breached section 750 of the Administration of Justice Act the [applicant] could be arrested pursuant to section 755, subsection 1 of the Administration of Justice Act.
During the arrest, and the subsequent detention [the applicant] was requested continuously to reveal her name and address, which she refused. Furthermore, she did not possess any identity papers, which could have enabled the police to determine her name and address. Finally, [the applicant] was released as soon as she revealed her name and address.
Under these circumstances, there is no basis for granting [the applicant] compensation pursuant to section 1018 a, subsection 1 of the administration of Justice Act.
Moreover, as no circumstances has been established, which could provide a basis for granting compensation pursuant to section 1018 a, subsection 2, [the court finds for the prosecution.]”
The applicant’s request of 24 February 1999 for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court (Højesteret) was refused by the Leave to Appeal Board (Procesbevillingsnævnet) on 25 May 1999.
B. Relevant domestic law
As from 1 January 1996 the rules in Danish law on complaints about the police are to be distinguished in the first place between complaints of police conduct and complaints of misfeasance, secondly between complaints of misfeasance within criminal justice and complaints of misfeasance outside criminal justice, and thirdly between complaints of misfeasance within criminal justice and claim for compensation relating thereto.
Complaints of police conduct concern the conduct of police officers during the performance of their duties, such as incorrect procedure or impolite behaviour. Such are to be decided on by the Regional State Prosecutor pursuant to Chapter 93 b of the Administration of Justice Act (Retsplejeloven), and can be appealed to the Prosecutor General (Rigsadvokaten).
Complaints of misfeasance within criminal justice are complaints about decisions taken in connection with criminal prosecution for example a decision to make an arrest, to start investigation, and to initiate specific investigative measures. Such are to be decided on by the Chief Constable, and can be appealed to the Regional State Prosecutor as the final instance according to section 101 (2) of the Administration of Justice Act.
Claims of compensation which arise out of criminal prosecution are considered in accordance with Chapter 93 of the Administration of Justice Act, and will be decided on by the Regional State Prosecutor, which decision can be appealed against to the Prosecutor General, which decisions again can be brought before the courts.
Finally, complaints of misfeasance outside criminal justice and claims of compensation related thereto concern decisions by police officers in cases other that criminal prosecution, including decisions of more practical nature, e.g. questions on access to toilet visits, conditions in cells and access to medical attentions regardless of whether criminal prosecution is involved. Such can be lodged with the Chief Constable, and pursuant to section 109 (1) of the Administration of Justice Act be appealed to the Ministry of Justice, which decisions can be brought before the courts.
The Administration of Justice Act, as far as relevant, reads as follows:
Section 101, subsection 2:
“The Regional State Prosecutors shall supervise the conduct of criminal trials by the Chief Constables and hear appeals of decisions made by Chief Constables on prosecution. Decisions by the Regional State Prosecutors cannot be appealed against to the Prosecutor General or to the Ministry of Justice... “
Section 109, subsection 1:
“The Minister of Justice is the chief superior of the police and exercises his powers through the National Commissioner of Police, the Commissioner of the Copenhagen Police and the Chief Constables”
“... Every person has a duty to disclose his name, address and date of birth to the police upon request. Failure to do so is punishable with a fine.”
1. “The police may arrest any person who is reasonably suspected of a criminal offence subject to public prosecution, if arrest must be deemed necessary to prevent further criminal offences, to secure the person’s presence for the time being or to prevent his association with others. ...
4. “No arrest may be made if, in the nature of the case or the circumstances in general, deprivation of liberty would be a disproportionate measure.”
Section 760, subsection 1:
“Any person who is arrested must be released as soon as the reason for the arrest no longer exists.”
Section 1018 a:
“1. Any person who has been arrested or held in custody as part of a criminal prosecution is entitled to compensation for the damage suffered thereby if the charges are withdrawn or the accused is acquitted ...
2. Even if the conditions for granting compensation under subsection 1 are not satisfied, compensation may be granted if the deprivation of liberty cannot be considered proportionate to the outcome of the prosecution, or if it is found unreasonable for other particular grounds.
3. The compensation may be reduced or refused, if the person charged has given rise to the measures himself.”
1. The applicant complains under Article 3 of the Convention that the treatment received during her detention was inhuman and degrading.
2. The applicant complains also that the detention from 9.30 p.m. on 11 August 1995 until 11.00 a.m. on 12 August 1995 was in breach of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention.
3. Furthermore the applicant complains that the length of the proceedings concerning her claim for compensation was in breach of the “reasonable time” requirement of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.
4. Finally, the applicant complains that there has been an interference with her right to respect for her private life within the meaning of Article 8 of the Convention, since the Chief Constable in an attempt to talk the incident over with her sent a police officer to her home twice.
1. The applicant complains that she was subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment amounting to a violation of Article 3 of the Convention, which reads as follows:
“No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”
The Government submit that the applicant did not exhaust domestic remedies as she failed to appeal to the Ministry of Justice pursuant to section 109 of the Administration of Justice Act against the part of the Chief Constable’s decision of 18 July 1996 which concerned her complaints of treatment while detained. Moreover, the Government recall that the applicant did not bring this part of the complaint before the courts.
Whilst leaving aside the question of exhaustion of domestic remedies the applicant maintains that during the detention she called the guards several times through the intercommunication system as she needed her medicine, a doctor and a visit to the toilet, but in vain. One guard looked through the window in the door to the cell, but just left again. In addition, she alleges being ridiculed by the police officers on duty.
The Court recalls that the purpose of Article 35 § 1, which sets out the rule on exhaustion of domestic remedies, is to afford the Contracting States the opportunity of preventing or putting right the violations alleged against them before those allegations are submitted to the Court see, inter alia, Selmouni v. France [GC], no. 25803/94, § 74, ECHR 1999-V. The rule in Article 35 § 1 is based on the assumption, reflected in Article 13 with which it has a close affinity, that there is an effective domestic remedy available in respect of the alleged breach of an individual’s Convention rights.
In the present case the Court is satisfied that section 109 of the Administration of Justice Act provides a remedy, whereby the applicant could have appealed against the part of the Chief Constable’s decision of 18 July 1996 which concerned the treatment she received while deprived of her liberty, and that the applicant was advised thereon in the Chief Constable’s letter of the same date, but failed to avail herself of this opportunity. Neither was the complaint brought before the ordinary courts.
It follows that this part of the application is inadmissible for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies within the meaning of Article 35 § 1 of the Convention and must be rejected pursuant to Article 35 § 4.
2. The applicant complains that the detention from 9.30 p.m. on 11 August 1995 until 11.00 a.m. on 12 August 1995 was in breach of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention, which reads as follows:
“1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law:
(a) the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a competent court;
(b) the lawful arrest or detention of a person for non- compliance with the lawful order of a court or in order to secure the fulfilment of any obligation prescribed by law;
(c) the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so;
(d) the detention of a minor by lawful order for the purpose of educational supervision or his lawful detention for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority;
(e) the lawful detention of persons for the prevention of the spreading of infectious diseases, of persons of unsound mind, alcoholics or drug addicts or vagrants;
(f) the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an unauthorised entry into the country or of a person against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation or extradition.
The Government maintain that the applicant’s detention was ordered in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law and that it was covered by Article 5 § 1 (b). They submit that the detention was imposed in accordance with section 755, subsection 1 cf. section 750 of the Administration of Justice Act, since the applicant refused to disclose her personal data, which is a specific and concrete obligation. Referring to the High Court judgment of 11 February 1999, the Government point out that the applicant was not in possession of documents that could have disclosed such data. Since the police had no other possibility of procuring the information, detention was the only suitable means of enforcing the duty of disclosure. Moreover, the applicant was released promptly when she disclosed her personal data. In the Government’s opinion the principle of proportionality of section 755, subsection 4 of the Administration of Justice Act was fulfilled.
The applicant disagrees with the Government and maintains furthermore that among her belongings was a letter from the Municipalities disclosing her name and address. As to the submission by the Chief Constable in his letter of 14 September 1995 describing her as hysterical, she admits having yelled, which however was natural since she had to communicate through a closed cell door.
The Court considers, in the light of the parties’ submissions, that the complaint raises serious issues of fact and law under the Convention, the determination of which should depend on an examination of the merits.
The Court concludes therefore that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. No other ground for declaring it inadmissible has been established.
3. The applicant complains that the length of the proceedings concerning her claim for compensation exceeded the “reasonable time” requirement of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which as far as relevant, reads as follows:
“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal...”
As regards the period to take into consideration it appears to be common ground that it commenced on 16 August 1995, when the applicant made her first complaint to the Chief Constable concerning the detention and the treatment she was subjected to while in police custody, and ended on 25 May 1999 when the Leave to Appeal Board refused the applicant leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. The Court shares this view. Accordingly, the proceedings lasted three years, nine months and nine days.
From a general point of view the reasonableness of the length of the proceedings must be assessed with reference to the complexity of the case, the conduct of the applicant and that of the authorities before which the case was brought (cf. Pélissier and Sassi v. France [GC], no. 25444/94, ECHR 1999-II, § 67).
The Government submit that the case was not of such nature that special or exceptional diligence was demanded, but diligence was required and also complied with. As to the complexity of the case and the conduct of the applicant the Government find that the case gave rise to practical procedural problems, because the applicant several times contacted the superior authority before the subordinate instance had made a decision in the case.
The applicant maintains that the length of the procedure exceeded the reasonable time requirement and she notes especially that a period of inactivity appeared when her case was dealt with by the Prosecutor General.
As regards the complexity of the case the Court considers that whereas the rules regulating the complaints about the police appears to be rather complex the applicant’s complaints did not make the proceedings particularly difficult.
As to the applicant’s conduct it is true that she contacted a superior authority before the subordinate authority had made a decision in the case, and that this to some extent prolonged the proceedings. Nevertheless, recalling the rather complex rules regulating complaints about the police, the Court finds that the applicant’s conduct cannot be considered unreasonable or be held decisively against her.
As regards the conduct of the authorities and the courts, the Court recalls that on 16 August 1995 the applicant complained to the Chief Constable of Aarhus, who on 14 September 1995 provided his comments on the course of the events. Subsequently, the Chief Constable made attempts to discuss the matter with the applicant. On 12 October 1995 the applicant complained to the Local Board of Complaints, which due to the amendment of the law regarding complaints of police conduct as from 1 January 1996 never considered the case or decided whether to treat the case as a complaint of police conduct or as a complaint of misfeasance. It appears that the Board informed the applicant of the change of authority on 18 January 1996. The Court notes that the present complaint solely concerns the length of the proceedings regarding the determination of the applicant’s claim for compensation arising out of criminal prosecution, which from 1 January 1996 in accordance with Chapter 93 of the Administration of Justice Act were to be decided by the Regional State Prosecutor, whose decision could be appealed against to the Prosecutor General, whose decision again could be brought before the courts. The applicant’s claim for compensation was emphasised in her letter of 14 June 1996 to the Regional State Prosecutor in Viborg, who requested the files and an opinion from the Chief Constable. On 16 July 1996 the case was remitted to the Chief Constable, who decided on the matter on 18 July 1996. The applicant complained against this decision on 31 July 1996 to the Regional State Prosecutor who was then to decide, as the first authority, upon the claim for compensation and, as the final appeal authority, upon the complaint of misfeasance within criminal justice. However, before receiving a decision, the applicant complained to the Prosecutor General on 29 October 1996. Having received the files and realised that the applicant’s claim for compensation had not yet been decided by the Regional State Prosecutor, on 30 January 1997 the Prosecutor General remitted the case to Regional State Prosecutor, who pronounced his decision on 6 February 1997. The applicant’s appeal was decided by the Prosecutor General on 25 November 1997. Thus, the prerequisite proceedings lasted 2 years, 3 months and 9 days.
Such a period may at first sight appear rather lengthy. However, the Court takes into account that both the law on complaints of police conduct and the law on claims for compensation arising out of criminal prosecution was amended as from 1 January 1996, which unavoidably entailed some practical problems in the period of transition. Furthermore, the Court notes that the applicant’s complaint of 16 August 1995 did not specifically entail a claim for compensation and that apparently this question was not raised until she submitted her letter of 14 June 1996 to the Regional State Prosecutor. Finally, the Court recalls that on 29 October 1996 the applicant contacted the Prosecutor General before the Regional State Prosecutor had made his decision in the case, which prolonged the proceedings until 30 January 1997.
In these circumstances, the Court considers that the authorities in the prerequisite proceedings did not act inappropriately and did not fail to conclude their duties with due diligence.
It appears that shortly after 25 November 1997 the applicant brought her claim before the courts. The City Court pronounced judgment on 25 September 1998 and the High Court pronounced judgment on 11 February 1999. Leave to appeal to the Supreme Court was refused by the Leave to Appeal Board on 25 May 1999. Accordingly, the proceedings before two court instances and the Leave to Appeal Board lasted approximately 1½ year which does not disclose to the Court any unacceptable period of inactivity which could bring the proceedings at variance with Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.
Therefore, making an overall assessment of the conduct of all concerned as well as the length of the proceedings the latter did not, in the Court’s view, go beyond what may be considered reasonable in the particular circumstances of the case. The applicant’s complaint does not therefore, disclose any appearance of a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.
It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention and must be rejected pursuant to Article 35 § 4.
4. The applicant complains that twice a police officer came to her home unexpected and uninvited, thus infringing Article 8 of the Convention, which reads as follows:
“1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”
The Government emphasise that the visit on 26 January 1996 was brought about due to the concerned call from the anonymous person, and that the purpose of the visit on 12 April 1996 only was to reach a friendly settlement. Moreover, the applicant did not object to these visits at the relevant time, actually she only mentioned these in her letter of 17 January 1997 to the Prosecutor General.
In so far as the applicant’s complaint under this Article also concerns the detention the Government submit that it was relatively brief and did not constitute any infringement of family and private life, or of the applicant’s physical integrity.
The applicant disagrees with the Government and alleges that the purpose of the police officer’s visits both on 26 January 1996 and on 12 April 1996 was solely to persuade her to drop the case, which in the applicant’s opinion, supports her claim that her detention was a disproportionate measure.
Leaving aside the questions whether the applicant has exhausted domestic remedies and complied with the 6 months time-limit within the meaning of Article 35 § 1 of the Convention, the Court considers, on the evidence before it, that it has not been established that there has been any interference in the applicant’s right to respect for her private or family life, her home or her correspondence within the meaning of Article 8 of the Convention.
It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 1 of the Convention and must be rejected pursuant to Article 35 § 4.
For these reasons, the Court unanimously
Declares admissible, without prejudging the merits, the applicant’s complaint that the detention from 9.30 p.m. on 11 August 1995 until 11.00 a.m. on 12 August 1995 was in breach of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention.
Declares inadmissible the remainder of the application.
Erik Fribergh Christos Rozakis
VASILEVA v. Denmark DECISION
VASILEVA v. Denmark DECISION