THE FACTS

The facts of the case may be summarised as follows:

A.1. General Background

The applicant is an Austrian citizen born in 1914 and resident in
Vienna. He has lodged with the Commission a previous application (No.
4517/70) (See Collection of Decisions, Vol. No. 38, pp. 90 and 99)
relating to criminal proceedings against him. These proceedings
concerned a number of charges brought in 1959 against the applicant and
several other persons, for having defrauded the exchequer by
fraudulently obtaining reimbursement of turnover tax to the extent of
several million schillings. The indictment was filed with the Regional
Criminal Court in Vienna on 17 March 1964. It contained altogether ten
charges against the applicant who was accused of
a) fraud by improperly obtaining turnover tax refunds for the sham
   export of various goods (points I/6, I/7, I/8a, I/8b and I/9 of the
   indictment);
b) attempted fraud, by attempting improperly to obtain turnover tax
   refunds for the sham export of various goods (points II/1, II/2a,
   II/2b and II/3 of the indictment);
c) attempt to aid and abet defamation (Article 9 and 209 StG) (point
   V of the indictment).

2. Proceedings on two further charges which were not included in the
indictment but were the subject matter of investigations were
discontinued in August and September 1964; viz a) the charge of having
been an accomplice in an offence of misuse of official powers within
the meaning of Articles 5 and 101 of the Criminal Code and b) the
charge of having made defamatory remarks about a lawyer and the
Vice-Chancellor of Austria.

On 16 September 1964, the Vienna Court decided, upon an application by
the Public Prosecutor's Office to discontinue, in accordance with
Article 109 StPO, the proceedings against the applicant as regards the
first-mentioned charges. The discontinuance was made subject to the
reservation of the Public Prosecutor's Office under Article 34 (2) of
the Code of Criminal Procedure to prosecute at a later date. The two
accused in this case, Fuchshuber and Rafael, were later acquitted for
lack of evidence against them. The second charge was similarly
discontinued on 28 September 1964 in accordance with Articles 34 (2)
and 363 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

3. The main trial against the applicant started before the Vienna Court
in November 1964 but the proceedings were adjourned in June 1965 and
the case was referred back to the Investigating Judge. On 8 March 1966
the Regional Criminal Court of Vienna decided that the proceedings
against the applicant for fraud and attempted fraud as set out under
points I/6, II/1, 2a, 2b and 3 of the indictment should be
provisionally discontinued in accordance with Articles 109 and 34 (2)
of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The charge under point V of the
indictment was made the subject of separate proceedings. On 26 April
1967 the applicant and his co-accused were acquitted from this charge
for lack of evidence against them. As regards the applicant this
judgment became final.

4. The trial concerning the remaining charges (see points I/7, I/8a and
b and I/9 of the indictment) opened on 4 December 1967 and continued
until 2 July 1968. However, on 10 June 1968, at the Public Prosecutor's
request, the charges set out under points I/8b and I/9 of the
indictment were severed from the remainder.

5. On 2 July 1968, the Regional Criminal Court also severed the charge
under point I/8a and convicted the applicant of fraud with regard to
the improper obtaining of turnover tax refunds for the sham export of
running gears, as set out under point I/7 of the indictment of 17 March
1964. He was sentenced to three years' severe imprisonment. The written
judgment comprising 80 pages, the applicant first criticised generally
the terms of the judgment and the manner in which it had been drafted,
as well as the fact that, under the relevant provision of the Austrian
Code of Criminal Procedure, he had only had two weeks to submit his
plea whereas it had taken the Court more than eight months to prepare
the judgment. In this connection the applicant also invoked Article 6
(3) (b) of the Convention.

The applicant then stated his grounds of nullity and, first, relied on
Article 281 (1) Nos. 3 and 4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure alleging
that the Court should not have taken certain evidence under oath. He
next challenged the Court's findings of fact invoking Article 281 (1),
No. 5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure pointing to many passages in
the judgment where the Court's findings, in his opinion, were either
unclear or incomplete, or contradictory in themselves, or based on
insufficient reasoning, or contrary to the contents of the case-file.

Finally, relying on Article 281 (1), No. 4 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure and Article 6 (2) and (3) (b), (c) and (d) of the Convention,
the applicant criticised the Court's refusal to hear certain evidence
offered by him. He further alleged that this inter alia deprived him
of his right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty.

On 16 June 1971 the Supreme Court rejected the plea of nullity insofar
as the applicant had alleged violations of procedural law, and, on 4
November 1971 it rejected the appeal and the plea of nullity concerning
the alleged violations of substantive law.

6. The Commission considered the admissibility of the previous
application (No. 4517/70) on 19 December 1970. At that time the
applicant's appeal and plea of nullity to the Supreme Court were still
pending. By partial decision, it rejected all the applicant's
complaints except that under Article 6 (1) of the Convention, relating
to the length of the criminal proceedings. In particular, it found that
with regard to the complaints concerning the alleged deprival of his
right to a fair hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal in
accordance with Article 6 (6.1, 6.2, 6.3, b, c, d) of the Convention,
an alleged breach of his right to respect for private and family life
and his correspondence, or an alleged inhuman treatment, domestic
remedies had not been exhausted (Article 27 (3), of the Convention).
 On 14 July 1971, the Commission declared admissible the applicant's
only remaining complaint, namely that Article 6 (1) of the Convention
had been violated by reason of the length of the criminal proceedings
against him.

7. After unsuccessful attempts to reach a friendly settlement, the
Commission adopted its report (Article 31) on 8 February 1973.

B.   Complaints included in the present application

In the present application, the applicant again submits complaints
relating to the above proceedings.

1. The applicant complains once more of the length of the criminal
proceedings instituted against him. Referring to the statement made on
14 July 1971 at the hearing on admissibility by the representative of
the Austrian Government (1), the applicant alleges that the authorities
have failed to discontinue certain proceedings with regard to which
preliminary investigations had been opened against him.
--------------------------------
(1) "I should inform the Commission that in respect of all the offenses
involving the applicant in which severance occurred the Public
Prosecutor's Office intends to discontinue (...) all further legal
proceedings against the applicant when the proceedings now pending in
the Supreme Court are concluded and its decision becomes final. I have
been authorised by the Public Prosecutor's Office to make this
announcement here."
--------------------------------
1.1  The applicant stresses that he had originally been charged in the
indictment on ten counts. He was later (2 July 1968) convicted on one
charge of fraud (point I/7 of the indictment) and (26 April 1967)
acquitted on another point (point V). The proceedings against him on
charges of fraud as set under points I/8a, I/8b and I/9 have been
formally discontinued on 26 May 1972 by decision of the Regional Court.
The applicant indicates however that the prosecution on charges of
fraud and attempted fraud as set out under points I/6, II/1, 2a , 2b
and 3 of the indictment, have only been provisionally discontinued on
8 March 1966 in accordance with Article 109 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, subject to a reservation of the Public Prosecutor's Office
under Article 34 (2) of the same Code to prosecute at a later date (see
A.3 above). The applicant submits that prosecution could be reopened
at any time on these charges, since the proceedings have not been
formally discontinued.

1.2  The applicant also complains that the proceedings have not been
expressly terminated with regard to the separate charge brought against
him of having been an accomplice in an offence of misuse of official
powers. As stated above (see A.2.) the prosecution against him had only
been provisionally discontinued (Article 109 and 34 (2) of the Code of
Criminal Procedure). The applicant submits in this respect that his
situation is not affected by the fact that his co-accused and, in
particular, the civil servant Fuchshuber, had been acquitted on this
charge of misuse of official powers by judgment of the Regional Court
on 26 April 1967.

1.3  The applicant finally complains that, as a result and evidence
of these pending proceedings, he is still subject to travel
restrictions and his sister would still be bound, as a surety, by a
recognisance she entered into in 1965, to pay 50,000 schillings in the
event that the applicant, released on bail, would fail to appear in
court. By decision of the Regional Court of 4 July 1968, the applicant
has been given complete freedom to travel in Austria and abroad,
provided that he would report to the judge when summoned within 8 days
if in Austria, 30 days abroad.

The applicant indicated that on 23 June 1972 he orally asked Judge
Koubek to be freed from these restrictions (bail and travel
restrictions) but that the judge rejected this.

2. The applicant again submits various complaints under Article 6,
which had been rejected by the Commission on 19 December 1970 for
non-exhaustion of domestic remedies.

2.1  The Vienna Regional Criminal Court has not been an independent
and impartial tribunal (Article 6 (1)) of the Convention for the
following reasons:

2.1.1 Under Article 170 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Court
should not have taken certain evidence under oath, especially from
persons the applicant had requested to be prosecuted for having
allegedly committed "investigation crimes" and misuse of official
powers.

2.1.2 In many passages, the Court's findings are either unclear or
incomplete, or contradictory in themselves, or based on insufficient
reasoning, or contrary to the contents of the case-file.

2.2.1 The Regional Court has violated the principle of presumption of
innocence (Article 6 (2) of the Convention) when stating in its
reasoning that the applicant was not reliable (glaubwürdig). He submits
that the Court has considered his guilt as a "thesis" and rejected all
counter-submissions ("antitheses").

2.2.2 Furthermore, the applicant complains that his guilt was not only
presumed but alleged in the various warrants of arrest, letters
rogatory, and statements made before by Austrian officials in
Switzerland and the Federal Republic of Germany. These documents
contained false information designed for the misleading of the foreign
authorities. In this respect, he specially refers to the warrant of
arrest in view of the extradition issued on 21 February 1961 which
reads, inter alia:  ".... in order to avoid an examination by the
fiscal authorities, the various co-accused decided to bribe the
accountant of the Tax Office. This bribery has been successful ...".
The applicant submits that his guilt was put forward in a very
affirmative way, although proceedings on this charge were lasted
discontinued.

2.3  The Regional Court has refused to hear certain evidence offered
by the applicant who alleges a violation of Article 6, paragraph (3)
(d) in this respect. On 17 and 18 June 1968, being the 78th and 79th
day of the trial, counsel for the applicant's defence made substantial
application for the taking of further evidence in connection with the
only remaining charges at that time, namely those under points I/7 and
I/8a of the indictment. However, on 2 July 1968 the Court also severed
the charge under point I/8a, rejected the 34 applications to take
evidence as being irrelevant, and convicted the applicant of fraud with
regard to the remaining point (I/7) of the indictment.

The applicant complained of this Court's refusal to hear further
evidence, in the introductory part of his plea of nullity. He referred
to Article 281, paragraph 4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

After the Regional Court, the Supreme Court repeated that the
obligation to hear evidence was in no way unlimited and that a Court
may refuse to summon witnesses whose statements could not be of any
relevance in the case. The Supreme Court shared the views of the
Regional Court in finding that the application for the taking of
further evidence was dilatory.

2.4  The applicant complains that he did not "have adequate time and
facilities to prepare his defence" and alleges a violation of Article
6 (3) (b) of the Convention. He points out that under the relevant
provision of Austrian law (Article 285 StPO) he had only two weeks to
submit his plea of nullity whereas it had taken the Court more than
eight months to prepare the judgment comprising 367 pages and based on
30 volumes of evidence.

He adds that his lawyer was prevented from examining all necessary
documents at the same time in order to compare them. He submits that
his lawyer should have been given opportunities to make himself
acquainted with the reasoning of the Regional Court before the judgment
was served.

The applicant raised this complaint in his plea of nullity, alleging
a breach of Article 6 (3) (b) of the Convention. The Supreme Court
rejected it as follows:

Article 6, paragraph 3 (b) is not a "self-executing provision". The 14
days' period running from the service of the judgment is a preclusion
period; the courts are not competent to prorogate it in any way. The
law does not provide a right to enquire into the Court's reasoning
before the service of the judgment.

3. The applicant heavily criticises the judgment of the Supreme Court.
He submits that this Court does not constitute an independent and
impartial tribunal, since it appears to be bound by the Attorney
General's (Generalprokurator) submissions. In this respect the
applicant stresses that on 5 May 1971, when drafting his submissions
concerning the applicant's appeal and plea of nullity based on alleged
violations of substantive law, the Attorney General mentioned that the
plea of nullity had "already been rejected on..." insofar as violation
of the procedural law was at issue. The application points out that the
Supreme Court rejected his plea of nullity based on alleged violations
of procedural law only on 16 June 1971. He therefore comes to the
conclusion that the Supreme Court is bound by the Attorney General's
instructions"  since he knows in advance which judgment the court will
pronounce.

The applicant alleges a violation of Article 6 (1) of the Convention
in this respect.

4. The applicant complains that his right for private and family life
and his correspondence has been violated by reason of the fact that,
during his detention on remand, the Investigating Judge had
communicated the contents of his correspondence to his co-accused and
thus caused him damage. The applicant alleges in this respect
violations of Article 8 (1).

5. The applicant complains under Article 3 of the length of the
proceedings, of the partiality of the judges, of the prosecuting
authorities' refusal to institute criminal proceedings against a judge
and governmental official.

6. The applicant finally complains under Article 13 that he had no
effective remedy against violations committed by the judges of the
Vienna Regional Criminal Court. An appeal to the Supreme Court could
not have been such remedy, since this tribunal appears to be bound by
the Public Prosecutor's conclusions.

THE LAW

1. The applicant again complains of the length of criminal proceedings
instituted against him.

He submits that he is still subject to criminal prosecution because the
authorities and courts had failed to discontinue certain proceedings
with regard to which preliminary investigations had been opened against
him, but no decision had been taken at a later stage.

a) It is indeed true that proceedings against the applicant on various
charges of fraud and attempted fraud (points I/6, 1, 2a, 2b and 3 in
the indictment of 17 March 1964) had only been provisionally
discontinued on 8 March 1966, subject to a reservation by the Public
Prosecutor's Office to prosecute at a later date (case number 6 bvr
573/62). Further prosecution on all such charges have, however, been
barred by operation of Article 363 (1) Section 3 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, three months after the final decision of the
Supreme Court on 4 November 1971.

b) Proceedings against the applicant on the charge of having been an
accomplice in an offence of misuse of official powers had likewise been
provisionally discontinued on 16 September 1964 (case number 26 DVR
2287/64). According to a letter from the Public Prosecutor to the
Regional Court, dated 17 October 1972, further proceedings on this
charge have also been discontinued by operation of Article 363 (1)
Section 3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

c) With regard to the so-called "travel restrictions", the applicant
who is very often abroad, failed to show that the last court's decision
in this respect - that of 4 July 1968 - is still valid. In particular,
his alleged talk with Judge Koubek on 23 June 1972 took place prior to
the Public Prosecutor's letter of 17 October 1972 in which it was
stated that further proceedings against the applicant in the above
charges (case numbers 6 bVR 5730/62 and dVR 2287/64) had been
discontinued.

d) With regard to the surety by his sister to an amount of 50,000
schillings for his not absconding, Article 195, paragraph 2 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure provides that the surety's recognisance expires
as soon as the criminal proceedings are closed by a final decision or
a decision to discontinue criminal prosecution.

The applicant failed to indicate that, in contravention of this
provision, the surety's undertaking had not expired.

The Commission concludes that the applicant's situation is not
adversely affected as no criminal charges are pending against him since
4 November 1971, when the Supreme Court confirmed his conviction and
sentence.

On this point the application thus contains no relevant new element and
is therefore essentially the same as a previous application (No.
4517/70) within the meaning of Article 27 paragraph (1) (b)
(Art. 27-1-b), of the Convention.

2. The applicant first complains that the Court refused to hear certain
evidence offered by him.

a) According to the Commission's constant jurisprudence, Article 6 (3)
(d) (Art. 6-3-d) of the Convention is intended to place the accused on
an equal footing with the prosecutor as regards the hearing of
witnesses but not to give him a right to call witnesses without
restriction.

The competent judicial authorities accordingly remain free, provided
that they comply with the provisions of the Convention, to establish
whether the hearing of witnesses can contribute to the finding of the
truth and, if not, to decide against calling such witnesses.

In the present case the Regional Court, in refusing to hear the
witnesses and experts in question, and the Supreme Court in confirming
this decision, found that some evidence proposed did not concern the
facts of the case, some had already been heard, some referred to counts
of the indictment which had already been separated, some was "hearsay"
evidence and some concentrated on facts which, even if proved true,
would not establish the applicant's innocence. Most of this evidence,
at any rate, could, and should, have been proposed in the course of the
proceedings two or three years earlier.

The Commission recalls that extensive measures had been taken at an
earlier stage of the proceedings in order to summon and hear witnesses
proposed by the applicant both in Austria and abroad.

It notes that the Court made a very detailed analysis of the
applicant's proposals for new evidence and is satisfied with the above
reasons put forward by the judge when refusing to hear this new
evidence. The Commission therefore finds that the applicant's complaint
under Article 6 (3) (d) (Art. 6-3-d) is manifestly ill-founded under
Article 27 paragraph (2) (Art. 27-2), of the Convention.

b) The applicant complains that Article 6 (2) (Art. 6-2) of the
Convention has been violated two different ways, in the course of the
preliminary investigations and before the Regional Court:

(i) in that the warrants of arrest against him presented the charges
as if they were proved.

In this respect, according to the Commission's previous findings (see
report of the Commission in application No. 788/63, Austria against
Italy, Vol. VI, p. 782), Article 6, paragraph 2 (Art. 6-2) is primarily
concerned with the spirit in which the judges carry out their task. It
may be asked however whether the authorities' behaviour, during the
preliminary investigations could not, in certain circumstances, amount
to a violation of this provision, namely if the Court subsequently
accept as conclusive evidence, without further evaluation, any
admission unlawfully obtained.

The problem does not arise in this case; even if one could sustain that
various warrants of arrest did present the charges as if they were
proved, this does not affect the applicant's position before the
courts, since proceedings on these charges were discontinued or
culminated in his acquittal.

This complaint is therefore manifestly ill-founded under Article 27
paragraph (2) (Art. 27-2), of the Convention.

(ii) in that the Regional Court stated in its reasoning that he was
not reliable.

Article 6 (2) (Art. 6-2) of the Convention requires basically that
court judges in fulfilling their duties should not start with the
assumption that the accused committed the act with which he is charged.
A careful examination of the Regional Court's decision does not
disclose any violation of this principle. In particular, the fact that
the Court did not follow the applicant's submissions, after having
found that they were in contradiction with statements made by both the
fiscal authorities and co-accused, does not as such indicate any
appearance of a violation of the principle of presumption of innocence.

This complaint is also manifestly ill-founded under Article 27,
paragraph (2) (Art. 27-2), of the Convention.

c) The applicant complains that he has not been given adequate time and
facilities to prepare his defence, and that this constituted a
violation of Article 6 (3) (b) (Art. 6-3-b) of the Convention.

In accordance with Article 285 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the
applicant had to submit the full text of his plea of nullity within
fourteen days after service of the judgment.

This period is under Austrian law a time-limit which cannot be extended
by courts. Moreover, the plea of nullity must comprise the detailed
grounds underlying the motions for revision; no other ground, no
substantial information would be taken into consideration by the court
after that period has elapsed (see O.G.H. 11.9.64, OZ 165 Evidenzblatt
121).

The task of the Commission is to find whether this period did
constitute an "adequate time" according to the kind of proceedings
involved and the facts of the particular case.

The time necessary to prepare a defence must indeed be estimated on a
different basis at the various stages of the proceedings. When lodging
an appeal or a plea of nullity, a defendant is already familiar with
the contents of the file, and in particular the nature of the charges
and the evidence on which they rely. It must be stressed, in this
respect, that the lawyer who had represented Huber before the Regional
Court, drafted the plea of nullity.

The facts of the case were obviously complex since they included
export-import transactions through middlemen, transfer of foreign
currencies through various banking channels in order to maintain the
appearance of genuine business transactions and so on. All these
aspects of the facts had however been examined at length in the course
of the trial which has lasted for some 90 days.

Turning to the applicant's plea of nullity the Commission notes that
it contained 80 pages of well-argued detailed material. The basic
ground of nullity invoked was that the court's findings were unclear,
contradictory in themselves, based on insufficient reasoning, or
contrary to the contents of the case-file. In support of this
allegation the applicant made altogether 173 detailed comments
concerning the 150 pages of the judgment in his case.

The Commission considers that the 14 days time-limit is rather short,
particularly as it cannot be extended and no submissions are admissible
after it has passed.

The Commission comes, however, to the conclusion that, even if Article
285 of the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure could in some
circumstances raise a problem under Article 6 (3) (b) (Art. 6-3-b), a
careful examination of the circumstances of this case does not disclose
any appearance of a violation of the Convention.

This complaint is thus manifestly ill-founded under Article 27,
paragraph (2) (Art. 27-2), of the Convention.

d) The applicant also challenges the Court's findings and reasoning.

With regard to the judicial decisions of which the applicant complains,
the Commission recalls that, in accordance with Article 19 (Art. 19)
of the Convention, its only task is to ensure the observance of the
obligations undertaken by the Parties in the Convention. In particular,
it is not competent to deal with an application alleging that errors
of law or fact have been committed by domestic courts, except where it
considers that such errors might have involved a possible violation of
any of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention. The
Commission refers, on this point, to its constant jurisprudence (see
e.g. decisions on the admissibility of applications No. 458/59,
Yearbook, Vol. 3, pp. 222, 236 and No. 1140/61, Collection of
Decisions, Vol. 8, pp. 57, 62).

It is true that in this case the applicant also complains that he was
not given all the procedural guarantees of an accused before the Court.
In this connection he alleges a violation of Article 6 (2), 3 (b) and
(d) (Art. 6-2, 6-3-b, 6-3-d) of the Convention.

However, as explained above, the Commission has found that there is no
appearance of a violation of these provisions in the proceedings
complained of.

It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded
within the meaning of Article 27, paragraph (2) (Art. 27-2), of the
Convention.

e) The same ground of inadmissibility applies to his further submission
that the Court did not correctly apply Article 170 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure in that it had certain evidence under oath.

3. The applicant alleges that the Supreme Court was bound by the
Attorney General's "instructions" and this did not constitute an
independent and impartial tribunal within the meaning of Article 6 (1)
(Art. 6-1) of the Convention. He points out that, on 5 May 1971, when
drafting his submissions concerning the applicant's substantial" plea
of nullity, the Attorney General mentioned that the "formal" plea of
nullity had already been rejected. A blank space was left for the date
of this decision which, in fact, was only given on 16 June 1971.

The Commission has previously studied the position and functions of the
Attorney General under Austrian law, in particular in proceedings on
a plea of nullity alleging violations of procedural law (Applications
Nos. 524/59 and 617/59, Ofner and Hopfinger against Austria). It might
be generally recalled that, although the Attorney General belongs to
the prosecuting authorities, his functions are different from those of
a public prosecutor. "His task is in a more objective way to ensure
respect of the law in criminal proceedings and he does not, like a
prosecutor, have the additional task to see that reasonably suspected
persons are convicted and adequately punished" (Report of the
Commission in the case of Ofner and Hopfinger v. Austria , p. 79). In
respect of cases where such a plea of nullity has been raised by the
accused, "the Attorney General is not a party to the proceedings, but
is required to examine the plea of nullity independently of the Judge
Rapporteur" (ibid. p. 80) in the interest of the law. Therefore, the
case-file, generally including a draft decision by the Judge Rapporteur
is submitted to the Attorney General for his observations. If he
expresses his agreement with the report the Supreme Court usually
adopts the draft decision in a non-public sitting in the absence of
both the applicant and the Attorney General. If, on the other hand, he
disagrees with the report, to the disadvantage of the appealing party,
the plea of nullity must be examined by the Court in an oral hearing.

In this context, the facts of the present case are that the Attorney
General, having read the draft decision submitted by the Judge
Rapporteur, anticipated its adoption by the Supreme Court. This
circumstance is certainly not of itself even prima facie evidence that
the court sitting in private was subject to any discretion by the
Attorney General, and thus not an independent or impartial tribunal
within the meaning of Article 6 (1) (Art. 6-1) of the Convention.
Furthermore, a careful examination of the proceedings before the
Supreme Court, in the light of the above findings of the Commission,
does not disclose any appearance of a violation of Article 6 (1)
(Art. 6-1) as a whole.

It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded
within the meaning of Article 27, paragraph (2) (Art. 27-2), of the
Convention.

4. The applicant complains that, during his detention on remand, his
right to respect of his correspondence has been violated.

However, such complaint constitutes the same matter as was already
before the Commission in Application No. 4517/70. The applicant having
failed to introduce any new remedy in this respect, the present
application contains no relevant new information of this point and is
therefore essentially the same as a previous application within the
meaning of Article 27, paragraph (1) (b) (Art. 27-1-b).

5. The Commission has also examined the applicant's other complaints.

However, a careful examination of these complaints does not disclose
any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set out in the
Convention, in particular in its Articles 3 and 13 (Art. 3, 13).

It follows that this last part of the application is manifestly
ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27, paragraph (2)
(Art. 27-2), of the Convention.

For these reasons, the Commission DECLARES THIS APPLICATION
INADMISSIBLE